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Articles
The Race/Class Conundrum and the
Pursuit of Individualism in the Making
of Social Policy
by
JENNIFER M. RUSSELL*
Now I think there is a very good reason why the Negro in this country
has been treated for such a long time in such a cruel way, and some of
the reasons are economic and some of them are political... Some of
them are social, and these reasons are somewhat more important be-
cause they have to do with our social panic, with our fear of losing
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
B.A. 1981, City University of New York, Queens College; J.D. 1984, New York University
School of Law. Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) School of Law generously sup-
ported this project with several summer research grants. At a November 1990 faculty
workshop my most nascent ideas were presented to members of the CWRU law faculty,
whom I thank for their indulgence. I am especially grateful to Edward "Ted" Mearns who
engaged me in many helpful discussions, to Robert Strassfeld who steered me toward rele-
vant historical sources, to Peter Joy who knew how to read an unpenned manuscript, and
to Jonathan Entin who commented on the penned manuscript. I have been informed and
stimulated by conversations with my colleague Barbara Krasner of the CWRU philosophy
department. I owe a significant debt of gratitude to the students who enrolled in my Law
and Social and Economic Inequality seminars for challenging and commenting on my
presuppositions. Earlier drafts of this Article were presented at the Fourth Annual Mid-
western People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, the 1993 Annual Meeting of the
Law and Society Association, the March 1994 Western Law Teachers of Color Conference,
and the Sixth Annual Critical Race Theory Workshop. I have benefitted from the com-
ments of conference participants. I am especially indebted to Cheryl Harris, Kevin Brown,
Peter Kwan, Taunya Lovel Banks, Sean Scott and Lani Guinier. Thanks, also, to Angela
Harris and Jim May for their perceptive reading of the manuscript when it was near com-
pletion. Words cannot express my gratitude for the encouragement I received from John
Calmore who shepherded me through with careful reading and criticism of earlier drafts of
this work. Able research assistance was provided by CWRU law students Stewart Binke,
Emily Cherniack, Rhonda Smith, Markus Willoughby, James Dixon, and by University of
San Francisco law student Karolyn King. This work could not have been completed with-
out the support of my husband, Rudy Bedford, and the cooperation of our son, Matthew
Logan Bedford, who provided me with new insights into the meaning of productivity. Full
responsibility for the Article's content is, of course, my own.
[1353]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
status. This really amounts sometimes to a kind of social paranoia.
One cannot afford to lose status on this peculiar kind of ladder, for
the prevailing notion of American life seems to involve a kind of
rung-by-rung ascension to some hideously desirable state. If this is
one's concept of life, obviously one cannot afford to slip back one
rung. When one slips, one slips back not a rung but back into chaos
and no longer knows who he is. And this reason, this fear, suggests to
me one of the real reasons for the status of the Negro in this country.
In a way, the Negro tells us where the bottom is: because he is there,
and where he is, beneath us, we know where the limits are and how
far we must not fall. We must not fall beneath him. We must never
allow ourselves to fall that low ....
-James Baldwin'
The policy of the United States is to bring the Negro American to full
and equal sharing in the responsibilities and rewards of citizenship.
-The Moynihan Report2
I. Introduction: The Post-Civil-Rights Query
There was a time when the favorite question of contemporary
policymakers addressing the subordination of African-Americans 3
1. JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS My NAME 111-12 (1963) (emphasis omitted).
2. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NE-
GRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 48 (1965).
3. Throughout this Article I use "African-American" and "black" and "European-
American" and "white." As I use "African-American" and "European-American" they
are not mere synonyms for "black" and "white," respectively. For bearers of the designa-
tion "European-American," the idea of individual agency and importance yielded unparal-
leled personal freedoms, economic prosperity and political democracy, though these are far
from unquestionably triumphant. See RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA (1990) (demonstrating the emergence of a "European-
American" identity, an essential feature of which is a diffuse sense of connection to a his-
tory incorporating mythical accounts of immigration and socioeconomic mobility). Bear-
ers of the designation "African-American," on the other hand, are least associated with the
fulfilled promises of American individualism. See discussion in Parts III.B-C infra. The
relative disassociation between African-Americans and American individualism and the
ways it has delineated the nation's character are due to racialization, the lumping of Mand-
ingos, Mandes, Akans, Ibos and other African peoples into the category "black," and of
Europeans, who once identified themselves as "Christian, English and free" into the cate-
gory "white." See STANLEY LIEBERSON & MARY C. WATERS, FROM MANY STRANDS:
ETHNIC AND RACIAL GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1988).
Thus, I use "African-American" and "European-American" to underscore alienation
from or identification with American individualism. "Black" and "white" are used to sig-
nify the ascription of racial meanings to relationships, behavior, practices, policies and
other occurrences. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (1994).
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was whether race or class is the causal factor.4 That simple either-or5
approach to African-American subordination has run its course, giv-
ing way to the much more complex query: Whether African-Ameri-
can subordination is a race problem with a class component, or a class
problem with a race component? 6
The reformulated question arises in a post-civil-rights 7 America
4. See, e.g., The Black Plight Race or Class? A Debate Between Kenneth B. Clark
and Carl Gershman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 22; see also RAYMOrND S.
FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS xii (1991) ("Is the subordinate position of the
black population ultimately derived from the stigma of color, or is it due to the black
population's inferior class or economic position?").
5. See; e.g., Michiko Kakutani, Books That Make a Case for Shades of Gray, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1993, at Cl, C24 (discussing the tendency to see everything in terms of
"either-or, all-or-nothing, left-or-right," and thus obscuring the "emotional and political
nuances of the actual situation").
6. Detailing what Gunnar Myrdal has termed the "American dilemma," Roy L.
Brooks writes:
It is the problem of a people's painful vulnerability in a society that promises
comfort and equality. And it is a problem that poses a simple question: how can
African Americans be accorded genuine equal opportunity in American society?
Whereas political inequality was once seen as the key element of the prob-
lem, social and economic disparities have become the central questions today.
One can no longer talk meaningfully about the problems of African Ameri-
cans and the resolution of those problems without merging the question of race
(which triggers civil rights laws and policies) with that of class structure-it is not
an either-or proposition. The issue of race versus class, in other words, is a red
herring, a nonissue, in today's African American society.
Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM xxiii-xxv (1990).
7. The term "post-civil-rights" is problematic. Commonly, it evokes imagery of linear
progress from a time of racial ignorance to a time of racial enlightenment, with each period
demarcated by enactment of civil rights legislation. As such, the term threatens to obscure
continuities in status and power imbalances that exist along racial lines. Cf. Anne McClin-
tock, The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Post-Colonialism,' SoCIAL TEXT, Spring
1992, at 1 (voicing misgivings about post-colonial theory, much of which is organized
around a binary axis of time rather than power, and which, in its celebration of the pastness
of colonialism, runs the risk of obscuring the continuities and discontinuities of colonial
and imperial power).
I use the term "post-civil-rights" to mark a transition from a period of racial domina-
tion to one of racial hegemony. See HOWARD WNANT, RACIAL CONDMONS: POLITICS,
THEoRY, COMPARISONS 6 (1994) ("Racial attitudes, practices, representations, and institu-
tionalized inequalities were no doubt rendered more problematic by the civil rights
'revolution,' but they were hardly destroyed. What the civil rights movement accomplished
was to replace racial domination with racial hegemony .... "). Racial hegemony is the co-
optation-rather than repression, exclusion or silencing-of racial differences and conflicts
within the existing social order such that oppositional discourses and currents are deprived
of their critical content. Id. at 29, 113. For example, African-American demand for the
redistribution of wealth to redress the material consequences of racial discrimination has
been channeled into existing public debates over such issues as meritocracy. Rechanneled
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in which all outward indications signal a general discontent8 with so-
cial and civil rights gains accruing to African-Americans. These gains
came as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,10 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,"1 and the race-conscious
antidiscrimination policies popularly known as "affirmative action"
that are pursued to decrease racial segregation in housing, employ-
ment and education.'2
The question also arises in the midst of a renewed debate among
poverty scholars and experts on the determinants of black poverty.13
Together, the growing discontent with black civil rights advocacy and
the renewed debate on the determinants of black poverty have fueled
a white backlash 14 that opposes race-conscious social policies and ad-
along less explicitly racial lines, the demand for race-justified reparations, if you will, loses
its potential for social transformation.
8. See THOMAS BRYNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACION: THE IM-
PACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 116-136 (1992) (discussing
the achievements of the civil rights movement and a growing conservatism among whites
during the years 1964 through 1980).
9. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988);
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-h(6) (1988)); see also John J. Donohue III, Continuous
Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of
Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIrERATURE 1603 (1991) (discussing the relationship between federal
antidiscrimination policy and black economic progress).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973,
1973a-p, 1973aa-dd6 (1988)); see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Plan to Delve Anew Into Race
and Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, at Al (discussing recent United States
Supreme Court voting rights decision in Shaw v. Reno).
11. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3535,
3601-3619 (1988)).
12. For a primer on race-conscious affirmative action, its origins and objectives, see
generally GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION (1991).
13. See Parts IV.A-B infra.
14. In his last major work published before his recent death, social historian Christo-
pher Lasch observed that liberalism, which embodies myths of progress and limitless abun-
dance, has fallen on hard times, and that the explanation for this development is "white
backlash," a term encapsulating the "status anxiety" of white ethnics. He writes:
White ethnics have allegedly deserted the Democrats, their former benefactors,
because they are now prosperous enough to resent high taxes and welfare pro-
grams but still insecure in their middle-class status. Status anxiety reinforces their
racism and makes them irrationally jealous of the racial minorities currently fa-
vored by liberal policy. In 1980, the New York Times explained that liberalism
once meant "helping the Irish and Italian families who were still mired in the
lower working class" but that it now meant "helping poor blacks and other racial
minorities"-something the "more prosperous" beneficiaries of an earlier liber-
alism could not seem to understand. The "deepest issue" in the controversies
over busing and affirmative action, which had split the liberal coalition, was "ra-
cial." White ethnics simply could not see that dark-skinned people need the same
kind of help they themselves had received from the New Deal.
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vocates for class-conscious social policies.15
Advocates of class-conscious social policies propose income-
based school busing rather than race-based busing.' 6 They propose
that scholarship' 7 and fellowship' 8 programs reserved for members of
specific ethnic and racial groups be abandoned in favor of need-based
programs. They object to university admissions practices that rely on
race.' 9 They object to the practice of setting aside federal contracts
for firms owned by racial minorities.20 Their general tendency is to call
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRuE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITIcs 476-77
(1991).
A small but increasingly vocal group of black conservatives has also expressed dissatis-
faction with the traditional civil rights agenda. See Peter Applebome, Drive for Civil
Rights in U.S. Faces New Agendas, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 2, 1990, at B8 (discussing black con-
servatives' view that the traditional focus on racism and race-based remedies like affirma-
tive action, instead of a focus on economic and social change within the black community,
is not only out of date, but also harmful to black aspiration).
15. Though affirmative action is the social policy that concerns this Article, I do con-
sider extensively other social policies- namely welfare-because in current debates, af-
firmative action policies are linked with welfare policies. Roger Wilkins, for example,
writes:
Before the 1950s, whites who were busy denying that the nation was unfair to
blacks would simply assert that we didn't deserve equal treatment because we
were inferior. These days it is not permissible in most public circles to say that
blacks are inferior, but it is perfectly acceptable to target the behavior of blacks,
especially poor blacks. The argument then follows a fairly predictable line: The
behavior of poor blacks requires a severe rethinking of national social policy, it is
said. Advantaged blacks really don't need affirmative action anymore, and when
they are the objects of such programs, some qualified white person (unqualified
white people don't show up in these arguments) is (as [Senate majority leader
Bob] Dole might put it) "punished." While it is possible that color-blind affirma-
tive action programs benefiting all disadvantaged Americans are needed, those
(i.e. blacks) whose behavior is so distressing must be punished by restricting wel-
fare, shriveling the safety net and expanding the prison opportunity. All of that
would presumably give us, in William Bennett's words "what we want-a color-
blind society," for which the white American psyche is presumably fully prepared.
Roger Wilkins, Racism Has Its Privileges, THE NATION, Mar. 27, 1995, at 409, 414 (empha-
sis in original).
16. See William Celis, Income-Based School Busing Stirs Anger in Wisconsin, N.Y.
TimEs, July 16, 1992, at B10.
17. See Scott Jaschik, Supporters Say Threat to Minority Scholarships Outlasts the
Bush Years, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 1993, at A25.
18. See Michael K. Frisby, Some Agencies Stage Affirmative-Action Retreat While
White House Still Debates Its Battle Plan, WALL STREET J., Mar. 24, 1995, at A16 (report-
ing on the Justice Department's denial of a Commerce Department request for approval of
a fellowship program aimed at minority business students).
19. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Conservatives Forge New Strategy to Challenge Af-
firmative Action, N.Y. Tims, Feb. 16, 1995, at Al.
20. See Steven A. Holmes, Programs Based on Sex and Race Are Under Attack, N.Y.
TimS, Mar. 16, 1995, at Al (reporting that Senator Bob Dole urged Congress to repeal a
program run by the Small Business Administration that provides federal contracts to small
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for "broad-based" economic reform2' or to stress assistance programs
that benefit needy people regardless of race.22
The advocacy for class-conscious social policies is frequently but-
tressed with reminders that it is un-American to make decisions or
allocations on the basis of racial averages, preferences or groupings. 23
Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, for example, is reported to
have remarked:
You can't defend policies that are based on group preferences as
opposed to individual opportunities, which is what America has al-
ways been about .... When we have such policies, we have the ef-
fect of breaking some of those ties in civil society that have held us
together.... And those who are the victims of them and lose out
when choices are made based on group preferences as opposed to
individual ability naturally become disaffected from the process. 24
Senator Lieberman continued:
[T]his business of deciding by group, in a sense, is the flip side of the
argument that has flared up here in the last year about genetics, if
you will, and the argument that some make that some groups are
genetically less able than others .... That's an un-American argu-
ment.... And it's an un-American argument because it's based on
averages, not on individuals. And that's the same when we come to
group preferences and quotas. America's about individuals, not
about averages or groups. 25
Though much of the advocacy for class-conscious social policies
has been occurring in the legislative and executive arenas, it also has
been reflected in recent judicial decisions. 26 Most recently in Podber-
disadvantaged businesses owned by minorities or women; and that Senator Dole attacked
programs requiring federal contractors to develop plans to increase the hiring and promo-
tion of minorities and women); see also Paul M. Barrett, Federal Preferences for Minority
Firms Illustrate Affirmative-Action Dispute, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1995, at A16.
21. See Jason DeParle, How to Lift the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1992, at A8.
22. See Todd S. Purdum, Broad Group Visits President on Affirmative Action's Future,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al.
23. See Todd S. Purdum, Senator Deals Blow to Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1995, at A16.
24. Id.
25. Id. Senator Lieberman's statement about the genetic argument is a reference to
the controversy surrounding Charles Murray's and the late Richard Hernstein's The Bell
Curve, in which the authors attempt to link race, genes and intelligence in an argument
against race-conscious affirmative action. CHARLES MURRAY & RICHARD HERNSTEIN,
THE BELL CURVE (1994).
26. Judicial consideration of social policies not premised on race is, of course, not
entirely new. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a
city's minority business set aside program). Writing for four Justices, Justice O'Conner in
Croson indicated that the program at issue was unconstitutional because, inter alia, there
was no evidence that the city considered any race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 507. Justice
Scalia in dissent argued that "[a] state can, of course, act 'to undo the effects of past dis-
[Vol. 46
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esky v. Kirwan,27 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down as
unconstitutional a race-conscious remedial program under which only
African-American students were eligible for scholarships. The court
intimated that a scholarship program based on economic hardship
could have been sustained. 28 Further, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefa,29 the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of section 502 of
the Small Business Act, which requires federal agencies to set aside
contracts for small business concerns "owned and controlled by so-
cially and economically disadvantaged individuals. '30 Thereafter, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals's judg-
ment and remanded the case with instructions to apply a strict scrutiny
standard of review to any use of race-based presumptions in identify-
ing socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.31  The
Supreme Court apparently left undecided the issue of whether a
strictly class-conscious basis (absent any presumption with respect to
disadvantage based on race) for federal set aside programs would be
constitutional.3 2 These judicial considerations of class-conscious social
policies are important developments because policymakers must act
within the boundaries of the Constitution, as interpreted by the
judiciary.33
crimination' in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by race." I& at
526. Justice Scalia offered, for example, that "[s]ince blacks have been disproportionately
disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any race-neutral remedial program aimed at the
disadvantaged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks." Id. at
528.
27. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995); see also Barbara
Carton & Paul M. Barrett, High Court Declines to Review Ruling Striking Down Blacks-
Only Scholarship, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1995, at B16.
28. 38 F.3d at 161.
29. 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
30. Section 502 of the Small Business Act provides in pertinent part:
The President shall annually establish Government-wide goals for procurement
contracts awarded to small business concerns and small business concerns owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.
15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1) (1988).
31. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
32. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Cast Doubts on U.S. Programs That Give
Preferences Based on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at Al, A9 (reporting that numerous
issues were left unresolved, including "the fate of the preference program .... which pro-
vides a financial bonus to contractors on Federal highway programs who subcontract part
of the work to businesses owned by 'socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.'
The presumption under the law is that blacks and members of other minorities meet that
definition, although the presumption may be rebutted in individual cases and white con-
tractors may seek to qualify as 'disadvantaged."').
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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But should we constitutionalize "class-consciousness," and thus
enshrine it into doctrine? What does it mean to be "class-conscious"
in America? Does class-consciousness merely mean recognition of
differences in income and wealth, or does it recognize something
more? Would class-consciousness serve egalitarian principles? Would
class-consciousness move America closer to its idealized self-image as
a color-blind society?
This Article analyzes the advocacy for class-conscious policy ini-
tiatives within the context of recent debates over the contributing
roles of race and class to the subordination of African-Americans. 34
The analysis begins in Part II with a discussion of the components of
the Article's title, "the race/class conundrum" and "individualism,"
and their centrality to the formulation of social policy in a post-civil-
rights era.
The "race/class conundrum," discussed in Part II.A, is about so-
cial relationships and relationships of power. It is about the limits of
static cataloguing and ordering. And it is about rejecting the notion
that only one stable category-either race or class-matches up with
the realities of the post-civil-rights era. Martha Minow has empha-
sized the importance of a "social relations approach" that questions
the construction of certain social problems in either-or terms. She ar-
gues that a concern with the processes of assigning categories (that is,
34. I concentrate in this Article on African-American subordination as an act of "stra-
tegic essentialism." See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Es-
sences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 653 (1993). For reasons
of limited space, data, and bibliographic sources, as I use it, "strategic essentialism" in-
volves analysis of the effects of social policy on a selected racially defined minority group
(here, blacks). But in focusing on this selected group, I in no way intend to convey the
erroneous impression that the analysis is necessarily a black/white undertaking. See Eliza-
beth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, 20 Soc. JusT. 22 (1993).
The relationship between race and class as determinants of Asian-American and Latino/
Hispanic subordination is also a matter of open public debate. Today the complexity of the
race/class dynamic is such that even within groups comprising a racial category, economic
polarization, see, e.g., Sam Roberts, New York's Puerto Ricans Split in Economic Success,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at B3, engenders public discourse on the significance of race for
policy initiatives. The relative socioeconomic success of Japanese-Americans, for example,
is typically proffered as proof of Asian-American achievement unhindered by race and
unaided by race-conscious policy. But not all Asian-Americans have enjoyed socioeco-
nomic prosperity. See Ashley Dunn, Southeast Asians Highly Dependent on Welfare in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at Al (reporting that "more than 30 percent of all South-
east Asian households in the nation now depend on welfare for survival"); Al Kamen,
Myth of 'Model Minority' Haunts Asian Americans, WASH. POST, June 22, 1992, at Al
(reporting poverty rates for Vietnamese-Americans (33.5%), Cambodian-Americans
(46.9%), Hmong-Americans (65.5%) and Laotian-Americans (67.2%)).
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labeling), and with the relationships between categories, would resist
abstraction and demand context.35
My analysis of race and class issues in this Article is not unlike
Professor Minow's social relations approach. The analysis pays atten-
tion to a particular social-historical context shaped by the ideas of "in-
dividualism" and "race." Particular attention is paid to the ways these
ideas operate to categorize or label African-Americans and thus to
impose upon African-Americans a cultural identity that has dire pol-
icy consequences. In other words, the analysis focuses on the social
meaning of the African-American, as expressed by language, popular
iconography, other signification systems, and the interpretation of
everyday experiences.
I contend, for example, that the categorization of African-Ameri-
cans as a people behaviorally, morally and culturally impoverished-
as a people outside the pale of what characterizes "Americanness,"
and therefore justifiably relegated to the margins of society-has
called into question the efficacy of all race-conscious policymaking.
Additionally, European-American identity-oppositionally con-
structed as "race"-less and harmonious with American individual-
ism-results in policy prescriptives, couched in the term "class," that
preserve relationships of disparate power between blacks and whites.
Relational insights make possible the exploration of power and
its social manifestations between European-Americans and African-
Americans. Power, in this analysis, is not treated as a possession of
individual social agents. Rather, the concept of power refers to the
systematic and continuous ability of one social group to affect ad-
versely the welfare of another.36 In post-civil-rights America, white
power over racialized minorities is maintained by use and invocation
of "individualism."
"Individualism," discussed in Parts lI.B and III, is the title's short
hand reference for what I call "individualistic democratic capitalism."
In brief, individualistic democratic capitalism is the touchstone of
American cultural identity.37 It valorizes the individual as the primary
moral, political and legal subject; it fears the instrumentalities of gov-
35. See Martha Minow, The Emergence of the Social-Relations Approach, in MAKING
ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLusIoN, AND AMERICAN LAW 173-224 (1990).
36. See; e.g., THOMAS E. WARTENBERG, THE FORMS OF POWER: FROM DOMINATION
TO TRANSFORMATION 17-27 (1990) (discussing the Platonic conception of power as an abil-
ity to affect or to be affected by something else).
37. See David E. Apter, Introduction: Ideology and Disconten4 in IDEOLOGY AND
DiscoNTENT 20-21 (David E. Apter ed., 1984) (discussing the notion that "ideology satis-
fies the identity function").
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eminent as potential obstructions to expressions of individual liber-
ties; and it reveres the minimally regulated market place as the venue
in which an application of reason will result in progress-defined as
the expansion of individual liberties. As a conception of self and soci-
ety, individualistic democratic capitalism in its broadest conceptual
terms is committed to an abstracted universal subject capable of trav-
ersing all time and space.
Because of these universalizing tendencies of individualistic dem-
ocratic capitalism, race 38 undertakes to furnish specific identities to
otherwise abstracted and alienated social actors.39 In so functioning,
race becomes a central feature of individualistic democratic capital-
ism. Paradoxically, the more race characterizes individualistic demo-
cratic capitalism, the more insistent assertions of the irrelevancy of
race become.
Michael Omi and Howard Winant's racial formation theory40 fa-
cilitates an understanding of race as a central axis of social relations
that cannot be subsumed into some other category-in this analysis
the category "class." Racial formation theory maintains that race per-
vades social life, operating at both micro- and macro-levels to perme-
ate individual psyches and relationships as well as collective identities
and social structures. Racial formation theory recognizes race as pre-
eminently a sociohistorical concept. Race is not a natural attribute,
though the racial dimensions of social structures, identities and signifi-
cation systems are often naturalized. Racial formation theory con-
fronts the unnatural attributes of race that result in the tendency to
dismiss race.
38. The confounding question-what is "race"?-is not within the scope of this Arti-
cle. For recent legal scholarship probing the nature of "race," see Jayne Chong-Soon Lee,
Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747 (1994) (reviewing KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, IN My FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE
(1992), and arguing that race is defined not by its inherent meaning but by the social con-
texts through which it is constructed); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
1 (1994) (advancing a theory of race as a social complex of meanings we continually repli-
cate in our daily lives). See generally DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHI-
LOSOPHY AND THE POLrICS OF MEANING 80-84 (1993) (maintaining that the meaning and
significance of race are determined by the social thought and ideology prevailing during
given historical epochs).
39. See GOLDBERG, supra note 38, at 4.
40. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 53-76; WINANT, supra note 7, at 115-17.
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Using racial formation theory, Part HI briefly chronicles the
"racialization" 41 of America's cultural identity-a process that ac-
quired saliency by the mid-nineteenth century and that continues as
we approach the twenty-first century. In broad strokes, I account for
the nation's racialized colonial origins, and the early use of race to
reconcile freedom-the central principle of individualistic democratic
capitalism-with "unfreedom." By the time of the revolutionary era,
individualistic democratic capitalism and race had consolidated such
that the realization of political rights and economic opportunities was
the exclusive preserve of European-Americans.
As the process of racializing the nation's character continued into
the nineteenth century, the presence of racially degraded "others" en-
abled the majority of European-Americans to endure continuously
the incongruous socioeconomic conditions that resulted from the
practices of individualistic democratic capitalism. For instance, during
the period of significant working class formation, a consciousness of
not being deemed "black" typified working white Americans. They
viewed "blackness" as the embodiment of habits and values inimical
to an industrialized society, the demands of which they felt privileged
to meet even though the resulting benefits were for their limited en-
joyment. The overidentification of American white workers with their
whiteness meant that race was a determining factor in the processes of
class formation and of class consciousness among American white
workers.
A review of the historical framework within which American cul-
tural identity evolved has led me to believe that, in tandem, individu-
alistic democratic capitalism and race impose their own conceptual
limitations on the subjects of public debate. As such, they circum-
scribe the range of feasible responses to questions raised for solution.
Additionally, I believe that certain traits of our racialized national
character limit our policy perspective and, in turn, present troubling
41. The term "racialization" comes from Howard Winant. See WINANT, supra note 7,
at 58-59. From a racial formation perspective, race is by nature historically specific, fluid
and unstable. Thus, according to Vinant, it is necessary to interpret the meaning of race
not in terms of definition, but in terms of processes. Chief among these processes is the
construction of racial identity and meaning-what Winant calls "racialization." He states
that racialization refers to the extension of racial meaning to social relations, practices and
groups. Il at 59. It is because of the process of racialization that race has no fixed mean-
ing. The concept of racialization is distinct from the concept of racism. Racism involves
the "creat[ion] or reproduc[tion] of structures of domination based on essentialist catego-
ries of race," categories purporting to embody the human essences that exist outside or
that are impervious to social and historical context. See OMI & WiNANT, supra note 3, at
71.
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policy issues. Such issues include how to accord genuine equality42 to
African-Americans in a society reluctant to rectify social and eco-
nomic imbalances that are deemed natural and deserved though they
are clearly racial in nature.
These are the issues that provide the impetus for my focus in Part
IV on the connections between an advocacy for class-conscious policy
initiatives and a racialized national cultural identity. One of my objec-
tives in Part IV is to lay out the renewed debate on the determinants
of black poverty. Thus, Part IV details the paradox of black progress
and black poverty and reviews competing theoretical explanations in
conjunction with relevant policy responses. Part IV also reconstructs
the backlash from which the call for class-conscious remediation
resonated.
Racialization of America's national character is unchanged in a
post-civil-rights era, though the processes by which racialization oc-
curs are constantly evolving and in a state of flux. Thus, my other
objective in Part IV is to demonstrate the linkage of race to poverty,
social pathologies, personal morality and responsibility, economic de-
cline, bureaucratic growth, and costly government programs that are
deemed politically intolerable. Thereby, race is revealed as central to
public discourse involving some of the most pressing social issues of
the day. I conclude that the post-civil-rights advocacy for class-based
policy initiatives is a reaction to these race-linked societal issues.
In short, class is an emerging construct through which racializa-
tion is perpetuated without explicit references to race and with ex-
press denials of the significance of race. The site of this perpetuation
is the social policy arena (hence the call for class-conscious policy ini-
tiatives) where a melange of racialized character traits that define
"Americanness" is represented, interpreted and contested.
In Part V of the Article, I ask what transformations should be
made to our current regime of policymaking in order to counteract
42. Whenever there is talk of "equality" it is almost inevitable that someone will
query, "What do you mean by equality? Do you mean equality of opportunity, or do you
mean equality of results?" The question so posed indicates for me that the inquirer has
firmly situated the concept of equality in the economic sphere. Thus, for me, that query
begs the question, "Why is the concept of equality located in the economic sphere in the
first place?" As I argue in Part II.B, the answer has to do with an application of the tenets
of individualism to political and economic life that accommodates the coexistence of uni-
form legal and political rights and vast social and economic divisions. Rather than debate
whether equality describes opportunity or result, why not engage in rigorous interrogation
of the economic sphere, its practical consequences for our lives, and its implications for any
theory of equality?
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what Etienne Balibar calls "neo-racism" 43 -the racism of a post-civil-
rights future. My first recommendation is that African-Americans
must act strategically to develop an identity with a view towards its
concrete implications for social policy and citizenship in American so-
ciety. My second recommendation is that policymakers in the legisla-
tive and executive branches refrain from predicating policy decisions
on individualistic democratic capitalism in their current, uncritical
fashion. Rather, policymakers should adopt a method of asking how
individualistic democratic capitalism has subordinated African-Ameri-
cans. Asking that question, I argue, requires policymakers to search
for latent racial bias underlying any proposed alternative policy crite-
rion such as class.44 I offer concluding remarks in Part VI of the
Article.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a word regarding its presen-
tation is in order. I write in the tradition of the critical race theorist,45
a tradition that has produced scholarship that is "necessarily eclec-
tic." 46 As such, I attempt to do what critical race theorists do: mine
the groves of established scholarly paradigms for themes and concepts
that are then incorporated into the analysis47 to form a new critical
43. Etienne Balibar, Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?, in RAcE, NATION, CL~ss: AmBIGUOUS
IDENTrrms 17 (Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein eds., Chris Turner trans., 1991).
44. The arguments made in this part of the Article parallel those made by Professor
Charles Lawrence in his seminal work on unconscious racism. See Charles R. Lawrence,
III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 317 (1987). Professor Lawrence employs principles of psychoanalytic theory and
cognitive psychology to demonstrate the pervasiveness of unconscious racism in American
society. He argues that requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation in racial
discrimination cases disregards both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect that
the history of American race relations has had on the individual and collective subcon-
scious. Id. at 323.
While Professor Lawrence's central focus is on the judiciary and the intent require-
ment in the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, I concentrate on legislative
and executive actors and the current advocacy for class-conscious social policy. I maintain
that, like the judiciary, legislators and executives must recognize the presence of uncon-
scious racism in social policy discourse. I argue that in considering a shift toward class-
consciousness, policymakers must pay specific attention to "individualistic democratic capi-
talism"-the philosophical framework within which unconscious racism resides.
45. As traditions go, the Critical Race Theory movement is young, dating back only to
July 1989. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL.
L. RFv. 741 (1994) (summarizing the events leading to the rise and prominence of Critical
Race Theory).
46. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Musi"
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. R v. 2129,
2165 (1992).
47. Professor Calmore writes that "critical race theory is necessarily eclectic, incorpo-
rating what appears to be helpful from various disciplines, doctrines, styles, and methods."
Id. at 2164-65.
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framework for understanding the social relations of subordination and
of power. Thus, my focus is decidedly extralegal and contextual.4 8
I take this analytical approach because, as John Calmore writes, it
enables, without the restrictions inherent in traditional doctrinal anal-
ysis, the critique and reinterpretation of law, society and culture-the
three large "texts" to which groups turn for the symbols, representa-
tions and expressions pertinent to their identity.4 9 This analytical ap-
proach, however, is not without unavoidable features that might be
problematic for some readers. For some readers, fragmentation
among the parts of the Article will be an issue. But other readers will
recognize a complex relationship among the parts of the Article and
their respective themes. These readers appreciate that, though
presented and read sequentially, each piece forms part of an ensemble
that must be heard at once.50 Let us now listen to the analysis.
II. Ideological Determinants and Constraints
A. The Race/Class Conundrum
Assessing the soundness of class-conscious policymaking is a per-
plexing undertaking. First, there is the absence of any sustained class
analysis in the dominant discourse on equality and inequality5' that
could form a predicate for such policymaking. 52 Indeed, in the Ameri-
48. Id. at 2165.
49. Professor Calmore treats "law, society, and culture ... [as] texts-not so much
like a literary work, but rather like the traditional black minister's citation of text as a verse
or scripture that would lend authoritative support to the sermon he is about to deliver."
Id. at 2162. Calmore writes: "Texts are not merely random stories; like scripture, they are
expressions of authority, preemption, and sanction." Id Having so defined "texts,"
Calmore argues that culture constitutes the forms of symbolization, representation, and
expression through which a group secures its identity and solidarity. Id. (citing JoiN
BRENKMAN, CULTURE AND DOMINATION 26 (1987)). Thus, for the critical race theorist
challenging the oppressive and subordinating features of a post-civil-rights America, the
texts of law, society and culture must be subjected to fundamental criticism and reinterpre-
tation for it is there that identities delineating the oppressed and the oppressor are forged.
50. See Calmore, supra note 46, at 2133 ("[E]ach of the major parts [of Calmore's
article] could read as a separate article, but they are not; they form an ensemble piece that
unfortunately must be read sequentially instead of heard at once.").
51. See J. R. POLE, THE PuRsurr OF EoUALrrY IN AMERICAN HISTORY xi (1978)
(noting that "a remarkably small proportion of the debates on equality recurring through-
out American history has been taken up by such questions as the redistribution of wealth
or any effective re-evaluation of the criteria by which economic rewards are allotted").
52. To be sure, poverty was "discovered" in America after the publication of Michael
Harrington's The Other America, and Americans launched an anti-poverty effort.
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962). That, however, is not the same as
the discovery of class followed by an appropriate policy response. The discovery of pov-
erty spumed a policy industry because poverty is generally regarded as an eminently cura-
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can experience, the generally accepted belief is that class bears little, if
any, relevance to conceptions of equality and inequality.5 3 Conse-
quently, class distinctions qua class distinctions historically have not
provoked significant social policy initiatives.
Second, the resulting analytical void has had a dynamic impact on
policy discussions regarding the possible import of the modem phe-
nomenon of a black population increasingly stratified into socioeco-
nomic classes.54 Since race in the American experience has been the
stark embodiment of inequality,55 many African-Americans express
reservations about a generalized class approach to policymaking.
They argue that such an approach threatens to disregard the continu-
ing and lasting siibordinating effects of racism on all segments of the
African-American community. 56 The perception is that emphasis on
socioeconomic stratification within the African-American community,
and a concomitant shift to universal class-conscious policies, are at-
tempts to avoid remedying racial discrimination. 57
ble condition. Class, rigorously defined, is evidence of a structural hierarchy unresponsive
to remedial cure that does not also entail examination of its supporting ideological edifices.
53. See e.g., JENNIFER L. HocHscHUD, WHAT's FAIR? AImmCAN BELiEFS ABOUT
DiSmTRu E JusticE 264 (1981) (asserting that Americans who pride themselves on legal
and political equality accept economic inequality because they simultaneously believe that
"the necessity and justice of economic differentiation permits political equality to exist,"
and that "the existence of political equality permits economic differentiation to persist").
54. See Felicity Barringer, Income Gap Thins Middle-Class Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1992, at A12.
55. It is so common for interest groups advocating for women's rights, gay rights, etc.
to model their cause on the black civil rights movement that some scholars have found it
necessary to warn against conflating non-racial forms of inequality with racism. See Trina
Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of
Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE LJ. 397.
56. See Sheila Rule, Report Plays Down Class Division Among Blacks, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 2, 1983, at A13; see also Jennifer M. Russell, Nothing to be Ashamed of, ESSENCE,
Aug. 1991, at 140. Though "the African-American community" or "the black community,"
may be ahistorical, transcendent and in a constant state of flux, I invoke it at times, as
Professor Austin does, "to convey the illusion that my arguments have the backing of mil-
lions." Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifi-
cation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1770 (1992).
57. See Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites,
N.Y. Tmas, Aug. 18, 1991, § 4, at 3. The argument appears to be that, as a matter of class
or socioeconomic status, the subordination of African-Americans would remain unremed-
ied because it is very difficult to convince ourselves (that is, Americans) that the poor are
stigmatized, or disadvantaged or otherwise subordinated. For example, we do not ex-
pressly require their use of segregated facilities. Even though we judge and treat poor
people adversely because of their indigence, the perpetuation of the Horatio Alger myth
disables us from recognizing and acknowledging the infinite ways in which we discriminate
against and debase the poor. Each time we hear the fable of the person who pulls him- or
herself up by the bootstraps, we are subtly coerced into believing that stigma does not
occur, otherwise the individual ultimately would not have succeeded.
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Indeed, invocation of class differentials by the African-American
community itself to name and to identify the source of its ailments is
almost nonexistent.58 Prevailing notions of racial solidarity within the
African-American community seem to discourage such intra-racial
distinctions. 59 As a consequence, significant segments of the African-
American community treat class talk60 as coded terminology that
views violence, adolescent and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, drug
abuse and chronic unemployment as congenital pathologies that in-
here in all blacks.61 As such, the invocation of class in social policy
discourse is widely regarded as a proxy for "those black people with
58. "The main event intellectually for blacks seems to be ethnic and cultural identity,
not the tensions between rich and poor. . . ." Nicholas Lemann, Black Nationalism on
Campus, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1993, at 31. A committee on the status of black Americans ex-
plained the absence of a "class" critique as follows:
The growth of the new black middle class, contrary to some expectations, has
created a black bourgeoisie that is more predisposed to align itself politically with
the black lower class than was the case earlier. This pattern may be due to a
"structural liberalism" stemming from a shared interest, reinforcing considera-
tions of ideology or race solidarity, in seeing the public sector expand. It may be
significant that a large proportion of lower status blacks receive public assistance
and community services from programs that are disproportionately staffed by
black professionals. Thus, the lack of a pronounced class differential in black
attitudes toward the public sector can be partly attributed to the fact that the class
structure and vested interest in the expansion of the public sector intersect in a
very different way among blacks than among whites.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
169 (1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY].
59. See Constance Johnson, The Hidden Perils of Racial Conformity, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REp., Dec. 24, 1990, at 42 (reporting that the racial solidarity stance and "the
reluctance of many blacks to countenance criticism of the civil-rights agenda" are damag-
ing to poor blacks). For a recent discussion on ideological conformity within the African-
American community see ISHMAEL REED, AIRING DIRTY LAUNDRY 3 (1993) ("The profit-
able literary scam nowadays is to pose as someone who airs unpleasant and rank facts
about the black community, only to be condemned by the black community for doing so.").
60. See BENJAMIN DEMOTr, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK
STRAIGHT ABOUT CLASS 95-109 (1990).
61. Professor Calmore observes that "[m]uch of today's racialization is coded and
covert. Ironically, we have now a policy of what I call 'racialized color blindness,' that
never explicitly refers to race in talking about cultures of poverty, welfare cheats, inner-city
poor or underclass poor, etc. In such instances, the unstated reference is to blacks." See
Calmore, supra note 46, at 2160 n.105.
The observation that "class talk serves as a means of releasing hostility to 'inferiors,'
usually blacks and minorities," see DEMOTr, supra note 60, at 95, is not intended as a
diversion from the real social problems of violence, adolescent pregnancies, drug abuse
and unemployment. The point is that these problems are inadequately addressed because
they are inextricably associated with race. See Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall,
Race, ATLANTIC, May 1991, at 53 (demonstrating that when the official subject is presiden-
tial politics, taxes, welfare, crime, rights or values, the real subject is race).
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the dysfunctional culture. '62
Further compounding these difficulties in responding to advo-
cates of class-conscious policymaking is a nationalist ethos that
equates "authentic blackness" not only with poverty,63 but with pov-
erty of the urban variety.64 Black urban poverty is regarded, there-
fore, as a unique testament to ineradicable racial subordination.
Nonetheless, advocates of class-conscious policymaking continue to
regard white poverty and black poverty as equal inequities-as a mere
function of wealth and income deprivation. Advocates of class-con-
scious policymaking conflate white poverty and black poverty, sub-
jecting them both to a single "cure-all" premised on generalizations
and with no analysis of the differing causes and manifestations of
white and black poverty.
In the words of Benjamin Demott, "Americans can't think
straight about class." 65 Thus, "social wrong is accepted in America
partly because differences in knowledge about class help to obscure it,
and the key to those differences is the degree of acceptance of the
myth of classlessness. ' '66
62. See Adolf Reed, Jr., Steele Trap, THm NATION, Mar. 4, 1991, at 274 (reviewing
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEw VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1990), and noting that in discourse about African-Americans, culture has re-
placed biology as a source of African-American inferiority).
63. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "Jungle Fever" Charts Black Middle-Class Angst, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 1991, § 2, at 20 (reviewing the film "Jungle Fever"), in which Professor
Gates comments on a "new nationalist ethos in the late 60's and 70's" regarding black
social advancement as follows:
As ghetto or street culture became romanticized, many blacks became defensive
about a middle-class past or future. "Authentic" black culture, in other words,
was lower-class culture, from speech and attitude to clothes and coiffure. As if to
assuage guilt for having escaped, new arrivals in the black middle class, unable or
unwilling to visualize themselves in their own terms, embraced the affectations of
the ghetto, though without its pain, frustration and suffering. For one of the few
times in black history, the "blackest" aspects of black culture were thought to be
those least related to economic success. To be black and middle class was to
betray, somehow, one's black heritage.
Thus, for example, the media depiction of the obviously upper middle class Huxtables
on the Bill Cosby Show generated much debate (among both white and black viewers) on
the representational nature of the show. Even in a fictitious context, a unity of blackness,
economic prosperity, bourgeoisie consumption patterns and lifestyle was incredulous.
Americans, both black and white, consign blacks to the lowest ranks in American society.
Black and poverty (and here "underclass" or "lower class" may substitute for the word
"poverty") are synonymous terms in public debates.
64. Increasing attention is now being paid to the rise in black rural poverty. See, e.g.,
Peter Applebome, Deep South and Down Home, But It's a Ghetto All the Same, N.Y.
TIMws, Aug. 21, 1993, at Al.
65. See DEMOTT, supra note 60.
66. Id. at 10-11.
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The advocacy for class-conscious policies appears to contradict
Demott's observations. A class-conscious advocacy presumably-by
its very nature-rejects the mythology of classlessness. By acknowl-
edging the existence of class differences, social wrongs visited upon
Americans, regardless of race, are rendered ameliorable with appro-
priate public policy.
Notwithstanding their rhetorical recognition of socioeconomic
stratification, class advocates fail to confront and account for a more
theoretical conceptualization of class,67 its historiography, nature and
function in relation to American identity. I believe this is so because
of a dialectic interplay between individualistic democratic capitalism
and race that creates conditions that negate theoretical attention to
class even when the concrete features of socioeconomic differentiation
are pervasively evident. Unless policymakers reckon with this dialec-
tic that informs all of the race/class debate, their policy judgments will
be inherently limited and resulting initiatives will be wholly
inadequate. 68
My argument, in other words, is that advocates of class-conscious
policies dangerously abstract wealth and income differentials from the
67. As I argue in this Article, the best way to think about class is as a relational con-
struct. The italicized class denotes this construct. The relational model of class, which
embraces the concept of the social group as constituent of the individual, is at variance
with notions emphasizing, for example, income and occupational differentials among indi-
viduals who are grouped for the sake of statistical comparisons. The practice of what I will
call "comparative grouping" does not take the concept of class seriously. Comparative
grouping sees individuals in possession of income and occupational attributes that were
acquired as a result of individual choice, effort and merit, regardless of social group history
and affiliation.
68. My thesis is influenced by Professor Peggy Davis's observations regarding the im-
portance of culture, perspective and sensibility in shaping "law," and here I will add "pol-
icy." Professor Davis writes:
When legal scholars believed that law was only and always derived by reasoning
from fixed principles, legal scholarship was confined, justifiably, to the critique of
deductive syllogisms within the judicial opinion. Our beliefs have become more
complicated. We no longer imagine law, or much of anything, to be a matter of
simple deduction. Instead, we understand that law is created by people-people
who reason within a culture, from a perspective, and with a set of sensibilities.
Accordingly, we see that law is shaped by culture, perspective, and sensibility as
well as by logic. Mastery of the deductive syllogism is still foundational, but no
longer sufficient, to fulfillment of the legal scholar's obligation to provide critical
commentary as law evolves. The thorough scholar looks not only to the logic of
principles that we call law, but also to the characteristics of interactive, cultural
processes that comprise lawyering and judging. S/he takes as texts both the stat-
utes and judicial opinions that constitute law and the discursive acts by which law
is articulated, debated, and applied.
Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and
"Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1635, 1635 (1991).
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beliefs and practices of American life, representing them alone as in-
trinsic properties of subordination.69 Extracted from the specificities
of "Americanness," the distillates wealth and income threaten to con-
geal into social policies that effectively neglect the complex problems
they purport to solve.70
In order to substantiate my thesis, I must first ask, What is class?
According to Paul Fussell, "[n]obody knows for sure what the word
class means. '71 Societal members use the term class to reference so-
cial valences.72 For social theorists, the term class is a referent to so-
cial status distinctions or to modal relations. As it relates to social
status, class is a function of a range of variables including income,
wealth, occupation, education, consumption capacity and lifestyle.73
As a referent to modal relations, class focuses on modes of economic
production and on economic and structural relationships.74
69. Angela Harris argues that feminist theorists' emphasis on gender constructed
through male domination and sexual exploitation treats race and racism as inessential to
understanding women's lives. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 581 (1990). Borrowing from Professor Harris's critique of
feminist theorists, I charge the class advocates with "essentialism," which in class-conscious
advocacy assumes multiple forms, including:
a) overgeneralizations--enlarging wealth and income characteristics to embrace
a variety of social attributes that are better explained with the (il)logic of race
ideology;
b) forced fragmentations-splitting socioeconomic characteristics from other
core constituents of social identity,
c) false consciousness-believing that the distribution of people into wealth and
income categories happens independently of a social context determined by
racism and individualism; and
d) reductionism-maintaining a primacy of wealth and income characteristics as
self-explanatory organizers of society.
70. See NATHAN GLAZER, THE Lmu'rs OF SoCIAL PoLcy 6-7 (1988) (discussing the
tendency of social policy to target identifiable problems, while ignoring other problems
that are equally important).
71. PAUL FussELL, CLAss 12 (Touchstone ed. 1983) (emphasis in original). Fussell
explains his use of the term as follows:
Followers of the sociologist Max Weber tend to say class when they're talking
about the amount of money you have and the kind of leverage it gives you; they
say status when they mean your social prestige in relation to your audience; and
they say party when they're measuring how much.., built-in resistance you have
to being pushed around by shits. By class I mean all three, with perhaps extra
emphasis on status.
Id. (emphasis in original).
72. See DEMOr, supra note 60, at 17-27 (providing examples of "class" vocabulary or
talk that is used to categorize behavior, clothes and people). However, class as a referent
to social valences is not the central concern of this Article.
73. See generally LEONARD RPIsSMAN, CLAssEs IN AMERiCAN SOCIETY (1959), cited
in T.B. BOTroMORE, CLASSES IN MODERN Socmrv 105 (1966).
74. See EPim OLmN WoiGHTr, CLAsSES 10 (1989) (explaining that in Marxist discourse
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Common use of class, to denote either status or modal relations,
appears to presume that class has a real existence that is objectively
verifiable. Take, for example, the use of class in a recent account of
one family's hardships featured in The New York Times.75 The fam-
ily's chief income earner is Craig Miller, a laid-off sheet-metal worker
for TWA, whose "middle-class status was stamped on the pay stub:
$15.65 an hour. ' 76 Miller's former occupation and income enabled the
family to maintain "two cars in the garage and a swing set in the back-
yard, . . .[and to fall] easily into the suburban rhythms of Johnson
County."77 Additionally, the Millers "moved comfortably in a social
circle that included college graduates, people who wore suits to work
and were therefore deemed 'professional' but who often earned no
more than the Millers." 78
By contrast, a $5 per hour job relegates Miller to "behind the
counter in a McDonald's, hustling orders for Quarter Pounders and
chicken fajitas and deferring to teen-age customers with 'Yes, sir' and
'Thank you, ma'am."' 79 The reader is told that "Mr. Miller doesn't
care to talk much about McDonald's. He sat in the living room with a
visitor for two hours one evening, never taking off the jacket that cov-
ered his McDonald's shirt. Finally, for a brief moment, he unsnapped
the buttons to reveal the uniform. 'There, you see it,' he said, with a
blush of embarrassment and perhaps a glint of rage. Then he closed
the jacket again."' 80 On the job Mr. Miller had even devised a tactic
for dealing with the customers: "[Hie always tries to wear a polite
smile, but he doesn't always meet their eyes.'
Throughout the Times account of the Millers' situation, income
and occupation, imminently verifiable indices, were proffered as proof
of the Millers' class standing.82 Mr. Miller, a sheet metal worker,
earned at least $31,000 in 1992, above the median income for the na-
on class, the highest level of abstraction is mode of production, whereby classes are ana-
lyzed in terms of pure types of social relations of production, each embodying a distinctive
mechanism of exploitation). Thus, Marxists employ the term class to refer to the major
social groups-oppressors and oppressed-that are in conflict with each other. See BoT-
TOMORE, supra note 73, at 21.
75. Dirk Johnson, Family Struggles to Make Do After Fall From Middle Class, N.Y.
TIms, Mar. 11, 1994, at Al.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at A14.
79. Id. at Al.
80. Id. at A14.
81. Id.
82. Professor Roy Brooks has noted that the occupational approach to defining class
status is problematic because it can be a misleading indicator of income level, "the most
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tion's workforce.8 3 Some might venture, as the Times did, to classify
him as a member of the middle class because he occupies an interme-
diate position between the professional and business classes and the
"underclass." 4 Additional proof of the real existence of the Millers'
middle-class standing was the common lifestyle they shared with
"professionals."
When the layoff disrupted Mr. Miller's stream of income, and he
did not secure an appropriate lateral position, the Times more than
intimated that classification of the family's class standing changed.
The proof consisted of Mr. Miller's $5 per hour wage earned at Mc-
Donald's.85 The Times reported that "[c]ounting all their part-time
jobs, the Millers will make about $18,000 this year [1994]."'86 Dra-
important determinant of socioeconomic status and the primary measure of class stand-
ing." See BROOKS, supra note 6, at 35. Professor Brooks offers the following example:
A Legal Aid attorney might earn only $18,000 a year, a salary ordinarily inade-
quate to allow one to "buy into" the middle-class dream: comfort and security, a
nice home, a late-model car, household appliances such as a microwave oven or
VCR, an annual vacation, savings and investments-in general, a stable, even
thriving existence. Yet a plumber earning $60,000 a year could easily afford such
a lifestyle.
Id. And though Professor Brooks favors an income approach, that too has its deficiencies:
A ... fundamental problem with an income approach is that it provides little
information about occupational status, earnings stability and potential, or educa-
tional background. A young business lawyer who earns $40,000 a year, a janitor
who moonlights as a taxicab driver and has a combined annual income of $40,000,
a high school teacher who earns $40,000 after twenty years on the job, and a
family in which the husband works in a factory and the wife cleans offices to earn
a combined annual income of $40,000 all have the same "middle class" income-
but their occupations, their degree of job security and mobility, their future earn-
ings potential, and their educational backgrounds are vastly different.
Id. at 36. Professor Brooks has ample reasons to worry himself with the unreliability of
occupation and income as indicators of class position. But, by thinking about class as an
historical relationship, the greater worry is the manipulation of occupation and income
categories to fabricate group interests in a struggle over the distribution of limited social
resources such as education and employment, to name just two.
83. Wilfred Masumura & Paul Ruscavage, Dynamics of Economic Well-Being: Labor
Force and Income 1990-1992, in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS SERIES P70-40 (1994).
84. See LAScH, supra note 14, at 479-80 ("[W]orkers can be considered a middle class
only in the sense that they occupy an intermediate position between the professional and
business classes on the one hand and the 'underclass,' largely black and Hispanic in compo-
sition, on the other.").
85. According to the 1991 poverty standards, the Millers would have to earn $18,587
to keep their family above the poverty line. See Shea & Martina, Dynamics of Economic
Well-Being: Poverty 1990 to 1992, in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS SERIES P70-42 tbl. B-2 (1995).
86. Johnson, supra note 75, at Al.
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matic lifestyle changes were introduced as additional evidence of the
family's reclassification:
The couple buy one newspaper a week, for the food coupons, and
only one light burns in the house at a time. When a child forgets to
flip off the switch, Mrs. Miller chides gently: "Have you got stock in
the electric company? Well, neither do I.' 87
Discussion of Mr. Miller's altered social relations with other per-
sons served a similar evidentiary function. No longer the proud so-
cialite among the "coat and tie set," Miller kowtows to youthful
customers. He is unable to meet the eyes of those with whom he in-
teracts. As discussed, he is ashamed to the point of psychologically
retreating (on several levels) from his immediate community. Only
reluctantly, and with great pain, does he reveal to a visitor evidence of
any connection with McDonald's, which presumably is an indicator of
his diminished personal worth.
Yet Mr. Miller remained adamant about the family's middle class
standing: "We are middle-class people .... It is just that we have a
lower-class income. '8 8 His words belie any attempt to establish a class
to which his family belongs with empirically objective measurements.
Indeed, from his words, it would appear that the concept class is little
more than a construct externally imposed on the Millers. 89
As a descriptive term, class evades as much as it defines.90 That is
because, as E.P. Thompson writes, class is not a "structure" or even a
"category." Class is "something which in fact happens (and can be
shown to have happened) in human relationships." 91
[T]he notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship.
Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if
we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its
structure. The finest-meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure
specimen of class, any more than it can give us one of deference or
of love. The relationship must always be embodied in real people
and in a real context .... [C]lass happens when some men, as a
result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articu-
late the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as
against other men whose interests are different from (and usually
opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by
the productive relations into which men are born-or enter
87. Id. at A14.
88. Id.
89. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and
Practical Existence of Groups, 32 BERKELEY J. Soc. 1 (1987) (criticizing the commonly
perceived opposition between objective and subjective theories of class construction).
90. See E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 9 (1966).
91. Id.
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involuntarily.92
Mr. Miller's insistent claim to the middle class is understandable
when the Times's lack of historical context is taken into account. It is
possible that the Millers were clinging to more than an occupation and
an income. Perhaps Mr. Miller's words were a linguistic sack in which
he could preserve patterns of relationships, habits of thoughts, and
entitlements to scarce social goods that arose over a considerable pe-
riod of time. Readers of the Times will never know because the real-
ity of the Millers' material condition is examined without historical
background or foreground. As such, the Times simply featured a fam-
ily experiencing occupational insecurity and income loss in an econ-
omy in transition from a manufacturing to a service orientation. In so
doing, the Times offered the public a crude notion of class that perpet-
ually insinuates itself in social policy discourses, especially discourses
about the determinants of African-American subordination.
E.P. Thompson was convinced that "we cannot understand class
unless we see it as a social and cultural formation, arising from
processes which can only be studied as they work themselves out over
a considerable historical period."93 I share his conviction. In this Ar-
ticle, I explore the concept of class within the limited universe of
American society as it has been shaped by the complex historical de-
velopment of the interactive ideologies 94 of individualistic democratic
capitalism and race. The discussion that follows will demonstrate how
the concept of class, as I am redefining that term, is mediated by the
pursuit of specific interests-interests represented by racialized ex-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 11.
94. The word "ideology" carries with it certain baggage I wish to avoid. In the tradi-
tion of Marxist orthodoxy, "ideology" is understood as a false body of ideas used con-
sciously and unconsciously to conceal or excuse vested interests. See MELVIN RADER,
MARX'S INTERPRETATION OF HLSTORY 41-45 (1979). By "ideology," I refer to the
seldomly articulated conceptions, beliefs, conventions, doctrines and principles that pro-
vide coherence, structure and form to social and political discourses. See Martha L.
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 Durr L.J. 274,289-93. Viewed in
this way, ideology has no life of its own. Instead, it comes into existence "at a discernible
historical moment for rationally understandable historical reasons and is subject to change
for similar reasons." Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States
of America, 181 NEw LEFT REv. 95, 101 (1990). Ritual repetition makes for the continuity
of ideology, not the handing down of appropriate attitudes. Id. "[I]deology must be con-
stantly created and verified in social and political life; if it is not, it dies[.]" Id. at 112.
The re-creation and verification of ideology entail "rearticulation," "a practice of dis-
cursive reorganization or reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests already pres-
ent in the subjects'... consciousness, such that these elements obtain new meanings or
coherence." OMu & WINANT, supra note 3, at 99 n.11. An example of this rearticulation
process is provided in Bourdieu, supra note 89, at 9.
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pressions of individualistic democratic capitalism. 95 Based on my un-
derstanding of these complex historical processes, we must resist
conceptualizations of class that unacceptably focus on taste, style,
mannerisms, consumption patterns, income or occupation.96 If con-
ceptually recast to reflect a formation process, class is irreducible to
such objective manifestations. Rather, as I argue, class refers to the
hierarchical relations unfolding over a period of time while in pursuit
of individualistic democratic capitalism.
The difficulty in utilizing the class concept as a basis for social
95. According to Barbara Fields, the concept of class is ideologically mediated. She
writes:
At its core, class refers to a material circumstance: the inequality of human be-
ings from the standpoint of social power. Even the rather diffuse definitions of
applied social science-occupation, income, status-reflect this circumstance,
though dimly. The more rigorous Marxian definition involving social relations of
production reflects it directly. Of course, the objective core of class is always
mediated by ideology, which is the refraction of objective reality in human con-
sciousness. No historical acount of class is complete or satisfying that omits the
idological mediations.
Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in REGION, RACE, AND RECON-
STRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD 143, 150 (J. Morgan Kousser &
James M. McPherson eds., 1982). An analogous point is made by Erik Olin Wright in his
discussion of concept formation:
Scientific concepts, no matter how embedded in an elaborated theoretical frame-
work, are never constrained exclusively by theoretical presuppositions. They also
face what can be called 'empirically mediated real-world constraints,' or simply
'empirical constraints' for short. This cumbersome expression-'empirically me-
diated constraints'-is meant to convey two things: first, that the constraint in
question come from real mechanisms in the world, not simply from the concep-
tual framework of the theory; and second, that this real-world constraint operates
through data gathered using the concepts of the theory. The constraint is thus
empirically mediated, rather than directly imposed by the 'world as it really is.'
WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 20.
96. Regrettably, as Wai Chee Dimock and Michael Gilmore remind us, the word class
"has come to deem no more than a flat description, a matter of taxonomy, shorn of the
animated coloration of will and necessity, incipience and dialectic." WAI CHEE DIMOCK &
MICHAEL T. GILMORE, RETHINKING CLASS: LITERARY STUDIES AND SOCIAL FORMA-
TIONS 1 (1994). Commenting on the social significance (or insignificance) of the word
class, R.H. Tawney writes:
Refined and sublimated by the wholesome acid of free competition, the word
"class" itself was purged of the invidious associations which formerly had clung to
it. It shed the coarse integuments of status and caste, and emerged as a fluid
economic group, which all, if they pleased, were free to enter, and from which all,
if they chose, were at liberty to escape. In a world where the law offered no obsta-
cles to aspiring enterprise, class privilege and class tyranny were evidently impos-
sible. A society marked by sharp disparities of wealth and power might properly,
nevertheless, be described as classless, since it was open to each man to become
wealthy and powerful.
R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 102-03 (1964).
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policymaking in America is that the historical invention, and continual
reinvention, of the American occur without regard to the political sig-
nificance of these hierarchical relations. Such relations hinge on the
status and power that are manifestations of individualistic democratic
capitalism. As a result, it is generally accepted that socioeconomic
standing or position in relation to modes of production-a conse-
quence of the practices that sustain individualistic democratic capital-
ism-do not determine access to cultural capital,97 social institutions
and political power.98
Given this inexpressive quality that is attributed to class, race-
that "unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly
being transformed by political struggle"99-became the analytical
97. The term "cultural capital" originates with Pierre Bourdieu, who uses it to refer to
forms of cultural knowledge, competencies or dispositions. See PmIRRE BOURDrxu, THE
FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ESSAYS ON ART AND LrrnRATuRE 7 (Randal Johnson
ed., 1993). I use the term to denote a type of asset that can be used to leverage one's
influence in social policy discourses. Compare John Hagan, et al., Cultural Capita4 Gender,
and the Structural Transformation of Legal Practice, 25 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 239 (1991)
(defining cultural capital as the "nontechnical social and symbolic assets") with ROBERT
WUTHNow, THE STRUGGLE FOR AmERICA'S SouL: EVANGELICALS, LIBERALS, AND SECU-
LAmSM 14 (1989) (discussing the movement toward a more impersonal society "with a
highly professional work force and large, diversified conglomerate corporations ... where
'only the professional elite has the cultural capital with which to engage in effective dis-
course about public issues"').
98. But see LAURENCE H. TPm, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1658-59 (2d ed.
1988) (commenting on the failure of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence to under-
stand that one's economic class has wide-ranging social significance).
99. See O u & WinArN, supra note 3, at 55. Yehudi Webster takes issue with the
socially constructed status of the concept of race. He posits, instead, that race exists only
because human experiences and social problems have been subjected to a practice of racial
classification or thinking that enjoys a privileged status:
American society is being tied into painful knots by virtue of legislative, social
scientific, and media practices of racially classifying persons. These practices are
evinced in racial descriptions of past and contemporary social relations and socio-
economic conditions and experiences as well as in explanations of behavior in
terms of either nonwhite biological deficiencies or a white moral deficiency,
racism.
... In the social-constructionist approach, it is argued that since laypersons
are attached to race, public policies and social studies must deal with race as a
social reality. Even if race is a reality (and it is not clear which of the many
definitions of "reality" is being utilized), the question remains: How is this reality
to be dealt with, subversively or subserviently? Public policies and academic re-
search deal subserviently with race, then claim that laypersons are attached to
race. The realness of race, therefore, may be said to be a result of this subservi-
ence. So intensely have people been bombarded with this thesis of race's realness
that they are bound to be convinced of the unchallengeability of racial
classification ....
It is not "race," but a practice of racial classification that bedevils the society.
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prism through which Americans would have to, even be forced to,
confront and contest maldistributions of status and power.100 Such a
role was suitable for the construct race because it is a structural force
that supports American society's political' 0 and economic 1°2 compo-
sition. Race populates our cultural canons. 103 Race infuses our
Race is a riddle only as the result of a choice not to specify precisely what the
term means. It is not race that... "has served as a central category of natural and
social recognition and self-representation." Rather, government and social scien-
tists choose to promote the racial classification of citizens, and this practice is
hidden behind equivocal references to race.
YEHUDI 0. WEBSTER, THE RACIALIZATION OF AMERICA 2-28 (1992). Webster urges
abandonment of a racial theory of social relations in favor of conceptualization of events in
terms of class, ethnic or human experiences. Id. at 153-272.
Webster is one of many who, by act of will, seeks to abolish the concept of race on
ground that it is merely a product of illogical and uncritical social science classificatory
systems. But, even if deemed illogical and uncritical, Webster appears unappreciative of
the salient consequences of racial cataloguing for everyday life that, as Howard Winant
argues, make replacement of the category of race by other, supposedly more objective,
categories like ethnicity, nationality, or class mistaken at best, and intellectually dishonest
at worst. See WINANT, supra note 7, at 13, 14.
Abolition of racial cataloguing is no simple proposition. First, because after centuries
of racial classification, its effects have taken permanent residence in our psyches and con-
sciousness. See Lawrence, supra note 44, at 322. And second, because our "society is so
thoroughly racialized[,] ... to be without racial identity is to be in danger of having no
identity." WINANT, supra at 16.
Classificatory systems evince ways of knowing and organizing the world. See Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Li-
brarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REv. 207 (1989). Race is such a
classificatory system. And while ethnicity, nationality and class are possible ways of know-
ing and organizing the world, these classifications, in fact, do not structure our lived exper-
iences, and therefore would only contribute to the popular but inaccurate perception that
"racism is dead." Cf. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework- Consequences of the Dif-
ference Model for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 309 (1990) (arguing how
certain classifications prevent us from seeing inequalities that do not neatly fall within
those classifications).
100. Iris Marion Young warns against metaphorically extending the concept of distri-
bution to such non-material social goods as power, rights, opportunity and self-respect
when "the concept of distribution represents them as though they were static things, in-
stead of a function of social relations and processes." Iris Marion Young, The Distributive
Paradigm, in JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 16 (1990). Though I use distribu-
tive terminology, my analysis, with its use of racial formation theory and emphasis on his-
torical specificity and context and the social processes surrounding the American working
class, is intended to avoid the dangers of the distributive paradigm.
101. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORiTY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (arguing that the American demo-
cratic principle of simple majority rule oftentimes operates to render blacks and Latinos
continual losers in the political process notwithstanding their participation through voting).
102. See generally WILLIAM K. TABB, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE BLACK
GHETTO (1970) (arguing that an historic aspect of the American economy is the coloniza-
tion of black communities).
103. See, e.g., LEROI JONES, BLUES PEOPLE: NEGRO MUSIC IN WHITE AMERICA (1963)
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thoughts,1°4 attitudes, 05 beliefs, 0 6 values, 0 7 character, personality,
and identity. Race organizes both public and private relations. 0 8
Race maps the terrain on which we engage each other individually as
well as collectively. 0 9 As such, in the words of Cornel West, "Race
Matters."11o
In other words, it is because of this "naturally determining
role""' that race has had, and continues to have, undeniable signifi-
cance in the making of the American, and hence in the making of
social policy. The problem with locating maldistributed status and
power within the paradigm of race, however, is that only people who
are designated "of color" have "race,""12 and thus it would appear
(racialization of musical expressions); Guy C. McELRoY, FACING HSTORY: THE BLACK
IMAGE IN AMERICAN ART 1710-1940 (1990) (racialization of pictorial imagery); TONI
MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHI-ENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992)
(racialization of literature).
104. See, e.g., STUDs TERKEL, RACE: How BLACKS AND WHrSES THINK AND FEEL
ABouT THE AmERICAN OBSESSION (1992) (collecting testimonials on race relations).
105. See, e.g., WINTHROP D. JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMEuIcAN AnTruDES
TOwARD TIm NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968) (chronicling the emergence of white America's
anti-black predispositions).
106. See, e.g., GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971) (discuss-
ing whites' beliefs about the inferior character and destiny of blacks).
107. See, e.g., PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & MICHAEL GRAY HAGEN, RACE AND INEQuAL-
rY: A STuDY IN AMERICAN VALUES (1985) (pointing out that although Americans have
minimally organized ideas on many issues of policy, they are likely to hold settled and
coherent ideas about why blacks are less well off than whites).
108. See, e.g., SHIRLEE TAYLOR HAZLp, THE SWEETER Tm JuICE (1994) (memoir
exploring the consequences of being simultaneously black and white); JUDY SCALES-
TRENT, Noms OF A WHrTE BLACK WoMAN: RACE, COLOR, ComMuNrrY (1995) (same);
GREGORY WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY
WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) (same).
109. See, e.g., GERALD EARLY, TUXEDO JUNCTION: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CULTURE
(1989) (essays exploring the culture from which black and white identities emerge).
110. See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, RACE MANrEus (1993) (a collection of essays discussing
the significance of race in American life).
111. I borrow this phrase from Henry Louis Gates, Jr. See HENRY Louis GATES, JR.,
LOOSE CANNONS: NOTES ON Tm CULTURE WARS 46 (1992).
112. Barbara Flagg's insightful analysis of how whites are without "race" is worth set-
ting forth at length:
White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to think or
speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, or perhaps, at times,
to reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color. But we tend
not to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinctive. Whites' "con-
sciousness" of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness. We per-
ceive and interact with other whites as individuals who have no significant racial
characteristics. In the same vein, the white person is unlikely to see or describe
himself in racial terms, perhaps in part because his white peers do not regard him
as racially distinctive. Whiteness is a transparent quality when whites interact
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that only the claims of those people have the moral authenticity to
support political and legal action. 113 Relatedly, claimed socioeco-
nomic inequities by people without "race"-that is, whites-would
appear to lack the capacity either to arouse our moral indignation or
to inspire political or legal action.
To rectify the situation, the natural tendency as exemplified by
class advocates is to attempt a transfer of maldistributed status and
power to a venue where all claimed inequities, regardless of the claim-
ants' racial identity, will be ostensibly recognized and redressed. I am
doubtful, though, that the transfer of those maldistributions to the
venue of class is the right move. If we were to look at class within the
ideological framework of individualistic democratic capitalism, we
would see individuals autonomously pursuing their own destinies, and
we would be indifferent to the resulting differentiated distributions of
status and power. But as Nobel laureate Toni Morrison, in another
context, stated: "In a society with a history of trying to accommodate
both slavery and freedom, and a present that wishes both to exploit
and deny the pervasiveness of racism, black people are rarely individ-
ualized. 11 4 Without individuation, there is no destiny for black indi-
viduals to pursue independently. Their status and power (or lack
thereof) result not from free competition, but from collective
subordination.
with whites in the absence of people of color. Whiteness attains opacity, because
apparent to the white mind, only in relation to, and contrast with, the "color" of
nonwhites.
I do not mean to claim that white people are oblivious to the race of other
whites. Race is undeniably a powerful determinant of social status and so is al-
ways noticed, in a way that eye color, for example, may not be. However, whites'
social dominance allows us to relegate our own racial specificity to the realm of
the subconscious. Whiteness is the racial norm. In this culture, the black person,
not the white, is the one who is different. The black, not the white, is racially
distinctive. Once an individual is identified as white, his distinctively racial char-
acteristics need no longer be conceptualized in racial terms; he becomes effec-
tively raceless in the eyes of other whites. Whiteness is always a salient personal
characteristic, but once identified, it fades almost instantaneously from white con-
sciousness into transparency.
Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Require-
ment of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 970-71 (1993) (emphasis in original).
113. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985 (1990) (arguing that
knowledge and appreciation of the unique struggles of the powerless and oppressed are
indispensable to any critical legal studies movement).
114. Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-INO JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF SOCIAL REALITY vii, xiv-xv (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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My view, therefore, is that there is no exclusive perch for maldis-
tributed status and power. These maldistributions are manifestations
of race. They are also inherent to individualistic democratic capital-
ism. Consequently, the racial dimensions of maldistributed power and
status cannot be ignored, and our understanding of them is necessarily
enriched with an accounting of class. The race/class conundrum, then,
is how not to abandon race as a policy predicate in a period of racial
hegemony, and at the same time to enlarge the scope of analysis and
inquiry in the social policy arena to account explicitly for the opera-
tion of individualistic democratic capitalism.
B. Individualistic Democratic Capitalism
Americans, "characterized by the fact that they had escaped from
something or other,"11 5 are at once individualistic," 6 democratic 1 7
and capitalistic.118 These fused attributes reflect a religious-like fun-
115. ERn H. ERmKSON, CHILDHOOD AND Socmry 285, 294 (1985). In conducting
psycho-cultural analysis of American identity formation, Erikson writes, "fi]n this country
the image of the freeman is founded on that northern European who, having escaped feu-
dal and religious laws, disavowed his motherland and established a country and a constitu-
tion on the prime principle of preventing the resurgence of autocracy." Id at 304.
116. Americans define their lives in individualistic, independent terms. For a recent
discussion on the persistence of individualistic values in the political economies of the
1970s and 1980s, see generally PAUL LEMERGER & BRUCE TUCKER, Tim NEw INDIVIDU-
AusTS: THE GENERATION AFTER TiE ORGANIZATION MAN (1991).
117. The dominant motifs of the American political order as expressed in the preamble
to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution are personal liberty and equality
before the law. For an historical analysis of the democratization of American society, see
GORDON S. WOOD, TH RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992).
118. Here I use Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's definition of "capitalism," which turns on
the organization of labor power. She writes:
Many scholars use capitalism in a general, heuristic fashion to apply to concentra-
tions of wealth, participation in commerce, the presence of banks, and the quest
for income. Although such definitions, properly qualified, may serve some useful
analytical purposes, they carry the debilitating tendency to conflate all historical
experience by focusing on ubiquitous-and therefore ahistorical-attributes of all
or most economic life.... I understand capitalism to consist in historically spe-
cific, if diverse, social relations of production. Capitalism as a social system de-
pends upon the divorce of labor from the land, the transformation of labor-power(not labor) into a commodity, and the political recognition of both land and labor
as entities of absolute property that can be freely exchanged on the market.
ELIZABErH Fox-GENoV'ESE, WITHIN T=m PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE
WOMEN OF THE OLD SouTH 53 (1988).
James Oakes also defines capitalism to focus on the free alienability of interests held
in property, and the organization of labor power:
The development of capitalism, while underway for hundreds of years, was not
complete until "absolute" property rights had fully replaced the feudal sys-
tem .... This seemingly simple shift in the way property was held in fact implied a
wholesale revolution in the way labor was organized throughout Europe and its
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damentalism. 119 I refer to this faith when I speak of the ideology of
individualistic democratic capitalism. 120
colonies. With private property came various forms of free labor as well as an
extraordinary revival of the ancient system of slave labor. Not for another two
centuries would the industrial revolution bring this process to its culmination with
the spread of a wage-labor economy. But long before then free laborers-
whether independent yeomen, self-employed shopkeepers, or tenant farmers-
had become the most important source of productivity and economic dynamism.
Absolute property had been secured by the English Revolution of the 1640's and,
thereafter, decisions about what should be produced and how goods should be
distributed in society were increasingly determined by the impersonal forces of
the market.
JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 43-44
(1990).
119. Max Weber argued that capitalism, a modern economic order, is the social coun-
terpart of Calvinist theology, a conception of religion that canonized as economic virtues
the habits which in earlier ages had been denounced as vices. See generally MAX WEBER,
THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
RELIGION AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE IN MODERN CULTURE (1958). In his
foreword to Weber's work, R. H. Tawney writes:
The central idea to which Weber appeals in confirmation of his theory is ex-
pressed in the characteristic phrase "a calling." For Luther, as for most mediaeval
theologians, it had normally meant the state of life in which the individual has
been set by Heaven, and against which it was impious to rebel. To the Calvinist,
Weber argues, the calling is not a condition in which the individual is born, but a
strenuous and exacting enterprise to be chosen by himself, and to be pursued with
a sense of religious responsibility. Baptized in the bracing, if icy, waters of Cal-
vinist theology, the life of business, once regarded as perilous to the soul...
acquires a new sanctity. Labour is not merely an economic means: it is a spiritual
end. Covetousness, if a danger to the soul, is a less formidable menace than sloth.
So far from poverty being meritorious, it is a duty to choose the more profitable
occupation. So far from there being an inevitable conflict between money-mak-
ing and piety, they are natural allies, for the virtues incumbent on the elect-
diligence, thrift, sobriety, prudence-are the most reliable passport to commercial
prosperity. Thus, the pursuit of riches, which once had been feared as the enemy
of religion, was now welcomed as its ally.
R. H. Tawney, Foreword, in WEBER, supra, at 2-3.
Tawney, in his own scholarly endeavors, investigated the changes in religious attitudes
contributing to the rise of capitalism. See generally R. H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE
RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926). For a general treatment of the religious dimensions of Ameri-
can society, see Robert N. Bellah, America's Myth of Origin, in THE BROKEN COVENANT.
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL 1-35 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing some of the
ways in which biblical, and other, imagery has operated powerfully, consciously and uncon-
sciously, to shape the American interpretation of reality and to some extent the actions of
Americans in the world).
120. 1 prefer this admittedly cumbersome phrase over the term "liberal" because it
avoids the notorious meanings ascribed to that word in contemporary American politics.
"Liberal" was once a term designating "a party, a policy, an opinion that favored freedom
as opposed to authoritarianism." See J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO, LIBERALISM: ITS MEANING
AND HISTORY 9 (1958). Today, "liberal" is a pejorative. Under the influence of George
Wallace and Richard Nixon, in the 1960s and 1970s "liberalism came to connote ... the
favoring of blacks over whites and permissiveness towards drug abuse, illegitimacy, welfare
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In American political discourse, capitalism and democracy are
historically linked.121 Capitalism, a modem mode of economic organi-
zation, rests on Enlightenment notions of the rational, self-knowl-
edgeable individual owning one's self and labor, and attuned to a
market of opportunities for profit.'2 Wealth accumulation, according
to Enlightenment thinkers, is a form of individual self-preservation
with which the state should not interfere.123 At the heart of liberal
democracy is the same rational, self-knowledgeable individual who is
free to make choices consistent with the liberty of others and without
fraud, street crime, homosexuality, anti-Americanism, as well as moral anarchy among the
young." EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 10. Branding Michael Dukakis with the "L"
word during the 1988 presidential campaign secured the office of president for George
Bush. See; e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Why Bush Accentuates the Negative: Beyond Beating
Dukakis, the GOP Aims at Permanent Political Change, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1988, at Cl;
Liberalism and Pragmatism, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1988, at 14.
More importantly, my preference for the phrase "individualistic democratic capital-
ism" reflects my efforts to confront the paradoxes arising from an application of the phi-
losophy of Individualism to economic and political life.
121. "[Tlhe system of material production (and relationships of material production)
we call 'capitalism' is ... historically associated with a political and social system we call
'liberal democracy."' PHmn GREEN, THE PuRsurr OF INEQUALITY 2 (1981).
122. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 391-92 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., 1993) (1776):
All systems either of preference or restraint, therefore, being thus completely
taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of
its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring forth his
industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of
men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the
proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be suf-
ficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing
it toward the employments most suitable to the interest of society.
123. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GovERNmENT 66 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1980) (1690) ("The great and chief end... of men uniting into common-wealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property."). Professors
Bailey Kuklin and Jeffrey Stempel interpret Locke's conception as follows:
Locke's conception of property has been particularly influential. The natural right
to property follows from its necessary linkage to the right of self-preservation. To
live, a person must have the means to obtain food and shelter. Hence, property
expresses God's dominion on earth, and the use of property evidences God's
grace. An individual possesses herself absolutely, and thus owns that which she
'mixes' her labor. While the earth was originally owned by all in common, one
may appropriate that which one removes from the state of nature by means of
personal labor, so long as the goods removed do not go to waste and the removal
does not deprive others of their means of self-preservation. The creation of
money, which is a nondecaying medium of exchange, avoids the.., limitation...
that the goods do not spoil, and facilitates the accumulation of wealth.
BAILEY KutIN & JmFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 52-53 (1994).
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state intervention. 124 That governance must rest on the consent of the
governed; that state power and authority are tolerable only so far as
they are accountable to the polity; and that differences of character
and capacity are inconsequential among human beings given their
common humanity are cornerstone principles of a liberal, political de-
mocracy.' 25 Thus, capitalism and liberal democracy are linked by indi-
vidualistic conceptions of personhood and by notions restricting the
scope of state authority. Indeed, individualistic theories of humanity
and society undergird both capitalism and liberal democracy.
Notwithstanding this linkage, there are fundamental tensions be-
tween capitalism and liberal democracy. R.H. Tawney declared that
the inequality of economic and social opportunity is the essence of
capitalism.126 Philip Green, for one, echoes Tawney: "The ethos of
capitalism is systematized inequality."' 27 Inequalities in a capitalist
political economy are esteemed as expressions of individual achieve-
ment or failure to achieve. Thus, "[t]hey are twice blessed. They de-
served moral approval, for they corresponded to merit. They were
economically beneficial, for they offered a system of prizes and
penalties." 28
Whereas the ethos of capitalism is systematized inequality, the
ethos of liberal democracy is equality:
Despite vast economic divisions we learn that we are all citizens and
in some sense equally citizens; that every citizen should count for
one and none for more than one; . . . that the system promises
worldly 'success' to all of us who are not incorrigible idlers: every
man (if not woman) can be king. Authority is alleged to result only
from merit, not from wealth, and wealth itself is justified as only a
reward for serving an important social function.12 9
The combination of the inequality of economic and social circum-
stances with the equality of civil and political rights has meant that
"economic divisions between men take the place of legal ones,"'130 and
equality has come to mean a uniformity of legal rights:
Rightly interpreted, equality meant, not the absence of violent con-
124. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY 16 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859):
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede
their efforts to obtain it.
125. See LocKE, supra note 123, at 52.
126. TAwNEY, supra note 96, at 30.
127. GREEN, supra note 121, at 1.
128. TAWNEY, supra note 96, at 102.
129. GREEN, supra note 121, at 2.
130. H. SEE, LEs ORIGINEs Du CAPITALISME MODERNE 183 (1926), quoted in TAW-
NEY, supra note 96, at 112.
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trasts of income and condition, but equal opportunities of becoming
unequal. It is true that few could take part in the competition, but
no one was forbidden to enter it, and no handicaps were imposed on
those who did. To ensure that it was fair, it was sufficient ... to
insist that the law should neither confer advantages nor impose
disabilities.' 31
Further, this combination has also limited any search for more
equality within the very economic sphere that produces inequality.132
In addition, the combination has elevated the individual over the col-
lective as the primary, if not the only appropriate, concern of social
justice.133 The primacy of the individual, in turn, has rendered factu-
ally and morally suspect conceptualizations of "the good society" that
are premised on collectivity.134
Throughout American history, conflicts arising from the relation-
ship between capitalism and democracy have been repeatedly re-
solved in favor of capitalism. Theodore Lowi recalls several instances
in which "capitalism won out in a straight fight" with democracy:
The issue could be Dred Scott v. Sanford, in which slaves were in-
corporated into the system by confirmation that they are property
under the Fifth Amendment. Or the issue could be popularly en-
acted state regulatory laws, invalidated as unreasonable restraints
on contract; many were invalidated as interference with even the
process by which contracts are made. Or the issue could be that of
the corporation itself, which was given two advantages in nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence; taken together they strain heavily
upon one's sense of logic. On the one hand corporations were
131. TAwNEY, supra note 96, at 103.
132. "[T]he advance of capitalism has everywhere deepened the social division of labor
and thus inequality on the one hand, and inspired and broadened the search for more
equality on the other." GREEN, supra note 121, at 1.
133. John Rawls, a philosophical descendant of Enlightenment thinkers, identifies two
basic principles of justice. One principle requires an equal right to liberty, while the
other-the "difference principle"--allows social and economic inequalities only when they
stem from opportunities that are fairly open to all and are reasonably expected to be to
everyone's advantage. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 60 (1971).
134. As Philip Green puts it:
Individualism is certainly as central to the ethos of liberal society as is egalitarian-
ism.... [T]wo aspects of liberal individualism... -- the principle of equal oppor-
tunity for individuals and the principle of limiting government interference with
the 'free' market-might at first glance seem to be unrelated to each other; cer-
tainly many people who uphold the first of those principles would repudiate the
second unqualifiedly. But in practical fact they are deeply related. Each makes
individual well-being the source as well as the criterion of social justice, and con-
siders versions of the good or the just which define them collectively as factually
and morally false. Each too.., proceeds by the almost unnoticed expedient of
accepting past assertions of collective good while opposing any attempt to extend
them to present-day groups who are excluded from the benefits of the past.
GREEN, supra note 121, at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
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merely property, for which the owners, the shareholders, received
for themselves total protection and full claim to all profits. On the
other hand corporations were defined as persons separate from
their owners, so that the death of a corporation affected no owner
beyond his shares-because stockholders are not responsible for
the debts of the corporation-and yet this "person" was held to en-joy almost all the rights of citizenship under the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment.135
My conscious disaggregation of the triad individualism, democ-
racy and capitalism is intended to bring into sharp relief the different
political and economic obstacles to a full realization of the egalitarian
doctrine-the point of reference from which Enlightenment thinkers
pontificated. 136 This disconnection of formal political equality from
the particulars of the socioeconomic milieu from which political equal-
ity derives meaning impedes realization of the egalitarian doctrine.
So too does the unequal sharing of socioeconomic prosperity brought
about by coordinated efforts.
My disaggregation of individualism, democracy and capitalism is
also an attempt to leave open the possibility of government provision
without conjuring up the specter of compromised individuals, free-
doms and markets. If indeed it is the state's obligation to protect indi-
vidual liberty-and thus ensure equality among the individuals
constituting a civil society-and, if indeed, the economic sphere is the
repository of more equality, then a revision of the noninterventionist
view is required if the state is to fulfill its obligation. 37
This Article does not seek primarily to interrogate the philosoph-
ical claims of Enlightenment thinkers.138 Rather, it engages in an ex-
position of individualistic democratic capitalism as it has been socially
constructed 139 in the American context. My concern is with a distinc-
tive American cultural identity that is imbued with these long-ago ar-
ticulated notions that pervade our thinking and practices regarding
135. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LiBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRI-
SIS OF PUBLIC AuTHORITY 6 (1969).
136. See M. JANE FRANCES FERGUSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EQuALITY xi-xiv (1943).
137. For the contemporary forumulation of the noninterventionist, or "minimal," state
see generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
138. The literature critiquing the philosophy of Individualism is voluminous. See gen-
erally LMERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael Sandel ed., 1984) for a debate on the contem-
porary ramifications of individualistic self-conceptions that pervade American culture.
139. Social constructionists assert that "human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted
and maintained in social situations." See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 3
(1966). The question that animates this work is, How is it that Enlightenment notions of
the individual pass for "knowledge" regardless of their validity or invalidity, and thus pro-
vide meanings for everyday life for Americans?
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social policy for the twentieth century and, in all likelihood, for centu-
ries to come.140
Enlightenment notions of individual autonomy drive social pro-
grams designed to "help the poor help themselves," to "avoid welfare
dependency" and to "get them off the dole" with deliberate speed.141
Thus, rather than effectuating economic redistribution, our current so-
140. The view that there exists a distinctive American cultural identity imbued with
Enlightenment notions that are rooted in centuries past suggests that there is a reified,
transcendental nature to those notions. Moreover, that view competes with the assertion
that Enlightenment notions are adaptable to changing and specific socio-cultural contexts.
A social constructionist understanding of reality, however, is helpful in striking an
accommodation of these seemingly competing views. Berger and Luckmann write that:
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that
is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. Another way of saying this is
that reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they
were something else than human products-such as facts of nature, results of cos-
mic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable
of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further that the dialec-
tic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness.
... lypically, the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in
consciousness.... Human meanings are no longer understood as world-producing
but as being, in their turn, products of the 'nature of things."'
BERGER & Luc ArN,, supra note 139, at 89 (emphasis in original).
Enlightenment notions are products of human activity, and are thus iade and remade
in an ongoing human production. This means that in a sense they are artificial. However,
because they are habitually reproduced, they have -a self-evident quality. They possess a
reality of their own that appears unbounded temporally and spatially. These characteris-
tics cause me at times to speak of the Enlightenment notions embodied, in individualistic
democratic capitalism as timeless, transcendental principles, as a sort of grand theory
around which all cohere.
I also speak of the adaptability of individualistic democratic capitalism, and I make
appeals for specificity and historical contextualization. This is not because I intend to be
contradictory. Rather, it is because I recognize that the continuing legitimacy of so-called
timeless, transcendental principles is dependent upon their availability and plausibility for
particular societies. The timeless quality of Enlightenment notions cannot be appreciated
without exploration of how they thrive in-are rearticulated in-particular cultural and
historical circumstances.
141. These are commonly expressed sentiments. They frequently appear in one form
or another in journalistic coverage of and editorial commentary on contemporary welfare
policy reform efforts. See e.g., Susan Chira, Novel Idea in Welfare Plan Helping Children
by Helping Their Fathers, N.Y. Tnmms, Mar. 30, 1994, at A10 (discussing the relationship
between paternal responsibility and welfare reform); Mickey Kaus, The G.O.P.'s Welfare
Squeeze, N.Y. TIMEs, April 6, 1995, at A31 (arguing that "workfare discourages people
from going on the dole and gives them the means to survive"); Robert Pear, House Backs
Bill Undoing Decades of Welfare Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at Al (reporting on the
Republicans' belief that proposed welfare bill "would liberate people from dependence on
Government programs."); Help the Poor Help Themselves, N.Y. TeiEs, July 13, 1994, at
A18 (letter to the editor advocating the "empower[ment] of-poor overseas... [and] here at
home"); Welfare Reform in the Making, N.Y. TnIEs, Dec. 13, 1993, at A16 (editorial com-
menting on proposed "time-limited welfare").
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cial policies are limited to providing incentives of various sorts for the
poor to assimilate into an entrenched capitalistic economy that com-
pels the very existence of a poverty class. Enlightenment concepts of
meritorious ascension up a scale of rewards and opportunities provide
justification for any failure to move from the margins of economic
existence. Thus, no serious consideration is given to alternate modes
of economic organization. 142
In addition, the fear of centralized government and the faith in a
market economy restrict governmental efforts to provide for the pub-
lic weal. Furthermore, the dominant perspective is that servient gov-
ernment undermines the capitalism that is of vital importance to a
strong sense of individual independence.
I do not contend that the abstract philosophical claims of the En-
lightenment thinkers are inherently racially oppressive. 43 Rather, I
maintain that expressions of individualistic democratic capitalism in
the American experience tend to be informed and determined by
race. 44 Individualistic democratic capitalism, in its abstract form,
posits a vision of society comprised of rational, free-choosing persons,
142. Liberal democracy is so linked with capitalism that the legitimacy of socialism, an
alternate mode of economic organization, is undermined by representing it as at variance
with democracy. But socialism is a criticism of capitalism that is congruous with democ-
racy. Tawney writes:
Socialism accepts ... the principles[ I which are the corner-stones of democracy,
that authority, to justify its title, must rest on consent; that power is tolerable only
so far as it is accountable to the public; and that differences of character and
capacity between human beings, however important on their own plane, are of
minor significance compared with the capital fact of their common humanity. Its
object is to extend the application of those principles from the sphere of civil and
political rights, where, at present, they are nominally recognized, to that of eco-
nomic and social organization, where they are systematically and insolently
defied.
TAwNEY, supra note 96, at 197.
143. Professor Richard Delgado, in Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy,
and the State, 41 UCLA L. REv. 721 (1994), appears to suggest otherwise, contending in
one instance that "racism and enlightenment are the same thing. They go together; they
are opposite sides of the same coin," id. at 729, and, in another, that "[1]iberal democracy
and racial subordination go hand in hand, like the sun, moon, and stars. Enlightenment is
to racism as sexuality is to women's oppression-the very means by which [racialized peo-
ples] are kept down." Id at 734-35.
144. Here, I employ the idea of race, see THOMAS F. GossETT, RACE: THE HISTORY
OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963) (discussing the importance of European contact with the
indigenous populations in the Americas in generating modern race theories), not to denote
racial prejudice, but rather to denote white supremacy. Compare GORDON W. ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (25th Ann. ed., Addison-Wesley 1979) (1954) (discussing race
as a contributing factor to intergroup prejudice) and JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A
PSYCHOHISTORY (1970) (discussing racism as a source of gratification to whites) with
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SuPREmAcy: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN
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each knowledgeable of his or her own interests and capable of advanc-
ing those interests in a market place accessible to all. However, in a
racialized American society, the vaunted freedoms of personhood are
recalibrated. As such, they almost always assure greater liberties to
white persons and lesser, or none, to people of color. As a conse-
quence, people of color, while striving for parity, tend to exist at the
political, economic and legal peripheries of American society.
So profound is the influence of race on the core ethos of the na-
tion's identity that it is common to speak of the United States of
America as "a white country." Commenting on life in America, the
historian Roger Wilkins writes:
Whites have an easy sense of ownership of this country; they feel
they are entitled to receive all that is best in it. Many of them be-
lieve that their country-though it may have some faults-is supe-
rior to all others and that, as Americans, they are superior as well.
Many of them think of this as a white country and some of them
even experience it that way. They think of it as a land of opportu-
nity-a good place with a lot of good people in it. Some suspect
(others know) that the presence of blacks messes everything up.145
Political theorist and social commentator Andrew Hacker, for ex-
ample, asserts that "America is inherently a 'white' country: in char-
acter, in structure, in culture." 146 Toni Morrison recently made a
similar observation:
Deep within the word "American" is its association with race. To
identify someone as a South African is to say very little; we need the
adjective "white" or "black" or "colored" to make our meaning
clear. In this country it is quite the reverse. American means
white[.]147
AND SouTm AFRICAN HIsToRY (1981) (discussing race as a qualification for membership
in the civil community and the alien or outsider status of persons of color).
Professor Frances Ansley best articulates my understanding of white supremacy. She
writes:
By "white supremacy" I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious racism
of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, economic and cul-
tural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material re-
sources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are
widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are
daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings.
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholar-
ship, 74 CoRNn.L L. R v. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
145. Wilkins, supra note 15, at 410 (emphasis in original).
146. ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WsroT, SEPARATE, HosTILE, UN-
uOAL 4 (1992).
147. MORRISON, supra note 103, at 47. America's identity and culture, as defined by
European ancestry, are in a state of crisis as Americans who trace their descendants to
Africa, Arabia, Asia, the Pacific Islands and the Latino worlds challenge the dominant
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Much of my thesis depends upon an understanding of American
identity, character and culture as it has been racialized over several
centuries. According to anthropologist Sidney Mintz, culture can be
"a kind of resource."'1 48 "[C]ulture," Mintz writes, "is used; and ...
any analysis of its use immediately brings into view the arrangements
of persons in social groups, for whom cultural forms confirm, rein-
force, maintain, change, or deny particular arrangements of status,
power, and identity."'149 Cultural expressions of the racialized tenets
of individualistic democratic capitalism have been used to establish
what Michael Omi and Howard Winant identify as a "racial dictator-
ship" against which all U.S. politics must be measured: o50
From 1607 to 1865-258 years-most non-whites were firmly elimi-
nated from the sphere of politics. After the Civil War there was the
brief egalitarian experiment of Reconstruction which terminated ig-
nominiously in 1877. In its wake followed almost a century of legally
sanctioned segregation and denial of the vote, nearly absolute in the
South and much of the Southwest, less effective in the North and far
West, but formidable in any case. These barriers fell only in the mid-
1960s, a mere quarter-century ago. Nor did the successes of the
black movement and its allies mean that all obstacles to their polit-
ical participation had now been abolished. Patterns of racial ine-
quality have proven, unfortunately, to be quite stubborn and
persistent.151
Because my task here is to interpret and comprehend the politics
of American social policy, I must explicity consider the cultural conti-
nuities and adaptations that sustain and normalize the racialized struc-
tures within which our current social policy is developed. Thus, in the
next section, I provide an analysis of the historical relationship be-
tween individualistic democratic capitalism and race in America, their
influence on the nation's culture, character and identity, as weli as
their organization and structuring of social and political discourse.
This history, sometimes prominent in our collective consciousness
and, at other times, a vague recollection ensconced in the recesses of
our minds, contains powerful ideological themes that are played out in
current attempts to understand the social standing of African-Ameri-
cans in a post-civil-rights era. Indeed, one might argue that our spe-
construction of Americanness. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY
OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 2 (1993) ("This emerging demographic diversity has raised
fundamental questions about America's identity and culture.").
148. Sidney W. Mintz, Foreword, AFRo-AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY: CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 10 (Norman E. Whitten, Jr. & John F. Szwed eds., 1970).
149. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
150. OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 66.
151. Id. at 65-66.
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cific policy treatment of African-Americans reflects the larger
sociopolitical and economic events that have shaped the development
of the American character. Thus, a brief, historical examination of
individualistic democratic capitalism and race, and their linkages, is a
necessary prerequisite to the analysis of specific social policies.
I. A Brief History of American Cultural Identity
A. The Central Principle of Individualism
Individualism is rooted in the belief that humans exist to fulfill
themselves. Set apart from other animals by their intellect and capac-
ity to reason, humans are self-aware and knowledgeable of their inter-
ests, desires, and preferences. Moreover, humans possess, or are
capable of possessing, scientific ideas that enable the realization of
those interests, desires and preferences. This self-realization is possi-
ble only when individuals have the freedom to determine the course
of their lives-the freedom of choice.
The private ownership of property and a free market system are
central to the concept of freedom. Property ownership prevents de-
pendence on and exploitation by others. One need not offer up one-
self as a wage-earner. 152 Independence and security can be attained
through one's own toil. Rational, self-reliant and in total control over
his or her' 53 production, the individual is suited to venture out into an
open market place, where, for one's exclusive benefit, one barters and
trades at will. Self-realization is not only possible-it actually occurs
in this market place.
The economic identity acquired as a result of venturing into the
market place has crucial significance for individualism. A person's
economic identity speaks volumes about and gives meaning to the
civil and political freedoms enjoyed by that person. 54
As feminist historian Elizabeth Fox-Genovese has noted, the de-
152. As discussed in Part III.B.4 infra, an ideology of individualism equates wage work
with bondage and unfreedom.
153. Though I acknowledge that abstracted individualism does not account for gender
differences etched in social reality, I do not pursue that line of critique in this Article. For
the feminist critique of the individualistic underpinnings of liberal societies, see generally
FEMINIST CHALLENGES: SoCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (Carole Pateman & Elizabeth
Gross eds., 1986) (providing a feminist analysis of conventional or 'male-stream' political
and social theory).
154. I do not make the facile argument that economics determines all. Rather, I con-
tend that the economic self is a dominant feature among the interdependent constituents
of the free individual. The economic is dialectically interactive with, for example, the polit-
ical and the cultural, which are cause and effect of each other.
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velopment of individualism as an expression of Western culture was
evolutionary:
Individualism did not emerge all at once as a full-blown ideology. It
developed slowly and piecemeal. The Renaissance, the Reforma-
tion, the Scientific Revolution, and the rapid expansion of com-
merce have all been related to the growth of "individualism" in
Western culture, although in significantly different ways. As cultural
and ideological movements, the Renaissance and the Reformation
both introduced a new emphasis on the individual into Western cul-
ture, although neither resulted in its political consolidation. The Sci-
entific Revolution fostered a growing confidence in the capacity of
the human mind to understand and master the workings of nature.
The rapid expansion of commerce and colonialism, combined with
the decline of feudalism and corporatism - that is, the growing sep-
aration between laborers and the land, between people and commu-
nities - fueled a social and economic transformation that
encouraged the gradual application of aspects of secular and reli-
gious culture to political life and that eventually culminated in the
series of political revolutions that inaugurated our modern world.155
B. Individualism in the American Context
1. The Colonial Era and the Emergence of Divergent White and Black
Social Economic Identities
The first full-blown expressions 156 of individualism in the Western
world occurred in America, a nation said to have been "conceived in
liberty."'1 57 During the two centuries preceding the American concep-
tion, existing western societies-notably England-had powerful
monarchies, aristocratic classes and gentry that sought to secure and
maintain their dominance over other sectors of society.158 The coloni-
zation of the vast American frontier presented a means by which the
155. ELIZABETH Fox-GENoVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A CRITIQUE OF IN-
DIVIDUALISM 120-21 (1991).
156. To be sure expressions of individualism were evident throughout the Western
world. But, as Gordon Wood observes:
For the revolutionary generation America became the Enlightenment fulfilled.
The settlement of America, said John Adams in 1765, was "the opening of a
grand scene and design in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant, and the
emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth." The Revolution
was simply the climax of this grand historic drama. Enlightenment was spreading
everywhere in the Western world, but nowhere more promisingly than in
America.
WOOD, supra note 117, at 191.
157. See GARY WILLs, LINCOLN AT GETrYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE
AMERICA 78 (1992) (discussing "Lincoln's fertility-language of conception").
158. For an example, see SIDNEY LENS, POVERTY: AMERICA'S ENDURING PARADOX:
A HISTORY OF THE RICHEST NATION'S UNWON WAR 11-15 (1969) (describing the impact
of "the first taste of individualism" on sixteenth and seventeenth century England). Lens
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upper classes could preserve a favorable social order.159 The abun-
dant American land was promised to any dispossessed person willing
to conquer it from its aboriginal peoples.
Lowly Europeans escaped a life of dependence and exploitation
by migrating to the American colonies. Land was too accessible and
cheap to restrict its ownership. Most colonial males owned land and,
consequently, controlled their own means of production as well as the
resulting product. 160
The widespread ownership of property by Europeans in colonial
America facilitated a way of life, the likes of which had never before
been seen. No remnants of a feudal society with its nobilities, privi-
leges of birth and social strictures curtailed the pursuits of the colonial
soil tillers. Their labor, unlike the labor of their non-colonial breth-
documents the rise of an insidious pauperism as England replaced its stagnant and immo-
bile feudal economy with an economy based on mercantilism:
The population, of course, had always been poor, in the sense that the average
man lived from hand to mouth. But in earlier times he had had a certain security;
he had had a few patches of land to work and a reasonable expectation that he
would continue to work them. But wool, England's chief export for a long time,
made a shambles of the former way of life. By age-old custom each village had a
commons, used by the lowly as well as the mighty to graze cattle. Presumably the
commons was commonly owned, but in their zeal to find pasture land for their
sheep, the gentry built enclosures-fences-around this common property to
make it their own. Tenants and small farmers were left to graze their cattle on
already inadequate holdings, or slaughter them, and in many cases give up their
land.
IA at 13.
159. Lens noted that the availability of land in America "was no sure-fire guarantee
against poverty," id. at 21, and that the English upper classes at all times secured and
pursued their own riches:
England's men of power understood that by opening up America they were offer-
ing a mecca to the poor-draining off, as the London Company put it, "the fuel of
dangerous insurrections." Their first concern, however, was for themselves. The
monarchs doled out America's largesse in large chunks to the high and mighty.
The whole area from Maine to the middle of South Carolina, two hundred miles
inland, for instance, went to two stock companies made up of the biggest entre-
preneurs of the time on condition they would pay James I one-fifth of the gold
and silver they found there. One of these charters-for the Massachusetts Bay
Company-was given to twenty-six men, mostly affluent Puritan merchants....
The Carolinas went to eight proprietors... Maryland was given to Lord Balti-
more and the Calverts; Pennsylvania, to William Penn; New York (and New
Jersey), to the Duke of York.
Id
160. See Wn-iLAm L. BAmEY, THE PASSAGE OF THE REPUmLIC: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY HISTORY OF NNmEEENTH CENTURY AmERcA 9 (1987) ("In sharp contrast to Eu-
rope, land was cheaper, more accessible, and comparatively widely owned in the
colonies.... [Most] colonial males had neither the incentive nor the need to offer them-
selves as wage earners.").
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ren, brought them not only wealth and prominence, but also self-ful-
fillment. Upwardly mobile and untethered from aristocratic
conventions, European colonists confidently asserted their intrinsic
worth and right to self-determination.
Race eventually substituted for the status of birth and fortune-
social constructs that were, theoretically, exorcised from a society im-
bued with the idea of equal individuals with indistinguishable liber-
ties-to structure the cultural and social realities of the colonial
American. As racialized beings,161 Africans were deemed inferior to
Europeans, and thus were excluded from the autonomous existence
that accompanied the settlement of the colonies.
The historical record indicates that in 1619, twelve years after the
settlement of Virginia, the first Africans, twenty in all, arrived in
Jamestown, apparently as indentures sold to the highest bidder for a
predetermined number of years.162 Like European indentured ser-
vants, African indentures secured their freedom at the expiration of
their terms of servitude. Subsequently, they "accumulated land,
voted, testified in court and mingled with whites on a basis of
equality."'1 63
This form of equality, however, was short-lived. By the 1640s,
lifelong servitude was imposed on African indentures, but not on Eu-
ropean indentures. The basis for this emerging distinction between
black and white bondage, Professors Franklin and Moss explain, had
to do with Virginians' efforts to satisfy the colony's labor needs:
[A]s time went on Virginia steadily fell behind in satisfying the la-
bor needs of the colony with Indians and indentured servants. It was
then that the colonists began to give serious thought to the "perpet-
ual servitude" of Negroes. Virginians began to see what neighboring
islands in the Caribbean had already recognized, namely that Ne-
groes could not easily escape without being identified; that they
could be disciplined, even punished, with impunity since they were
not Christians; and that the supply was apparently inexhaustible.' 64
By 1680, European indentured labor had precipitously declined,
only to be replaced with an explosive demand for African slave labor.
Ninety-five percent of African slaves brought to the New World came
161. For a discussion of the racialization of Native Americans that accompanied the
settlement of the colonies, see TAAXI, supra note 147, at 24-50.
162. See LERONE BENNETr, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLAcK
AMERICA 29 (Penguin Books 5th ed. 1982) (1962).
163. Id. at 35.
164. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY To FREE-
DOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 53-54 (6th ed. 1988).
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after the mid-seventeenth century.165 The degraded status of Afri-
cans, from servants to slaves, and the increase in their numbers in the
colonial population coincided with the mass arrival of European set-
tlers. The total colonial population in 1650 was only 50,368, with en-
slaved blacks constituting three percent. By the end of the
seventeenth century, the total colonial population grew to 250,888,
with enslaved blacks making up eleven percent of the population.166
Just one year before the American Revolution of 1776, the total popu-
lation of the colonies had swelled to 2,460,000, with enslaved blacks
accounting for twenty percent of the population. 67
Thus, as the mass settlement of the colonies occurred, early
American individualism endowed the population with inalienable
rights in a racially discriminatory manner that favored whites (both
free and indentured) over blacks. Consequently, European colonists
pursued the freedoms and opportunities associated with the owner-
ship, possession and use of land, while Africans were likened to chat-
tel, enslaved and subjected to the complete authority and control of
European settlers.
Thenceforth, white socioeconomic identity would be fastened to
historic themes of flight from authority and opportunities in the "fron-
tier." Black socioeconomic identity, by contrast, would be directly
linked to a history of subjugation' 68 and exclusion from the "frontier"
experience. 169
Legalized slavery in each of the colonies provided the staging
ground for the divergence of white and black socioeconomic identi-
ties. In the North, by 1790, 2.1 percent of the colonial population
were enslaved blacks who served as domestic servants and skilled
165. See OAKES, supra note 118, at 46-53.
166. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HIsToIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TiMEs TO 1957, SERIES Z1-19 (1960).
167. See JAMES A. HENRETA & GREGORY H. NoBLEs, EVOLUTION AND REVOLU-
TION: AMERicAN SocmY 1600-1820, at 30 (1987).
168. I purposely say a "history of subjugation," and not a "history of slavery," to recog-
nize that even after the abolition of slavery, other means-sharecropping, Jim Crow-ism,
segregation, terrorism, disenfranchisement, and discrimination-were devised to ensure
dominion over blacks.
169. The recent experience of black immigrants to the United States, especially those
from the West Indies, has caused a significant fusion of the two economic identities. As a
Jamaican growing up in the boroughs of New York City, it was not uncommon for me to
hear my parents and their contemporaries talk in terms of flight from economic oppression
"back home," and the possibilities of unlimited opportunities in "buckra country." The
word "buckra" was used to denote white authority (historically, the overseer of slaves),
and my parents' and their friends' use of it communicated their awareness of their para-
doxical existence-expatriates of color in search of opportunities that are race-determined.
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craftsmen. By contrast, in the southern colonies, 33.5 percent of the
population were enslaved blacks. 170 The preponderance of enslaved
blacks in the South made possible a "slave society," as distinguished
from-as in the case of the North-a society with slaves.171 Historian
James Oakes writes that to appreciate fully the qualitative distinction
between a society with slaves and a slave society, one has to imagine
the Old South without slaves:
Everything is different. The Proverbial social pyramid - slavehold-
ers on top, nonslaveholders in the middle, slaves on the bottom -
does not simply change with the hypothetical removal of slaves, it
collapses altogether.... Yet if all the slaves had hypothetically been
removed from the northern colonies, the structure of society would
not have fundamentally altered. The basis of the economy, the or-
ganization of politics, and the social hierarchy might have changed
somewhat, but they would not have been radically transformed. 172
"A slave society," Oakes continues, "was one in which a relatively
high proportion of slaves signaled the central place of slavery in the
social hierarchy, the economic structure, and the political system. So-
cial standing was determined by whether one was slave or free and, if
free, whether one owned or did not own slaves."'1 73
The slave societies of the Old South were imbued with the ideol-
ogy of individualistic democratic capitalism. 74 That germinal ideol-
ogy had to account for a system of slavery that so clearly contradicted
its most fundamental tenets-universal rights, individual indepen-
dence and the pursuit of self-interest. One paternalistic view insisted
that black people were naturally unfit to enjoy the freedoms flowing
from inalienable rights and personal autonomy. 75 Deemed so un-
suited, they were reduced to "property" with the attendant rights of
use, possession and ownership vested in white persons. 176 Held as
"property," blacks were absolutely denied the tenets of individualistic
170. PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 242 (1993).
171. See OAKES, supra note 118, at 36-39.
172. Id. at 37-38.
173. Id. at 38. Oakes also notes that "[i]n colonial New England a substantial propor-
tion of the most prominent leaders were slaveholders." Id at 37-38.
174. For a discussion of other ideological strains infused with Old South slave societies,
see generally MARK TUSHNET, AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY (1987).
175. See Howard McGary, Paternalism and Slavery, in BETWEEN SLAVERY AND FREE-
DOM: PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 16-17 (Howard McGary & Bill E. Lawson
eds., 1992) (arguing against the "paternalistic" aspect of the "were slaveholders ignorant or
evil?" debate, which is an explanation of slavery that claims slaveholders held slaves be-
cause they felt that they truly served the slaves' interests).
176. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1716 (1993)
(discussing the historical idea of racial charactistics as property).
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democratic capitalism and, with the aid of the law,177 placed outside of
society178 where they experienced "social death.1 79
In other words, the slave societies of the Old South infused the
ideology of individualistic democratic capitalism with race to justify,
preserve and perpetuate the social and economic order of the day.
Importantly, it was a social and economic order from which a mere
minority of whites benefitted directly. Only one in five white house-
holds actually owned slaves.180 Most whites were nothing more than
aspirants to planter status-that is, ownership of enslaved blacks. Yet
their aspirations to rise above their actual circumstances were fueled
with the knowledge that their own loss of freedom by enslavement
was impossible because they were deemed not "black."' 81 Non-
slaveholding whites, however, posed no ideological challenge to the
existing state of inequity even though the practices engendered by in-
dividualistic democratic capitalism were clearly economically-and,
derivatively, politically--disadvantageous to them.182
177. See HON. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND
THE AMERIcAN LEGAL PRocEss: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 78-82 (1978) (discussing the con-
struction of the colonial legal system to entrench non-white servitude and limit and dehu-
manize non-whites).
178. See OAKES, supra note 118, at 69-71 (discussing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREA-
TISE ON GOVERNImNT). See generally Bill Lawson, Citizenship and Slavery, in BETWEEN
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 175, at 55-70 (discussing Lockean political theory and
black citizenship).
179. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SociAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE SruDY
38 (1982).
180. Writing on class and labor relations in the late antebellum south, historian Jacque-
line Jones notes that
[d]epending on the locale, as many as 20 to 33 percent of Southern whites in [as
late as] 1860 possessed neither slaves nor land; about one-fifth of all white house-
holds owned at least one slave (with 1 percent of that number qualifying as
"planter-aristocrats"), and about half of the total white population were yeoman
farmers.
JACQUELINE JoNEs, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UNDERCLASSES FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO THE PRESENT 54 (1992); see also JAMES OAKEs, THE RULING RACE: A HIsTORY
OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS (1982) (discussing antebellum white social structure).
181. Professor Cheryl Harris argues that "[b]ecause the 'presumption of freedom
[arose] from [the] color [white]' and the 'black color of the race [raised] the presumption of
slavery,' whiteness became a shield from slavery." Harris, supra note 176, at 1720 (quoting
THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 68-69, at 66-67 (1858)).
182. The upcountry yeomen's protest against the predominance of planters' interests
over their own in state legislatures is not the ideological challenge of which I speak. Nor
are the efforts of white artisans who sought to avoid competition from the use of slave
labor. Upcountry yeomen and white artisans only sought inclusion as equal participants in
and beneficiaries of individual democratic capitalism. See Fields, supra note 94, at 108-109
(discussing the economic independence and local self-determination of nonslaveholding
whites).
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2. Individualism in the Revolutionary Era
The early exclusion of blacks from a polity that guaranteed indi-
vidual freedoms and protection continued well into the Revolutionary
era. 8 3 Not coincidentally, it was an historic period punctuated with
the rise of racism based on physiognomy. Historian James Oakes
explains:
Nationalism is a language of inclusion within . . . the "imagined
community" that constitutes the nation. By contrast, racism is a lan-
guage of exclusion that "erases nation-ness by reducing the adver-
sary to his biological physiognomy." Thus it is not entirely
surprising that the birth of the "first new nation" was accompanied
by the disturbing articulation of a racist ideology. For the emer-
gence of nationalism generated novel pressures to re-affirm the
slave's place outside the "imagined community" of the modern
American nation. 184
The form of racism articulated during the Revolutionary era con-
tributed to a constitutionalization l8 5 of the "outsider" status of blacks
that would prove resistant to future reformatory efforts. 8 6 Indeed,
notwithstanding the extension of the formal privileges and immunities
of American citizenship to African-Americans in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, social critics of those epochs would continue to
recognize that though blacks were in American society, blacks were
not of American society.'8 7
183. On the hypocrisy of slaveholders devoting themselves to freedom see EDMUND S.
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIR-
GINIA 363-367 (1975) (discussing how the presence of slavery instilled in Virginians a spe-
cial appreciation for political freedom from the English).
184. OAKES, supra note 118, at 74 (quoting BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMU-
NITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 135 (1983)).
185. Though neither the term "black" nor "slave" appears in the text of the 1787 Con-
stitution, the institution of slavery, and thus the exile of blacks to a place beyond the
imagined community of the modern American nation was written into its subtext. See
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 34 (1991) (noting that the Constitution managed to continue
"Black Slavery" via its provisions for return of escaped slaves, representational aggrandize-
ment of slaveholding districts, and 20-year non-interference with the slave trade "all ...
without using the words slave or slavery").
186. "[Blecause slavery thrived in republican America, [blacks] could be stigmatized as
the antithesis of republican citizens." Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). For the argument
that the opposite is also true-that republicanism made it increasingly difficult to maintain
the outsider status of blacks, see WOOD, supra note 117, at 186-87 (arguing that "the re-
publican attack on dependency compelled Americans to see the deviant character of slav-
ery and to confront the institution as they never had to before").
187. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROB-
LEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 956-94 (1944) (discussing the "peculiarities" of black cul-
ture and personality). Emphasis on the extension of formal privileges and immunities of
American citizenship to persons who are black has had ironic consequences. Indeed, that
[Vol. 46
Though the colonial revolutionaries had brought forth a new na-
tion that idealistically embraced individualism as a guiding principle in
political and economic life,188 the new republic was, in fact, undemo-
cratic even among whites. Participation in the political process was
conditioned on substantial property ownership, thus revealing an un-
derlying assumption "that only those with a financial stake in the soci-
ety could be safely trusted with its management."' 8 9 The exploding
white population faced a shortage of cultivable land, which curtailed
its tendency toward acquisition. Moreover, economic stagnation pre-
vented established farmers and other rural traders from gaining a
stake in American society through the accretion of private prop-
erty.19° Lack of, or insignificant, property holdings among whites im-
plied political subordination and economic dependency.
3. Individualism in Antebellum America
The land needed for greater realization of political and economic
emphasis enervates and threatens to undermine race-specific remedies because such reme-
dies are vulnerable to attack on grounds that they offend principles of neutrality, objectiv-
ity, and color blindness. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," 44 STAr. L. REv. 1, 62 (1991) (suggesting an alternative to "color-blind constitu-
tionalism"). Additionally, such remedies have proven to be inattentive to race ideology
and neglectful of the operation of white nepotism that impedes meaningful racial reform.
See DERscK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
56 (1992) (discussing racial nepotism with the fictional lawyer-prophet Geneva Crenshaw).
Consequently, in the closing decades of the twentieth century, legal scholars like Professor
Kimberle Crenshaw insightfully observe that attempts at race reform that pivot on notions
of formal equality, in fact, preserve existing hierarchical structures of American society.
See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
188. Among historians, considerable controversy exists over the brand of individualism
prevalent in eighteenth century America. At one extreme, the individual is self-interested
and especially focused on private rights and profit-making. At the other, self-interested-
ness gives way to disinterestedness-to a common concern for the public good. For a re-
view of this controversy see Gordon S. Wood, The Virtues and the Interests, NEw
REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1991, at 32 (reviewing IsAAc KRAMNiCK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOUR-
GEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
AND AMERICA (1991)). Wood argues against the sharp dichotomy of views expressed in
this controversy in his book, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, supra note 117.
189. HEN-ETrA & NOBLES, supra note 167, at 171-73.
190. Barney explains that the post-Revolutionary American economy was stagnant. In
Massachusetts, for example, the state government sought to collect taxes in hard currency
though there was a shortage of specie. There was a ripple effect: urban merchants
squeezed hard currency out of rural traders, who in turn looked to farmers as a source of
specie. Legal proceedings to collect the farmers' debts ensued, often resulting in the con-
fiscation of entire farms. Even short of confiscation, the debt collection proceedings
sapped farmers of their capital and capital-producing resources. BARNEY, supra note 160,
at 185-89.
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liberty among whites became available with the enactment of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the purchase of the Louisiana terri-
tories in 1803, both of which opened the western frontiers. 191 In the
Old Northwest, migrants pursuing independence and self-sufficiency
transformed millions of forest acres into farms, which they cultivated
to sustain their families.192 Southern whites, also seeking indepen-
dence and a competency, transplanted the plantation agriculture of
the South Atlantic region to the Old Southwest.193 Just as the North
American frontier was a mecca for Europe's commoners, the western
frontier held the same allure for America's masses from the east.19
Individual entrepreneurship and commercialization slowly and
erratically emerged alongside (and oftentimes supplanted) the acquisi-
tive, property-based individualism of colonial America. The introduc-
tion of steamboats, the construction of canals, the building of
railroads-in essence the transportation revolution-and the mecha-
nization of farm labor encouraged commercial farming in the Old
Northwest. Farmers originally in pursuit of self-sufficiency and famil-
ial security were now bent on accumulating capital through the mar-
keting of income-producing crops. As a market economy grew,
nonfarm opportunities increased, and concomitantly, the number of
would-be farmers laboring for wages multiplied.
Slavery fueled the emerging market economy of the Old South-
west. In response to the demands for cotton by Europe's textile man-
ufacturers, planters of the Old Southwest exploited the labor of
enslaved Africans and African-Americans to cultivate cotton. Conse-
191. The classic work on the significance of the frontier experience and individualism is
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1921). See also
RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, WESTWARD EXPANSION (1974). For critiques of the Turnerian
interpretation, see generally THE FRONTIER IN HISTORY: NORTH AMERICA AND SOUTH
AFRICA COMPARED (Howard Lamar & Leonard Thompson eds., 1981) (testing Turner's
hypothesis on "frontiers" created by the expansion of Europe and commercial and indus-
trial capitalism) and TURNER AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE FRONTIER (Richard Hofstadter
& Seymour Martin Lipset eds., 1968) (containing various criticisms, re-examinations, re-
evaluations of, and post mortem on, Turner's work).
192. My discussion of the expansion of the western frontier rests largely on BARNEY,
supra note 160, at 9-49.
193. See generally ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, The Origin and the Growth of Southern Black
Belts, in AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 11 (1906); W.H. YARBROUGH, ECONOMIC AS-
PECTS OF SLAVERY IN RELATION TO SOtTHERN AND SOUTHWESTERN MIGRATION (1932);
John Solomon Otto, The Migration of the Southern Plain Folk: An Interdisciplinary Syn-
thesis, 1985 J. SOUTHERN HIsT. 51.
194. "Free land ... tended to relieve poverty outside the West, and on the frontier
itself it fostered economic equality. Both these tendencies made for an increase of democ-
racy .... [T]he West offered freedom and subsistence to all .. " HENRY NASH SMITH,
VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 252 (1950).
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quently, a planter's wealth became directly related to the size of his
slave holdings because the greater the number of slaves, the greater
the size of his plantation and, hence, the greater his capacity to pro-
duce marketable cotton. In the market economy of the old South,
white southerners who were landless and without slaves found them-
selves obligated to planter aristocrats for credit, food, jobs, and loans
of slaves.195
Back in the East, particularly the Northeast, the revolution in
transportation opened up new domestic markets for raw materials and
the finished goods of artisans. As markets were established, the desire
for finished goods grew, in turn triggering a demand for raw materials
and an increase in production. Mechanization and specialization of
the production process was inevitable, and factories soon engulfed or
replaced the artisans.
Though the geographic boundaries of young America expanded
westward, the republic still failed to produce a predominant society of
independent farmers and artisans among whites. Ironically, the west-
ward expansion made possible the conditions for wage labor, which in
the eyes of the Jacksonian American bespoke of degradation and
"white slavery.1 96
4. Individualism, Racialized Identities and the Emergence of Wage Labor
In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England when wage labor
first emerged, it connoted freedom when contrasted against the condi-
tion of serfdom.197 However, when the white wage earner first ap-
peared in nineteenth-century America,198 the emancipatory meaning
of wage labor was less evident. The economic and political landscape
had been so defined by individual self-sufficiency and independence
that white Americans understood the experience of working for wages
as dependence, bondage and subjection to capital represented by
planters, banks, railroads and towns.- 99 Indeed, white Americans
195. See JONES, supra note 180, at 55-58.
196. For a discussion of the etiology of the term "white slavery," see ROEDiGER, supra
note 185, at 65-87 (chapter describing the emergence of white slaves, wage labor and free
white labor).
197. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALIsM:
HOBBES TO LocKE 149-51 (1962) (discussing the Leveller movement's concept of freedom
as a function of property in one's labor).
198. See ROEDIGER, supra note 185, at 20 (noting that in America the white worker
arrived in the early nineteenth century).
199. See JONES, supra note 180, at 55-57; see also Emic FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LA.
BOR, FRE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
xvii (1995) ("The rise of wage labor, and its institutionalization in the law, posed a
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who, as a result of commercialization and industrialization, had to sell
their labor in order to survive comprehended their status as wage la-
borers as a form of "unfreedom. ' '200
This "unfreedom" experienced by the emerging white American
wage earner underscored the nineteenth-century reordering of the so-
cial relations of production, which in turn augured new forms of social
divisions, anxieties and consciousness. J. R. Pole succinctly summa-
rizes the social reorderings arising from commercial manufacturing as
follows:
Manufacturing industry advanced with the increasing concentration
and division of labor in factories rather than small workshops, and
with a deepening distance between owners and managers on one
side and workers on the other....
The changes that were affecting the economy promoted among
the mechanics a wholly new sense of class, which began to take the
place of the older sense of belonging to a specialist trade and skill.
Workers were experiencing a disturbing sense of distance and alien-
ation from their employers and customers, together with a felt loss
of control over their livelihood and conditions of work.201
Initial resistance to the new social relations thrust upon the nine-
teenth-century American was (predictably) organized around the ten-
ets of individualistic democratic capitalism. Formerly independent
farmers, acting in the name of freedom and democracy, revolted.2°2
Artisans attempted to counter the disruption of their system of labor
by mobilizing in ways designed to preserve, in one form or another, a
modicum of their independence-a condition revered by individualis-
tic democratic capitalism.203
Resistance, however, gave way to reinterpretations of individual-
profound challenge for the ethos that define economic dependence as incompatible with
freedom.").
200. "Unfreedom" among whites was ostensibly eliminated by the Revolution of 1776,
which made full citizens of all white Americans (though only white males had suffrage
rights). Thus, in nineteenth-century usage, to be "unfree" was to be economically and,
consequently, politically dependent. See ROEDIGER, supra note 185, at 33 (speaking specif-
ically of the freedom of white artisans and journeymen mechanics).
201. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EoUALrrY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 155 (Cal. Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1993).
202. For a chronicle of the social anxieties of once independent farmers which
culminated in the Populist Revolts of the 1890s, see generally LAWRENCE GOODW'Y, DEM-
OCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA 25-50 (1976) (detailing those
anxieties in the chapter entitled "The Coming of the Farmers Alliance").
203. The social upheaval accompanying the demise of small workshops-that is, the
artisan system-gave rise to at least three decades of labor radicalism that spanned the
1830s and 1850s. See generally SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY
& THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WoRKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984) (discussing the emer-
gence of the American working class in nineteenth century America and its social history).
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istic democratic capitalism that enabled white American workers to
accept the realities of socioeconomic stratification and the subordina-
tion of wage labor to capital.204 Universal suffrage for white males
had been achieved before the emergence of the American wage
earner. Thus, free from political dominance and submission, members
of the emerging white working class believed that they could, in an
unconstrained fashion, pursue opportunities to earn and consume in
an open market place.205 So, rather than occupy themselves with op-
positional struggles against capital,20 6 white workers pursued opportu-
204. I do not suggest here a total absence of opposition to socioeconomic stratification
or class. Indeed, as T.B. Bottomore explains, the class critique is a direct by-product of the
development of individualism in western societies:
Only in modern times, and particularly since the American and French Revolu-
tions, has social class, as a stark embodiment of the principle of inequality, be-
come an object of scientific study, and at the same time of widespread
condemnation in terms of new social doctrines. The revolutionary ideal of equal-
ity, however variously it was interpreted by nineteenth-century thinkers, at least
implied an opposition to hereditary privileges and to an immutable hierarchy of
ranks. The revolutions of the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth
century, directed against the legal and political privileges which survived from the
system of feudal estates, brought about an extension of civil and political rights
and a greater degree of equality of opportunity. But at the same time they created
a new social hierarchy, based directly upon the possession of wealth, and this in
turn came to be attacked during the nineteenth century by socialist thinkers who
believed that the ideal of equality ultimately implied a "classless society."
BorroMORE, supra note 73, at 4.
205. See Louis HARTz, THE LmIERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN PoLrICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION'89 (1955) (arguing that "[ijn
a society ... where the aristocracies, peasantries, and proletariats of Europe are miss-
ing .... virtually everyone, including the nascent industrial worker, has the mentality of an
independent entrepreneur").
206. On the failure of American workers to pursue supposedly "radical" politics in the
nineteenth century and thereafter, see generally WniAm M. DICK, LABOR AND SOCIAL-
ISM IN AMERICA: Tun GOMPERS ERA (1972). See also AILEEN S. KRADITOR, TnE RADI-
CAL PERSUASION 1890-1917, ASPECrS OF THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF TiREE AMERICAN RADICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1981) (analyzing why
the Socialist party, the Socialist Labor Party and the Industrial Workers of the World failed
their goal of revolutionizing the United States); FAILURE OF A DREAM? ESSAYS IN Tim
HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOciALsM (John H.M. Laslett & Seymour Martin Lipset eds.,
1974) (examining the weakness of American socialism). American workers were not "rad-
ical" in a European socialist sense. To the extent there was confrontation between the-
American worker and capital-and there was-the -nature of the confrontation was deter-
mined by the cultural ideals of individualistic democratic capitalism. Like other Ameri-
cans, the American worker was faithful to the ideology of individualistic democratic
capitalism, and his fidelity permitted him only to find new expressions of its tenets that
would not exclude him from the idealized society it envisioned. For example, Stephan
Thernstrom has observed that nineteenth century American workers were not anticapital-
ist, but urban nomads in an almost perpetual search for capitalist opportunities:
For all the brutality and rapacity which marked the American scene in the years
in which the new urban industrial order came into being, what stands out most is
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nities for personal advancement, and wage labor was the instrument
of that pursuit. Economic self-interest was rewarded with wealth.
The resulting privileges and hierarchy based on the possession and
concentration of wealth were accepted as meritorious distributions re-
flecting personal talents and achievements as well as shortcomings and
failures. 207 A consensus208 of equal access to riches, therefore, stifled
philosophical attention to, and critique of, wealth-based
stratifications. 209
the relative absence of collective working-class protest aimed at reshaping capital-
ist society.... The American working class was drawn into the new society by a
process that encouraged accommodation and rendered disciplined protest diffi-
cult. Within the urban industrial orbit, most of its members found modest but
significant opportunities to feel that they and their children were edging their way
upwards. Those who did not find such opportunities were tossed helplessly about
from city to city, from state to state, alienated but invisible and impotent.
Stephan Thernstrom, Urbanization, Migration, and Social Mobility in Late Nineteenth-Cen-
tury America, in TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 158,
172-173 (Barton J. Bernstein ed., 1969).
207. Indeed, decades prior to the formation of the American working class, Samuel
Latham Mitchell articulated the prevailing attitude towards wealth-based stratification and
hierarchy as follows:
All citizens are acknowledged equal as to their rights, and the only inequality
subsisting is that which arises necessarily from office, talents or wealth. But as the
road lay open for everyone to aspire to these, it is the exercise of one or more of
his rights that a man acquires these means of influence.
SAMUEL LATHAM MITCHELL, AN ORATION, PRONOUNCED BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF
FLACK FRIARS 20-22 (1793), cited in JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL
ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s, at 74 (1984).
208. As a theory of American history, the idea of consensus emerged in RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (Vin-
tage Books 1989) (1948) (expounding the view that American political history should be
considered in light of a tradition of consensus about fundamental principles), and was sub-
sequently expanded in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953)
(expounding the view that the practical, shared experiences of Americans on a continent
believed to be without any physical limitations precluded ideological antagonisms) and
HARTZ, supra note 205 (expounding the view that in the absnece of a feudal heritage,
Americans imported a liberal philosophy from Europe which flourished without any op-
posing ideals). Of course, the fact of consensus is not the whole story of the American
experience. Intense conflict, crisis and violence are also part of the American heritage.
See, e.g., BERNARD STERNSHER, CONSENSUS, CONFLIcr, AND AMERICAN HISTORIANS 211-
230 (1975) (reviewing the consensus historians' neglect of violence in the American past).
Though my focus in this Article is on the antagonisms between whites and blacks, it is
not without recognition of the diversity-and hence conflict-within these respective
groups. A diversity of experience among whites and among blacks has yet to displace
powerful, orienting themes in American society such as inherent rights, privatized property
interests, individual effort and success, equality of opportunity (self-help), material abun-
dance and equality before the law.
209. Richard Hofstadter, reviewing the significance of Hartz's work, supra note 205,
writes that "[1]acking the opposition of feudal classes, American bourgeois thought never
had to develop a keen militant spirit to match its self-confident rhetoric; hence, in contrast
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Race ideology was also a central factor in the white American
workers' acceptance of their "wage earner" status and the new social
relations that emerged in early nineteenth-century America. During
the time that the American wage earner first emerged, the institution
of slavery was still dominant, and its existence profoundly affected the
self-identification of white Americans laboring for wages.210 The la-
bor provided by enslaved blacks had to be distinguished from the la-
bor provided by white wage earners. To that end, white workers
developed language that enabled them to identify "their freedom and
their dignity in work as being suited to those who were 'not slaves' or
'not negurs'."'21 Historian David Roediger notes:
[I]n a society in which Blackness and servility were so thoroughly
intertwined-North and South-assertions of white freedom could
not be raceless .... The existence of slavery (and increasingly of
open Northern campaigns to degrade free Blacks) gave working
Americans both a wretched touchstone against which to measure
their fears of unfreedom and a friendly reminder that they were by
comparison not so badly off. It encouraged an early language of
labor that was at once suffused with concern for 'republican liberty'
and at the same time willing to settle for... 'evasions'. Amidst
much assertion of independence, the term hired subtly became one
to be embraced. As hired was increasingly placed in front of man,
woman and girl, it was also placed before the old term hand, espe-
cially when referring to farm laborers. In the latter usage ... labor is
clearly a commodity, separable from its owner and for sale. Some
of the sting had been taken from the connection between hireling
and slave.212
The emerging exaltation of white wage labor over black slave la-
bor was based on a comparison of the two, and the conclusion that
wage labor is inherently commodiflable. Thus, wage labor could be
meaningfully distinguished from slave labor and was, consequently,
worthy of honor. Amid a new industrial discipline that demanded
regular, timed and routinized labor,213 white workers longed for the
debaucheries of the preindustrial past. To prevent white workers from
to the European bourgeoisie, it had no corresponding militancy to communicate to the
working class." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSrvE HISToRIANs: TURNER,
BEARD, PARRINGTON 446 (1968).
210. "Slavery was meant for blacks, freedom for whites, and what was degrading in
wage labor was reducing white men to the same level as African-Americans." FONER,
supra note 199, at xix.
211. ROEDIGER, supra note 185, at 49.
212. Id. at 49-50 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
213. See generally HERBERT G. GuTMAN, WoRK, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN INDUS-
TRIALiziNG AMERICA (Alfred A. Knopf 1976) (1966) (discussing the effect of industrial
labor discipline on late nineteenth century Americans).
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reverting to their preindustrial selves, Roediger argues, specific be-
haviors that whites simultaneously scorned and longed for were pro-
jected onto blacks.214 Thus, white working Americans added to the
mix a "desire not to be considered anything like an African-Ameri-
can"215 and, consequently, encased themselves in "whiteness. '216
In other words, racial demarcation was endemic to the develop-
ment of the American working class.217 Wage earners were white in-
dividuals-free, disciplined and, indeed, privileged to meet the labor
demands of a regimented, industrialized society. Infused with new
meaning, those excluded from the normative, as well as descriptive,
embrace of the term "wage earner" were defined, and personified de-
pendency and subjection. 218 African-Americans were the antithesis of
wage earners.
Nineteenth-century white American workers had to come to
terms with the new social relations of the times, and they did so by
rearticulating the cultural meanings of individualism, democracy and
capitalism. Barney explains that although the growth of a new class of
salaried and nonpropertied workers was striking, these workers were
considered failures because they lacked both land and independence.
Gradually, however, nineteenth-century American workers redefined
the fundamental terms by which American society measured status
and achievement:
Property in the traditional, republican sense of landed security now
took on myriad meanings related to a good salary and the accumu-
lation of material goods. Individualism shifted in meaning from
economic independence to upward career mobility in a business or-
ganization or professional association. Indeed, [salaried and non-
propertied workers] claimed that their careers embodied the very
essence of American individualism. Without the advantages of
prior wealth or privileges, they had democratically earned esteem
and recognition by mastering a skill in public demand.219
Moreover, race ideology synthesized with the ideology of individ-
214. ROEDIGER, supra note 185, at 95-133 (addressing the specific behaviors that
whites projected onto blacks during the formation of the first American working class).
215. Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
216. White workers sought refuge in their whiteness in response to a "fear of depen-
dency on wage labor and to the necessities of capitalist work discipline." Id at 13.
217. By contrast, race ideology played a negligible, if any, role in the making of the
English working class.
218. See Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Decoding "Dependency": Inscriptions of
Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State 8-14 (unpublished manuscript on file with au-
thor) (arguing that with the emergence of capitalism and industrial society, the meaning of
wage labor had to be reinterpreted so as to divest it of the association with dependency).
219. BARNEY, supra note 160, at 338-39.
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ualistic democratic capitalism to facilitate nineteenth-century working
white Americans' acceptance of their new circumstances.220 Their ac-
ceptance through a reinterpretation of what it meant to have "free-
dom," to be "independent," and to be a "wage earner" did nothing to
disrupt the racial organization of nineteenth-century America. In-
deed, a subordinated African-American population provided a carica-
tured group against which whites-who migrated from craftshop and
farm to factory, and immigrated from Europe to meet America's labor
demand-could measure their freedom, independence and wage
earner status. As a result, a race consciousness-a consciousness of
not being deemed "black"-was a defining characteristic of nine-
teenth-century working white Americans.
C. The Relationship Between A History of Racialized Individualism and
the Contemporary Advocacy for Class-Conscious Social Policies
This is just a broad outline of the historical development of indi-
vidualism in the American context. I have shown that the core value
of American individualism is "freedom" achieved through property
ownership, and that African-Americans were precluded from owning
property and, consequently, precluded from enjoying the freedoms
derived from property. I have also shown that European-Americans
have strived for a democratization of property ownership among
themselves, and thus for greater political freedoms and personal eco-
nomic security among themselves. When the market revolution of the
nineteenth century transformed the social relations of production, the
meaning of "freedom" and how it was to be achieved changed. "Free-
dom," in substantial part, thereafter referred to wealth accumulation
achieved in pursuit of market opportunities. What remained un-
changed, however, was the withholding of "freedom," however rede-
fined, from African-Americans, whose state of subordination
functioned to endow nineteenth-century European-Americans with a
form of primal equality notwithstanding a growing chasm between
rich and poor.
Given this understanding of the historical development of indi-
vidualism in the American context, what are we to make of the racial-
ization of American individualism, and of the concepts of freedom,
220. Nineteenth century white American workers did not bear sole responsibility for
the rearticulation of ideology in a rapidly changing society. I have focused on them be-
cause their efforts to reshape America in their own image aptly illustrate how concepts
central to American culture-freedom, autonomy, equality-are adaptable to specific his-
torical exigencies.
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political enfranchisement and economic independence embodied
therein? In what way is the racialization of individualistic democratic
capitalism in earlier centuries related to the contemporary advocacy
for class-conscious social policies? The answers lie in the fact that
racialization is continuing. This continuing racialization, as we will
see, explains the convergence of class advocacy with socioeconomic
cleavage within the black community, and class anxiety within the
white community.
In large measure, the strain of consciousness among white Ameri-
can workers that emerged from the social transformations of the nine-
teenth century has had important consequences in the political
domain for subsequent generations of Americans, including the post-
civil-rights generation. Today, the experience that defines the quintes-
sential American character is that of the immigrant European laborer
whose emigration coincided with the economic and social transforma-
tions of the nineteenth century. The story of the European immigrant
highlights arrival to America with neither social status nor honor, and
with few, or no, possessions of value. The burgeoning political econ-
omy of the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries
presented untold opportunities for personal advancement. Thus,
through personal sacrifice and hard work, which contributed to the
building of the nation, the European immigrant conquered poverty
and discrimination, and secured a better life for future generations. 221
The tale of the European immigrant is transethnic in the sense
that it is told by Americans of various European ancestries (i.e., Irish,
Italian, English, Dutch). As such, the tale unites European-Ameri-
cans despite their diverse backgrounds and cultures. Its thrust is to
defend the individualistic view of the American system because it por-
trays the system as open to those who are willing to work hard and
pull themselves over barriers of poverty and discrimination. Impor-
tantly, this tale sets the terms by which other groups of Americans are
to achieve socioeconomic and political success. 222 Richard Alba
writes:
Since Americans of European ancestry constitute a numerical ma-
jority of the population and are superordinate to other ethnic
groups, their view of their past is of considerable consequence for
221. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELT-
ING POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK
CITY 137-287 (2d ed. 1970) (describing the socioeconomic rise of major European immi-
grant groups in American society); Thomas Sowell, Americans from Europe, in ETHNIC
AMERICA: A HISTORY 17-129 (1981) (same).
222. ALBA, supra note 3, at 314-15.
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defining the nature of the American system-their justification of
their superior position implied in the historical account of their an-
cestors' experiences amounts to a definition of the 'rules of the
game' by which other groups will be expected to succeed in Ameri-
can society. 3
The expectation that other groups, especially African-Americans,
would follow in the footsteps of their European-American predeces-
sors and carve out their own rightful place in American society
through hard work and personal sacrifice, has been greatest since the
enactment of the 1960's civil rights statutes. That expectation has
been fostered by influential policy theorists such as Nathan Glazer
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan who view civil rights statutes as the leg-
islative removal of obstacles to African-American participation ac-
cording to the "rules of the game."224 The views of Glazer and
Moynihan are appropriately summarized by Omi and Wmant:
[B]lacks already had equal opportunity in the North; what more
could they demand? Once equal opportunity legislation along with
its judicial and administrative enforcement were accomplished facts,
it fell to blacks to follow in their "predecessors"' footsteps.
Through hard work, patience, delayed gratification, etc., blacks
could carve out their own rightful place in American society. In the
North, where blacks were still recent "immigrants" (from the
South), this would involve some degree of assimilation. It would
involve the development of a new postimmigration cultural identity,
and it would require engagement in mainstream pluralist politics.
Race relations would thus continue in what Nathan Glazer was later
to call the "American ethnic pattem."225
The tale of European immigration-embodying the powerful
concepts of freedom, independence and self-sufficiency through wage
work, as they have been reinterpreted since the nineteenth century-
provides a dominant "text" against which social and political claims
are made and measured in the twentieth century.226 For example, in
the post-civil-rights decade of the 1980s-in which questions regarding
the subordination of African-Americans revolved around the black
underclass-when African-Americans sought affirmative protections
223. lit at 316.
224. See, e.g., GLAZER & MoYvNrmAN, supra note 221, at x (suggesting that since the
demands of the Civil Rights Movement-equality in voting, equality in the courts, equality
in representation in public life, equality in public accommodations-exist in New York
City, African-Americans would become part of the game of accommodation politics in
which posts and benefits were distributed to groups on the basis of votes, money and polit-
ical talents).
225. See OMA & WinANT, supra note 3, at 19.
226. I use "text" in the same manner that Professor John Calmore does. See Calmore,
supra note 46, at 2161-62.
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against racial discrimination, European-Americans responded with a
version of "my ethnic group faced discrimination and we overcame
without special attention or legal protection":
[M]any whites... [were] stimulated to think about the relevance of
their own ethnic history when confronted by a challenge cast in ra-
cial/ethnic terms and justified by the historical burdens borne by a
specific group. The reply of many whites, especially of white ethnics
who had only recently made it out of their own ghettoes, was: our
groups too faced prejudice and discrimination; we haven't made it
to the top of American society, either, as is shown by our sparse
representation at elite levels; and it is not fair to change the rules in
midstream, after we have committed ourselves to them.227
To European-Americans, African-Americans were impermissibly
using "race" to create a competitive advantage in the American dis-
tributive system, thereby changing the rules of the game in midstream.
European-Americans seemed not to consider the advantages that
their "race"-whiteness-had bestowed on them as they played the
game, because the tale of the European immigrant identified them in
terms of bridgeable ethnic differences.228
An understanding of the social and political demands in terms of
the "race" of African-Americans renders those demands culturally il-
legitimate when measured according to the standards embodied in the
tale of the European immigrant.229 Such an understanding, for exam-
ple, caused Bradford Reynolds, head of the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division in the early 1980s, to declare a halt to perceived race-
based distributions. In a complex statement that combined appeals to
American individualism with an attack on racism, Reynolds asserted:
The use of race in the distribution of limited resources in the past
decade has regrettably led to the creation of a kind of racial spoils
system in America, fostering competition not only among individual
members of contending groups but among the groups themselves.
Racial classifications are wrong-morally wrong-and ought not to
be tolerated in any form .... It must be remembered that we are-
each of us-a minority of one. Our rights derive from the uniquely
227. ALBA, supra note 3, at 317.
228. The advantages of whiteness in playing by the "rules of the game" are further
obscured when European-Americans reference the socioeconomic success of some Asian-
Americans-a so-called "model minority"-as proof that the rules of the game are race-
neutral and fair. Some Asian-American legal scholars, however, have objected to this
ploy. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1243, 1264 (1993)
(arguing, inter alia, that the model minority myth works a harm against other racial minori-
ties who are blamed for not being successful like Asian-Americans).
229. See also Kamen, supra note 34, at Al (reporting myth of the "model" Asian
minority).
American belief in the primacy of the individual. And in no instance
should an individual's rights rise any higher or fall any lower than
the rights of others because of race.2 0
The next section considers in detail the material conditions of the
African-American community that caused others, like Reynolds, to
demand a halt to race-conscious remediation, and still others to advo-
cate a class-conscious alternative. Building on the themes articulated
in this section, I explore the way in which racialized individualistic
democratic capitalism shapes the discourse of the race/class debate
within the social policy context in the post-civil-rights era.
IV. Racialized Individualism and Social Policy
A. Black Progress, Black Poverty
Well into the mid-twentieth century, black and white Americans
were not only spatially segregated as mandated by custom and law,
they also inhabited socioeconomically distinct milieus. More than sev-
enty percent of the black adult population had no formal education
beyond the eighth grade.23' Sixty-two percent of working black men
and women were employed in either agricultural or menial personal
service jobs. 23 2 More than half of the black population lived in house-
holds with incomes below the poverty line.233 Furthermore, black per
capita income was a mere fifty percent of that of whites.2 3
By contrast, sixty percent of the white adult population had a for-
mal education beyond the eighth grade.23 5 Approximately twenty
percent of employed white men and women held professional and
managerial positions,236 and more than fifty percent were employed in
blue collar jobs or service occupations.23 7 Only one of every eight
white families had an income below the poverty line.238
White domination of political, social, cultural and economic insti-
tutions-institutions that embodied American norms, standards,
myths and values-reinforced and reflected the ignominious material
230. See Walter Stafford, Economic Decline and the Rise of the New Conservatism:
Tvin Threats to Blacks, in ALPHONSO PINKNEY, T-m Mx'm OF BrACK PROGRESS 18, 27
(1984) (emphasis omitted).
231. See A COMMON DEsTiNY, supra note 58, at 335.
232. Id. at 164.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 272.
235. Id. at 335.
236. Id. at 312.
237. See Stephen Schulman, A Critique of Declining Discrimination Hypothesis, in THE
QUESION OF DISCRMmfNAION 130 (Stephen Schulman & William Darity, Jr., eds. 1989).
238. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 58, at 272.
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condition of blacks in American society.2 39 Blacks were denied partic-
ipation in the political life of American society. Segregation laws re-
stricting all social contacts between blacks and whites prevailed.2 40
Black employment and economic opportunities were also limited.
Brown v. Board of Education241 raised black expectations for an
all-embracing society. As momentous as the Brown decision was,
however, maneuvers that did more than undermine the legal founda-
tion of segregation were necessary to recast the American social or-
der. A decade-long, and sometimes violent, struggle ensued,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Fair
Housing Act and a plethora of programs designed to expunge black
poverty.242
Blacks made many substantial gains.243 As the 1960s drew to a
close, a new category of middle-income blacks had emerged.24 Ap-
239. Professor John Calmore writes that:
Many widely shared American tenets are ideologically tied to dominant cultural
myths, expressions, habits, and symbols, which in turn are cited as ethical princi-
ples and justifications for political action. Thus, it is important to examine the
various ways culture serves to mediate not only political and social meaning, but
also legal meaning.
Calmore, supra note 46, at 2144.
240. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 83-124
(2d ed. 1980) (discussing segregated public facilities and their symbolic function).
241. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
242. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified
in scattered titles of U.S.C.); see also NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE
GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERCA 135-58 (1991) (discussing
the "war on poverty," and for support that the "war" was being fought primarily for the
benefit of blacks). But see John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner
Commission in Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1289-90 (1993) (sug-
gesting that the civil rights movement and the "war on poverty" are unrelated develop-
ments incidentally coinciding in the mid-60s). Political background to the "war on
poverty" is provided by Lawrence M. Friedman, The Social and Political Context of the War
on Poverty: An Overview, in A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS:
ACHIEVEMErs, FAILURES AND LESSONS 21, 27-35 (Robert H. Havemen ed., 1977) [here-
inafter A DECADE] and Hugh Helco, The Political Foundations of Antipoverty Policy, in
FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 312-40 (Sheldon Danziger &
Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) [hereinafter FIGHTING POVERTY].
243. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil
Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1720-22 (1991) (arguing that the federal civil rights appa-
ratus yielded large gains in the post-1964 decade).
244. See L. BART LANDRY, THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 2-3 (1987) (claiming that
the black middle class doubled in size during the 1960s and encompassed 27 percent of all
black workers by 1970 as a result of the Civil Rights Movement and a booming economy).
But see PINKNEY, supra note 230, at 103 (arguing that despite news accounts of a swelling
black middle class, there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that black middle
class families are rapidly increasing in numbers); ROBERT B. HILL, THE ILLUSION OF
BLACK PROGRESS 20 (1978) (noting how the composition of the black middle class is dis-
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proximately fifty-eight percent of black adults between the ages 25 to
35 completed high school.2 5 Blacks entered traditionally white-domi-
nated occupations in record numbers.2A6 Twenty six percent of black
workers held white-collar jobs.4 7 Twenty one percent of black fami-
lies had incomes above the median income of white families2"8 These
very visible social and economic gains contributed to the belief that
American society had been purged of its racism.249
The three decades following Brown were not solely characterized
by black progress.250 As significant percentages of black families gar-
torted by including occupations such as plasterers, painters, bus drivers, lathe operators,
secretaries, bank tellers, and automobile assembly line workers). See generally Richard B.
Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in Srtuirs iN
LABOR MARKr 247 (Sherwin Rosen ed., 1981) (stating that "simply ending job market
discrimination and guaranteeing equal employment opportunity have not achieved black-
white parity and are unlikely to"); James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic
Progress After Myrdal 27 J. EcoN. LrrnA-ruRE 519, 519 (1989) (presenting a "reassess-
ment of the relative long-term economic progress of black men" in the 45 years since Myr-
dal's work).
245. HACKER, supra note 146, at 234.
246. For example, Andrew Hacker reports that by 1970, blacks were represented in the
following fields as indicated:
Police Officers 23,796
Electricians 14,145
Bank Tellers 10,633
Health Officials 3,914
Pharmacists 2,501
Id at 121.
247. A COMMON DEsTINY, supra note 58, at 169.
248. Id.
249. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Changing, But Not Declining, Significance of Race;
77 MicH. L. Rlv. 917, 922 (1979) (arguing that the conspicuous movement of middle class
blacks into traditionally white residential areas lends visible support to the "myth that the
racial problems of the country were solved during the civil rights era of the 1960s").
250. Noted civil rights advocate, Vernon Jordan, observed:
Millions of black people were not only untouched by Brown, but they have been
bypassed by the other breakthroughs in employment, housing and other key ar-
eas. For many millions of black people the promise of Brown and the advances of
the 1960's have been illusory. Their needs have been ignored, their aspirations
trampled upon and their desire for equal opportunity scorned.
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., The Black Underclass Untouched by Brown, 23 How. L.J. 61, 63
(1980).
Newsweek also reported that two striking developments mark the situation of Afri-
can-Americans since the '60s:
One is the emergence of an authentic black middle class, better educated, better
paid, better housed than any group of blacks that has gone before it. As measured
sometimes by white-collar occupation-anything from bank clerk to engineer-
sometimes by incomes of $20,000 a year and up, the middle class grew to near 56
percent of black wage earners by 1980....
The second development is, in a way, the reyerse side of the first. As compar-
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nered higher incomes, they fled American cities to settle in suburban
areas like other economically-able groups.25l Sociologist William Ju-
lius Wilson posits that the effect of such an exodus was to create an
urban "underclass" 252 of "individuals who lack training and skills and
either experience long-term unemployment or are not members of the
labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other
forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term
atively well off blacks move to better neighborhoods, they have left behind a
stripped-down, socially disabled nucleus of poor people who have come to be
called (somewhat pejoratively) the "underclass."
David Gelman et al., Black and White in America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 18, 19-20;
see also Richard Bernstein, 20 Years After the Kerner Report Three Societies, All Separate,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1988, at B8 (detailing the "underside of progress").
251. See Larry Long & Diana DeAre, The Suburbanization of Blacks, AM. DEMOG.,
Sept. 1981, at 16,21 (table depicting the increase of black suburban populations from 1960-
80 for some 14 major American cities). The suburbanization of middle income blacks is
not without persistent racial discrimination. See generally ROBERT W. LAKE, THE NEw
SUBURBANITES: RACE AND HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS 239 (1981) ("Comparison of the
experiences of black and white suburban home buyers at the end of the 1970s provides
strong evidence of a suburban housing market explicitly and implicitly organized along
racial lines."); Phillip L. Clay, The Process of Black Suburbanization, 14 URB. AFF. Q. 405,
419 (1979) (black suburbanization has resulted in only the spatial, geographical expansion
of a "racially segmented housing market").
252. In his important work, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT,
AND ENTRAPMENT OF GHETTO YOUTH (1980), Professor Douglas G. Glasgow comments
on the emergence of the "underclass" nomenclature:
The term underclass has slowly, almost imperceptibly eased its way into the na-
tion's vocabulary, subtly conveying the message that another problematic group is
emerging that needs society's help. While still somewhat unclearly defined, and
even thought by some not to be deserving of serious attention, a permanently
entrapped population of poor persons, unused and unwanted, accumulated in var-
ious parts of the country.
Id. at 3.
Even though researchers have provided overwhelming empirical proof to the con-
trary, the popular view is that blacks and Hispanics are the exclusive members of the un-
derclass. See, e.g., RONALD MINCY, Is THERE A WHITE UtDERCLASS? (1988) (using
census tract data to show that whites represent 28 percent of the concentrated poor); see
also Peter Passell, Chronic Poverty, Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at D2
(noting that "[w]hites represent 28 percent of the population of underclass neighborhoods
in cities of less than one million, and roughly 20 percent of the underclass population in all
metropolitan areas"). The racialization of the term and concept of the underclass has
caused William Julius Wilson to urge social policy researchers to drop the term and to
select another to describe and highlight the theoretical linkage between a disadvantaged
group's position in the labor market. See Jason DeParle, 'Underclass' Reconsidered: What
to Call The Poorest Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, § 4, at 4; see also Herbert J. Gans,
Fighting the Biases Embedded in Social Concepts of the Poor, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan.
8, 1992, at A56 (noting how writers for the commercial media, with the help of academics,
have used the word "underclass" to lump together into one scientific-sounding stereotype
images of sinister-looking and promiscuous young blacks and hispanics whom the white
population fears and disapproves).
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spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency. ' ' 53 Wilson writes:
Whereas today's black middle-class professionals no longer tend to
live in ghetto neighborhoods ... the black middle-class profession-
als of the 1940s and 1950s... lived in higher-income neighborhoods
of the ghetto and serviced the black community. Accompanying the
black middle-class exodus has been a growing movement of stable
working-class blacks from ghetto neighborhoods to higher-income
neighborhoods in other parts of the city and to the suburbs. In the
earlier years, the black middle and working classes were confined by
restrictive covenants to communities also inhabited by the lower
class; their very presence provided stability to inner-city neighbor-
hoods and reinforced and perpetuated mainstream patterns of
norms and behavior.
This is not the situation in the 1980s. Today's ghetto neighbor-
hoods are populated almost exclusively by the most disadvantaged
segments of the black urban community, that heterogeneous group-
ing of families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of
the American occupational system 254
At the time of Wilson's observations-the mid-1980s-statistical
indicators of the social and economic well-being of families and indi-
viduals depicted an African-American community in which the jobless
rate for its members had soared to a depression-level of twenty per-
cent.255 When employed, a black family head earned fifty-nine cents
for every dollar earned by white family heads.256 Approximately ten
percent of black families had incomes below $5,000, the bottom of the
income distribution.2 7 The poverty rate among African-Americans
was thirty-three percent, with slightly less than three-fourths (74.2%)
of all black children under the age of six living in single-parent house-
holds below the poverty level.258
As early as 1977, journalistic scrutiny focused on "the American
underclass."' ' 9 But rather than an analysis in terms of socioeconomic
253. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: TmE INNER CITY, TiE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1987).
254. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
255 . Robert B. Hill, Research on African-American Families: A Holistic Perspective, in
I THE ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 31 (Wornie L. Reed ed.,
1990).
256. The income gap had widened since 1976 when a black family head earned 63
cents for every dollar earned by a white family head. See William Darity, Jr. & Samuel L.
Myers, Jr., Racial Earnings Inequality into the 21st Century, in NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, at 119 (1992).
257. Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1992,
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P60-184 (1993).
258. RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST- THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN
AFFLUENT AMERICA 18 (1986).
259. See e.g., The American Underclass, TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at 14 (cover story).
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disparity, journalistic scrutiny was limited to an examination of nar-
cotic use and addiction, crime and delinquency, teenage pregnancy
and joblessness.260 One journalist, Ken Auletta, even devised four
categories within which to group persons identified as belonging to
the "underclass":
(a) the passive poor, usually long-term welfare recipients; (b) the
hostile street criminals who terrorize most cities, and who are often
school dropouts and drug addicts; (c) the hustlers, who, like street
criminals, may not be poor and who earn their livelihood in an un-
derground economy, but rarely commit violent crimes; (d) the trau-
matized drunks, drifters, homeless shopping-bag ladies and released
mental patients who frequently roam or collapse on city streets.261
These journalistic presentations of the "underclass" have pro-
vided the American public-the overwhelming majority of whom
have had no actual contact with American inner-cities and their occu-
pants-with the controlling iconography of the individuals comprising
the "underclass. 2 62 As such, the American public perceives the exist-
260. For example:
Behind [the ghetto's] crumbling walls lives a large group of people who are more
intractable, more socially alien and more hostile than almost anyone had
imagined. They are the unreachables: the American underclass .... Their bleak
environment nurtures values that are often at radical odds with those of the ma-
jority-even the majority of the poor. Thus the underclass minority produces a
highly disproportionate number of the nation's juvenile delinquents, school drop-
outs, drug addicts and welfare mothers, and much of the adult crime, family dis-
ruption, urban decay and demand for social expenditures.
I& at 14; see also KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS Xiii (Vintage Books 1983) (1982) (de-
fining "underclass" as a group suffering from "behavioral as well as income deficiencies")
(emphasis in original).
261. Id. at xvi. Michael Katz has observed that Auletta's convenient lumping of people
with varied problems into the category "underclass" is consistent with social welfare prac-
tices rooted in the nineteenth century:
Auletta's description of the underclass has a nineteenth century ring because it
compounds various forms of dependence and deviance into one convenient and
derogatory category defined more by behavior than poverty. Long-term poverty,
crime, and mental illness blend into a serviceably updated image of the unworthy
poor. But how is one to distinguish the passive from the nonpassive poor? Why is
it helpful to lump people with such varied problems as drug addicts, women sup-
ported by AFDC, and former mental patients in one category? Will it point policy
in useful directions or increase compassion for the victims of America's structure
of inequality? Even if, as I believe, the answer is no, the concept of an "under-
class" serves a useful rhetorical purpose for the war on welfare. By drawing a
sharp line between the working class and the very poor, it fractures a potential
source of political mobilization, justifies mean and punitive social policies, and
keeps the working poor at low-paid jobs, any jobs, to avoid descent into the
underclass.
MICHAEL B. KATz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WEL-
FARE IN AMERICA 277 (1986).
262. For a discussion on the role that journalists play in shaping public perceptions of
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ence of an "underclass," not primarily as a socioeconomic crisis, but as
a reflection of individual immorality.263 This imagery is at the center
of the discourse about the determinants of African-American subordi-
nation, and around which explanatory theories are woven.
B. Explaining the Divide
Theories explaining "the divergence"' ' 4 in socioeconomic status
within the black population abound. As referenced earlier, William
Julius Wilson posits that inner-city neighborhoods have experienced
an outmigration of black working- and middle-income families previ-
ously confined to those neighborhoods by racially discriminatory laws
and practices.2 5 This outmigration caused a concentration of poverty
in inner-city neighborhoods. The economic transformation of those
neighborhoods, and of long-standing institutions, combined with the
continuous restructuring of American capitalism26 6 to create a social
African-Americans who reside within and without inner cities and experience socioeco-
nomic dislocation, see Charles Sumner Stone, Jr., Thucydides' Law of History, or From
Kerner, 1968 to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1711 (1993). For a more general treatment
of journalists, not merely as furnishing representative cultural symbols or passively serving
as conduits of social knowledge, but as active "agent[s] for carrying on the conversation of
our culture," see JAMrS W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION As CULUTRE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA
AND SOCIETY (1989).
Prominent journalistic portrayals of the underclass include Bill Moyers Reports, The
Vanishing Family: Crisis in Black America (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1986) and
Nicholas Lemann, The Origins of the Underclass (pts. 1 & 2), ATLANTIc, June 1986, at 31,
35 & July 1986, at 54 [hereinafter Origins of the Underclass].
263. The notion of poverty as a matter of individual morality has a long history. See
generally KATz, supra note 261, at xi-xii; JAMES T. PATrERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
AGAINST POvERTY 1900-1985 (1986).
264. See A COMMON DESTn-Y, supra note 58, at 274-277.
265. See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text. But see Reynolds Farley, Resi-
dential Segregation of Social and Economic Groups Among Blacks, 1970-80, in Trm UR-
iAN UNDERCLASS 274, 293 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991) (arguing that
after an inspection of data for Chicago, "[o]ne cannot so readily reject Wilson's conclusions
that poor blacks lived in proportionally more impoverished neighborhoods in 1980 than in
1970. This is an accurate conclusion, but the situation has occurred because of overall
increases in black poverty rather than because of higher levels of residential segregation by
social class or a new outmigration of prosperous blacks.").
266. Wilson hypothesizes that minorities are extremely vulnerable to recent shifts in
the economy:
Urban minorities have been particularly vulnerable to structural economic
changes, such as the shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries,
the increasing polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sec-
tors, technological innovations, and the relocation of manufacturing industries
out of the central cities.... [These urban centers are undergoing an irreversible
structural transformation from 'centers of production and distribution of material
goods to centers of administration, information exchange, and higher-order ser-
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milieu plagued by massive joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness,
and low-achieving schools. The thrust of Wilson's thesis, then, is that
the transformation of the structure of the black community coupled
with certain macroeconomic trends explain the widening socioeco-
nomic divisions among blacks.267
Whereas Wilson's explanatory thesis is "structural" 268 in nature,
vice provision.' The central-city labor market, particularly in northern areas, has
been profoundly altered in the process.
WILSON, supra note 253, at 39 (footnote omitted).
267. Wilson summarizes his thesis-that social isolation in impoverished neighbor-
hoods with weak labor force attachment is the central problem of the black underclass-as
follows:
In short, the communities of the underclass are plagued by massive joblessness,
flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving schools, and therefore tend to
be avoided by outsiders. Consequently, the residents of these areas, whether wo-
men and children of welfare families or aggressive street criminals, have become
increasingly socially isolated from the mainstream patterns of behavior.
If I had to use one term to capture the differences in the experience of low-
income families who lived in inner-city areas from the experiences of those who
live in other areas in the central city today, that term would be concentration
effects. The social transformation of the inner city has resulted in a disproportion-
ate concentration of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black popula-
tion, creating a social millieu significantly different from the environment that
existed in these communities several decates ago.
WILSON, supra note 253, at 58. Having linked the socioeconomic status of members of the
African-American community to mobility opportunities made possible by antidiscrimina-
tion laws and to macroeconomic trends, Wilson has argued that race per se is of declining
influence in predicting the life chances of individual blacks. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITU-
TIONS 1 (2d ed. 1980) ("Race relations in America have undergone fundamental changes in
recent years, so much so that now the life chances of individual Blacks have more to do
with their economic class position than with their day-to-day encounters with Whites.").
Recent reports indicate that Wilson's thinking has evolved, and that he has changed his
mind on his hypothesis regarding black economic well-being and racism. See Gretchen
Reynolds, The Rising Significance of Race, CHICAGO MAG., Dec. 1992, at 81.
268. The "structural" view of poverty, which emerged at the end of 1963, conceptual-
izes poverty not as an aberration or matter of individual indolence, but as structurally built
into the American social system. Reviewing and providing his own conservative analysis of
the structural approach to poverty, Charles Murray writes:
In a technical sense, the structuralists made a case only for the proposition that
much, not all, of American poverty derived from structural characteristics. Their
message was an antidote to the old wisdom that anyone with enough gumption
could make a good living. But the "passionate sense of urgency" got in the way of
balance. What emerged in the mid-1960s was an almost unbroken intellectual
consensus that the individualist explanation of poverty was altogether outmoded
and reactionary. Poverty was not a consequence of indolence or vice. It was not
the just desserts of people who didn't try hard enough. It was produced by condi-
tions that had nothing to do with individual virtue or effort. Poverty was not the
fault of the individual but of the system.
CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 29 (1984)
(emphasis in original). Wilson's structural theory differs from the structural approach of
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Charles Murray offers a "pathological"269 theory for the existence of
black poverty.270 Recognizing "a bifurcation within the black commu-
the 1960s in that, as Peter Edelman writes, it looks to the state of the economy, the state of
opportunity, the state of education and ethnic and racial discrimination as factors converg-
ing to cause poverty:
[The structural theory] says people are willing to work if jobs are available for
which they are qualified, if they are better off working than not working, and if
they can find care for their children while they are at work.... [The structural
theory] sees a lack of good jobs as a fundamental cause of the problem, as well as
lack of preparatory opportunity for the jobs that are available and a maldistribu-
tion of those jobs among those who compete for them.
Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Sil-
ver Bulle4 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1701 (1993); see also Frank M. Kirkland, Social Policy, Ethi-
cal Life, and the Urban Underclass, in THE UNDERCLASS QUESrION 152, 153 (Bill E.
Lawson ed., 1992) (emphasis in original):
[Wilson's] thesis .... brings together arguments affirming the negative impact of
the economy and culture on the underclass .... [I]t is serially ordered ....
because cultural arguments explaining the plight of the underclass cannot be justi-
fied, as they are in the 'culture of poverty' thesis, independently of arguments
explaining that plight by structural problems in the economy. Cultural arguments
are indeed necessary for Wilson's thesis, but they can neither precede nor exclude
the socioeconomic ones.
269. The "pathological" theory of poverty originates from the works of social scientist
Oscar Lewis. See generally OscAR LEwis, THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ (1961); OSCAR
LEwis, FIVE FAMILIES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY (1959);
OSCAR LEwis, LA VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY-SAN
JUAN AND NEw YORK (1966); Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 215 SCL AM. 19 (1966).
Poverty is understood as "both adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal
position in a class stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society." Oscar Lewis, The
Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPEcTvIES FROM THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 187 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1968) [hereinafter ON UNDERSTANDING POV-
ERTY]. Lewis contended that once in existence, poverty "tends to perpetuate itself from
generation to generation because of its effects on the children. By the time the slum chil-
dren are age six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes for their
subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions
or increased opportunities which may occur in their life-time." Id. at 188.
Murray extends Lewis's basic culture of poverty thesis by arguing that the subculture
of which Lewis speaks is created by federal assistance programs. MURRAY, supra note 268.
270. Though Murray's ostensible concern is "the poor" (see MURRAY, supra note 268,
at 8 where he asks, "What really has been happening to the poor?"), he does single out the
black poor for special treatment by linking the debilitating psychological effects of racism
with social programs to help the poor. He argues:
Virtually every commentator on what it is like to grow up black in America,
whether novelist or sociologist or memoirist, has reflected on the devastating ef-
fects of racism on self-confidence. Inside the ghetto, the rules and rule-setters are
known. Moving outside, competing on white terms for what have traditionally
been white perquisites, is objectively difficult. When the real difficulties are com-
pounded by the fears engendered by centuries of white propagandizing that white
is smarter (and by elements of self-denigration by blacks), the result can be im-
mobilization of even the most able and ambitious.
This debilitating aspect of black socialization is not a recent creation. The
problem is that post-1964 social policy fed it. Every assumption that a young
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nity,"271 Murray attributes the rise in black poverty to welfare and the
Great Society compensatory programs. Murray claims that such pro-
grams encouraged black dependency on government checks and fa-
vors by changing the rewards and penalties that govern human
behavior.272 For example, rather than punishing indolence, according
to Murray, federal assistance programs rewarded such behavior, and
consequently created important disincentives for segments of the Af-
rican-American community-typically poorly educated, unmarried
young women and the fathers of their children-to achieve economic
independence and success.273 With these disincentives in place, the
black in the ghetto might make about his inability to compete with whites was
nourished by a social policy telling him, through the way it treated him day to day,
that he was an un-responsible victim.
MURRAY, supra note 268, at 187. Indeed, in Losing Ground, the entirety of Part II, which
consists of chapters on, inter alia, poverty, employment, wages and occupations, education,
crime and the family, is a discussion on "Being Poor, Being Black." Id. at 53-142.
271. MURRAY, supra note 268, at 92. Murray alternatively refers to a "pulling-away"
phenomenon. Id. (citing Martin Kilson, Black Social Classes and Intergenerational Pov-
erty, 64 Pun. INTEREST, Summer 1981, at 64-68).
272. Murray's argument is as follows:
Basic indicators of well-being took a turn for the worst in the 1960s, most
consistently and most drastically for the poor. In some cases, earlier progress
slowed; in other cases mild deterioration accelerated; in a few instances advance
turned into retreat. The trendlines on many of the indicators are-literally-un-
believable to people who do not make a profession of following them.
The question is why....
The easy hypotheses-the economy, changes in demographics, the effects of
Vietnam or Watergate or racism-fail as explanations. As often as not, taking
them into account only increases the mystery.
Nor does the explanation lie in idiosyncratic failures of craft. It is not just
that we sometimes administered good programs improperly, or that sound con-
cepts sometimes were converted to operations incorrectly. It is not that a specific
program, or a specific court ruling or act of Congress, was especially destructive.
The error was strategic.
The most compelling explanation for the marked shift in the fortunes of the
poor is that they continued to respond, as they always had, to the world as they
found it, but that we-meaning the not-poor and un-disadvantaged-had
changed the rules of their world. Not of our world, just of theirs. The first effect of
the new rules was to make it profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in
ways that were destructive in the long term. Their second effect was to mask these
long-term losses-to subsidize irretrievable mistakes. We tried to provide more
for the poor and produced more poor instead. We tried to remove the barriers to
escape from poverty, and inadvertently built a trap.
MURRAY, supra note 268, at 8-9. For the argument that Murray's claim is factually in-
defensible, see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 70-91 (1992) (arguing that social transfer programs from 1964 to
1980 did help the poor).
273. To make his point, Murray provides a fictional account of a young unmarried
couple, pregnant Phyllis and unemployed Harold. Contrasting their situation in 1960 with
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segments of the African-American community receiving federal assist-
ance, and comprising the black poor, replicate themselves rather than
escape from poverty.
Lawrence Mead,274 like Murray, assigns a central role to federal
assistance programs in his analysis of black poverty.2 7 5 But while
Murray argues that such programs create harmful disincentives for
economic advancement, Mead envisions a redemptive potential for
federal aid if its distribution is expressly conditioned on compliance
with certain behavioral standards. Mead, in other words, contends
that federal assistance programs are simply too permissive because
they do not require recipients to demonstrate fulfillment of a "good
citizenship" criterion of sorts before receiving aid.276 If federal assist-
ance recipients were required to work for benefits, Mead argues, their
desire for economic independence and advancement would remain in
their situation in 1970, Murray attempts to demonstrate that given a paucity of welfare
benefits in 1960, it was better for Phyllis and Harold to marry and for Harold to seek
employment. However, in 1970, Murray argues, it was advantageous for the couple to
remain unmarried, for Harold to remain unemployed, and for Phyllis to receive federal
assistance. Murray then posits that, without federal assistance programs that taught Phyllis
and Harold that it did not pay to maintain a stable family and a job, they would have
avoided poverty by working in an expanding economy. See MuRRAY, supra, note 268, at
156-164.
Many have disputed Murray's thesis on the relationship between federal assistance
programs and individual motivations and behavior. See eg., Sheldon Danziger & Peter
Gottschalk, The Poverty of Losing Ground, CHALLENGE, May-June 1985, at 32; David T.
Ellwood & Lawrence H. Summers, Is Welfare Really the Problem, 83 PUB. IN-TER sr 57
(Spring 1986). Murray has responded to his critics in Charles Murray, Have the Poor Been
'Losing Ground'. POL. SCI. Q., Fall 1985, at 427, and Charles Murray, No, Welfare Really
Isn't the Problem, 84 PuB. IrEREsr 3 (Fall 1986). The controversy surrounding Murray's
work is addressed in Nathan Glazer, The Murray Phenomenon, 7 TocQuEv=IL Rv. 331
(1985-86).
274. See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTTmn-MN. TiM SOCIAL OBLI-
GATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986) [hereinafter BEYOND ENTnLEmENT]; LAWRENCE M.
MEAD, THE NEW PoLTIcs OF POVERTY: Tim NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992)
[hereinafter THE NEW PoLrrlcs].
275. Though Mead writes of "the poor," defined as "those Americans whose income
falls under a threshold calculated to provide a minimal living standard," see THE NEW
PoLITIcs, supra note 274, at 14, for all intents and purposes he too writes almost exclu-
sively about the black poor, because "most of today's long-term poor are nonwhite." See
Lawrence M. Mead, The Logic of Workfare: The Underclass and Work Policy, 501 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 156, 160 (1989). For Mead "nonwhite" is a referent to "blacks." Id.
276. BEYOND ENTITLEMENT, supra note 274, at 46-47 ("The politics of programs
caused them to be permissive. They did not set standards for their recipients with any
authority. They did not obligate them to function in integrating ways, such as work, in
return for support."); Tim NEW PoLTIcs, supra note 274, at 24 ("There is a culture of
poverty that discourages work, but the poor will work more regularly if government en-
forces the work norm.").
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tact and, consequently, they would eventually rise above poverty.277
Also an adherent of the "pathological" theory, Nicholas Lemann
argues that a culture of poverty within the African-American commu-
nity predates the Great Society programs of the 1960s. He contends
that such a culture was long extant among southern rural blacks who
transported it to northern inner cities during the mass black exodus of
the 1940s and 1950s:
The black underclass did not just spring into being over the past
twenty years. Every aspect of the underclass culture in the ghettos
is directly traceable to roots in the South-and not the South of
slavery but the South of a generation ago. In fact, there seems to be
a strong correlation between underclass status in the North and a
family background in the nascent underclass of the sharecropper. 278
Thus, for Lemann, premigratory socioeconomic status explains the di-
vergence that emerged within the African-American community dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. 279
Another explanatory theory for the divergence in socioeconomic
status within the African-American community is offered by Douglas
Massey and Nancy Denton. Massey and Denton argue that theoreti-
cal concepts such as structural economic change, the culture of pov-
erty, and welfare disincentives and permissiveness "systematic[ally]
fail[ ] to consider the important role that segregation has played in
mediating, exacerbating, and ultimately amplifying the harmful social
and economic processes they treat. ' 280 Further, Massey and Denton
contend that issues of race and racial segregation (black-white segre-
gation, in particular) are fundamental to our thinking about the status
of black Americans and the origins of the urban underclass.28' They
write:
Our fundamental argument is that racial segregation-and its char-
acteristic institutional form, the black ghetto-are the key structural
277. Among others, John Kasarda challenges Mead's view, demonstrating with empiri-
cal evidence that employment opportunities in urban centers declined sharply between
1970 and 1980. See John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and The Underclass, 501
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. Sci. 26, 29 (1989).
278. Origins of the Underclass, supra note 262, at 35.
279. Though Lemann subsequently expanded on his rural-to-urban migration explana-
tion for the black underclass in his book Tim PROMISED LAND, see LEMANN, supra note
242, the notion has been discredited. See WILSON, supra note 253, at 55-56, 177-80 (arguing
that systematic research on urban poverty and recent migration consistently show that
southern-born blacks who have migrated to the urban north experience greater economic
success in terms of employment rates, earnings and welfare dependency than do those
urban blacks who were born in the north).
280. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 7 (1993).
281. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 461422
THE RACE/CLASS CONUNDRUM
factors responsible for the perpetuation of black poverty in the
United States. Residential segregation is the principal organiza-
tional feature of American society that is responsible for the crea-
tion of the urban underclass.2
Residential segregation, according to Massey and Denton, creates
"underclass" communities because an increase in the poverty rate of a
residentially segregated group leads to an immediate, if not automatic,
increase in the geographic concentration of poverty. The concentra-
tion of poverty, in turn, is associated with a wholesale withdrawal of
commercial institutions and the deterioration or elimination of goods
and services that increase the susceptibility of these areas to crime,
decay and social disorder. Such concentrations of poverty are also
associated with the development of an "oppositional culture," with
behavioral norms that hinder social mobility in the larger society.283
In sum, these diverse theories are offered to explain socioeco-
nomic divergence within the African-American community as a con-
sequence of the dynamic interaction of several factors: postindustrial
economic trends, government intervention, individual responsibility,
geographic mobility, and residential segregation. None of the several
theorists discussed, however, has sought to explore the socioeconomic
divergence within the African-American community in terms of class,
in terms of relations of subordination and relations of power.
Liberal individualists and conservative individualists alike dismiss
the concept of class as being theoretically unimportant to an under-
standing of poverty generally, or the black poor in particular. In the
liberal camp, for example, Paul Peterson has this to say about the ur-
ban underclass terminology:
The urban underclass is at once a characterization of a fragment of
American society, a statement about the interconnections among di-
verse social problems, and an attempt to theorize about the paradox
of poverty in an affluent society. The term is powerful because it
calls attention to the conjunction between the characters of individ-
uals and the impersonal forces of the larger social and political or-
der. "Class" is the least interesting half of the word. Although it
implies a relationship between one social group and another, the
terms of that relationship are left undefined until combined with the
familiar word "under."4
I agree with Peterson that the prefix "under" is an important indi-
282. Id. at 9.
283. Id. at 9-16.
284. Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS, supra note 265, at 3 (emphasis added).
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cator of relations among groups.285 I would even venture to say, as
Stephen Steinberg does, that the significance of the concept of the
underclass is not only its acceptance of social stratification, but its ac-
ceptance of certain people as languishing outside, or below, the ac-
cepted boundaries of stratification.286 Unlike Peterson, however, I
would not relegate class287 to the realm of the "least interesting" be-
cause, as I contend throughout this Article, class plays a pivotal role in
explaining not only poverty, but also the policy response and ap-
proach to poverty.288
In the conservative camp, Lawrence Mead writes:
Economic inequality has recently increased, and some think a new
age conflict between rich and poor is upon us. Short of an economic
collapse, I find that difficult to imagine. Most Americans are a lot
more afraid of rising crime, welfarism, and declining schools than
they are of their employers. Government is perceived as having
failed to solve today's social problem. Until it succeeds, it will re-
ceive no new mandate to tackle the older problem of unequal
fortunes.289
I believe that Mead is substantially correct in his observation that,
short of economic collapse, Americans generally lack a consciousness
of socioeconomic inequality. Mead fails to consider, however, the ide-
ological composition of American society that requires such extreme
consequences as a precondition to such consciousness.290 Indeed, the
285. The paragraph from which I quote continues:
This transformation of a preposition into an adjective has none of the sturdiness
of 'working,' the banality of 'middle,' or the remoteness of 'upper.' Instead
'under' suggests the lowly, passive, and submissive, yet at the same time the dis-
reputable, dangerous, disruptive, dark, evil, and even hellish. And apart from
these personal attributes, it suggests subjection, subordination, and deprivation.
Id.
286. See Stephen Steinberg, The Underclass: A Case of Color Blindness, 11 NEW POL.
42, 43 (Summer 1989).
287. I have interpreted Peterson's "class" as being the equivalent of class, as I have
defined that term in this Article. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
288. See infra Part IV.C in which I argue that the social stratification accompanying
poverty in America is inadequately redressed because the resulting stratification occurs
along racial lines, with African-Americans forming the bottom of the hierarchy.
289. THn NEW POLITICS, supra note 274, at 3.
290. To the extent that Mead addresses any facet of the ideology of individualistic
democratic capitalism, he laments the so-called demise of "the competence assumption,"
which in liberal western societies led "ordinary people to advance their own interests." Id.
at 19-24. Mead attributes growing incompetence in the United States, on which much of
American social policy is premised, to the need to focus on a "disadvantaged subset of the
population." Comparing American social policy since 1960 with that of European nations,
Mead argues that American social policy is comparatively backward:
[T~he seeming American backwardness is ... explained by the fact that the new
social problems appeared in the United States earlier than in Europe .... [T]he
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ideological context in which Americans become aware of conflict be-
tween rich and poor determines how Americans fight it out. Ideol-
ogy-and how it mediates our general understanding of American
socioeconomic reality-as well as our particular understanding of the
socioeconomic divergence within the African-American community
are, therefore, important.
The diverse theoretical explanations discussed in this section have
generated and influenced social policy discourse and initiatives since
the 1980s. Wilson's structural explanation for socioeconomic diver-
gence within the African-American community and the existence of a
black "underclass" has been especially influential,2 91 as has Murray's
pathological hypothesis.292 Consequently, the policy continuum is
marked on one end with a guidepost reading "structural," and at the
other with one reading "pathological." The next section explores the
choice among policy alternatives presented on this policy continuum.
C. The Social Policy Response
Historically, social policy addressing poverty targeted particular
constituents of the poor-e.g., the old, the young, the widowed, the
disabled and the temporarily destitute.2 93 Social policy responded to
racial inequality by extending the formal privileges and immunities of
United States has had more contact than Europe with the Third World, originally
with Africa, due to slavery, and most recently through immigration from Latin
America and Asia. The backgrounds of many of these peoples, combined with
their hardships in the United States, have generated unusual poverty levels, driv-
ing American social policy in fresh directions.
Id. at 232. Mead's policy framework within which "ordinary people" are contrasted against
an alien presence of Africans, Latin Americans and Asians is an homologue to the pro-
ducer/parasite paradigm discussed in Part V.
291. Key policy discourse generated by Wilson's thesis include JENCKS, supra note 272,
at 120-42; Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An
Alternative View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 265, at 437; Frank M. Kirkland,
Social Policy, Ethical Life; and the Urban Underclass, in THE UNDERCLASS QUESTION,
supra note 268, at 152; Lawrence M. Mead, The Obligation to Work and the Availability of
Jobs: A Dialogue Between Lawrence M. Mead and William J. Wilson, Focus, Summer
1987, at 11; Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to
Combat Poverty in the United States, in Tim URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 265, at 411;
William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and The Truly Disadvantaged, in THE UR-
BAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 265, at 460 [hereinafter Public Policy Research]; William
Julius Wilson, The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy, 501 ANNAmS AM.
AcAD. POL. Sci. 182 (1989).
292. See, e.g., GLAZER, supra note 70, at 36-58; Mary Jo Bane & Paul A. Jargowsky,
The Links Between Government Policy and Family Structure: What Matters and What
Doesn'4 in THE CHANGING AMmicAN FAmILy AND POLICY 219 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed.,
1988).
293. See KATz, supra note 261, at 86-91.
July 1995]
American citizenship to persons whose race historically placed them
at the margins of American society. However, neither form of social
policy has effectively redressed the social problems presented by the
black "underclass." 94
Antipoverty programs narrowly conceive poverty as a problem of
unavailable income or assets,295 and consequently focus on either in-
come maintenance 296 or income acquisition. 297 Eligibility for relief is
means-tested and means-determined. Social stigma accompanies the
294. By bifurcating social policy into that which addresses poverty and that which ad-
dresses racial discrimination, I do not suggest that such policy objectives are mutually ex-
clusive. Indeed, the history of antipoverty and antidiscrimination social policies not only
indicates coexistence but, more importantly, symbiosis. See Charles V. Hamilton & Dona
C. Hamilton, Social Policies, Civil Rights, and Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note
242, at 286, 288 (arguing that an economically-oriented antipoverty movement is a logical
and necessary consequence of a substantially successful constitutionally-oriented antidis-
crimination movement, and that socioeconomic issues cannot be dealt with until certain
basic conditions of constitutional status and citizenship rights are established).
It is worth noting, however, that close association between antipoverty and antidis-
crimination efforts has not always been beneficial to either effort. According to Hugh
Helco:
The civil rights movement generated powerful white support so long as it concen-
trated on issues perceived as moral questions (such as segregation, voting rights,
antiblack violence); it lost that capability when the movement's focus shifted to
the economic aspects of racial inequality.
Helco, supra note 242, at 323.
295. A more comprehensive conception of poverty accounts for a complex and ongo-
ing socioeconomic transformation that disrupts streams of income and limits accumulation
of assets, as well as for "a political reality capable of animating social action." Helco, supra
note 242, at 337. See generally GREO J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY:
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC FORTUNES OF AMERICAN WORKERS AND FAMILIES (1984)
(demonstrating that poverty stems from changes within the American political economy);
Rebecca M. Blank & Alan S. Blinder, Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty,
in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 242, at 180 (reviewing the evidence on how
macroeconomic activity affects the poor).
296. Programs that ensure a minimal income include Social Security, see Social Secur-
ity Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397e (1988); Aid to Families With Dependent Children,
see iL; and tax credits, see Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1988). See generally
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., A Decade of Policy Developments in the Income-Maintenance Sys-
tem, in A DECADE, supra note 242, at 55-117.
297. Programs to cultivate marketable skills and abilities, and hence to facilitate in-
come acquisition include Head Start, see Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (1988 & Supp. 1991); Manpower Development and Training, see Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994); Neighboorhood Youth
Corps, see Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); Job
Corps, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1709 (1988); Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of
1973, see 15 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); and Work Incentive Program, see 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1995).
See generally Robert A. Levine, An Overview of the Policies and Programs to Guarantee a
Decent Standard of Living, in TOWARD NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SOCIAL POLICIES OF
THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS 55, 62 (David C. Warner ed., 1977).
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grant of benefits,298 and the beneficiaries thereof are stereotypically
viewed as blacks who lack an appropriate work ethic.299 Viewed as
such, political support for such programs is always dubious300 because
African-Americans are expected to conquer poverty without legisla-
tive aid or assistance.
Antidiscrimination policies emanate from the liberal idea that
each person possesses an inviolability and integrity worthy of respect.
Discrimination, therefore, is understood as the violation of the liber-
298. See John B. Williamson, The Stigma of Public Dependency: A Comparison of Al-
ternative Forms of Public Aid to the Poor, 22 Soc. PROBS. 213 (1974).
299. A structural feature of American antipoverty policy is the distinction between the
politically suspect public assistance programs (which include Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children and General Assistance) and the politically supported social insurance pro-
grams (mainly Social Security). See KArz, supra note 261, at ix. Public attitudes toward
each category of programs are race-linked. For example, commenting on public perception
of the recipients of AFDC, economist Lester Thurow writes:
The war on poverty started as a war on white poverty in the late 1950s but it had
become, and was perceived as, a war on black poverty and low relative incomes
by the middle of the 1960s. This perception has both its strength and its weakness.
The need to do something about blacks led to the passage of many of the pro-
grams, but many of the programs failed to reach their funding goals because they
were seen as programs that aided blacks and not whites. One cannot understand
the problems with AFDC mothers unless one understands that the public gener-
ally thinks of this program as one that aids "black" mothers.
Lester C. Thurow, Discussions, in A DECADE supra note 242, at 118, 119. See generally
Joel F. Handler, The Transformation ofAid to Families with Dependent Children: The Fam-
ily Support Act in Historical Contex=4 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457 (1987-88)
(exploring the connection between contemporary American attitudes toward the poor and
welfare policy, and theorizing that current views reflect deep hostility toward female-
headed households in poverty).
By contrast, social insurance programs are not viewed as primarily targeting blacks,
and thus enjoy greater public support. As originally conceived, social insurance programs
were of no benefit to those who were too poor to help provide for their own security:
Social Security offered insurance-based annuity for those who enjoyed a stable
attachment to the work force and who were well enough off to achieve security by
combining a modest government pension or unemployment check with personal
savings and private insurance. Roughly 90 percent of the black work force were
thereby excluded from Social Security coverage. Those blacks who were included
could anticipate an old-age pension amounting to between $4.50 and $54 per year.
Helco, supra note 242, at 316.
On the public perception of the beneficiaries of the war on poverty, see generally JOE
R. FEAGIN, SUBORDINATING THE POOR: WELFARE AND AMERICAN BELIEFS (1975);
MICHAEL E. ScHmTZ, PUBLIC ArrrruDEs TowARD SOCIAL SECURITY 1935-1965 (1970);
Zavada D. Blum & Peter H. Rossi, Social Class Research and Images of the Poor: A Bibli-
ographic View, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY, supra note 269, at 343-97; David J. Kal-
len & Dorothy Miller, Public Attitudes Toward Welfare, 16 Soc. WORK 83 (July 1971).
300. The offensive against antipoverty programs since the 1980s is analyzed in FRAN-
CEs Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.CLoWARD, THE NEw CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON
THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982) and THE MEAN SEASON: THE AT-
TACK ON THE WELFARE STATE (Fred Block ed., 1987).
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ties of persons with biologically immutable racial characteristics,301
which is remediable with laws enhancing individual freedom without
regard to racial categorization.3°2 The emphasis of antidiscrimination
policies on individual freedoms facilitated the entry of well-trained,
talented, and educated minorities into the American mainstream.30 3
However, not being similarly positioned, blacks who comprised the
"underclass" could not transform individual freedoms into opportuni-
ties for mobility.304
Concerned with public opposition to antipoverty policies as well
as with the demonstrated inability of antidiscrimination policies to re-
dress "the deteriorating economic plight of the truly disadvantaged
minorities," 30 5 Wilson proposes a social policy of "universal programs
that enjoy the support and commitment of a broad constituency. '" 306
301. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). But see
generally Harris, supra note 176 (providing a historiography of race and its social and ideo-
logical construction).
302. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) ("[It is the
individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial
or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights .... ").
303. I do not contend here that the life of the African-American in the American
mainstream is without racial incident or discrimination. It is quite the contrary. See gener-
ally ELLIS COSE, THm RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (examining discrimination
facing affluent African-Americans); GEORGE DAVIS & GLEGG WATSON, BLACK LIE IN
CORPORATE AMERICA: SWIMMING IN THE MAINSTREAM (1982) (exploring the ways black
managers deal with racism in corporate setting).
304. See WILSON, supra note 253, at 113-14. The intersection of race subordination and
socioeconomic stratification raises the proverbial chicken-or-the-egg problem. Wilson
seems to posit that a minimum level of socioeconomic resources is a precondition for reap-
ing the benefits of policies predicated on antiracist principles. Id at 112-18. But others,
like Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 294, at 297, maintain the opposite, that racial barri-
ers had to be overturned before the benefits of social welfare policies could be realized by
black Americans.
305. WILSON, supra note 253, at 121. Wilson castigates those who confront the issues
raised by the black "underclass" in terms of race:
[T]hose who argue that the deteriorating economic plight of the truly disadvan-
taged minorities can be satisfactorily addressed simply by confronting the
problems of current racial bias fail to recognize how the fate of these minorities is
inextricably connected with the structure and function of the modern American
economy. The net effect is the recommendation of programs that do not confront
the fundamental causes of poverty, underemployment, and unemployment. In
other words, policies that do not take into account the changing nature of the
national economy-including its rate of growth and the nature of its variable de-
mand for labor; the factors that affect industrial employment, such as profit rates,
technology, and unionization; and patterns of institutional and individual migra-
tion that result from industrial transformation and shifts-will not effectively han-
dle the economic dislocation of low-income minorities.
Id at 121-22.
306. Id. at 120.
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He contends that programs targeted at particular groups, whether
identified by class or race, should be "deemphasized-considered only
as offshoots of, and indeed secondary to, the universal programs."
Wilson's proposal, however, carries a "hidden agenda": "to improve
-the life chances of groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasiz-
ing programs in which the more advantaged group of all races can
positively relate. '307
The policy choice between targeted programs and universal pro-
grams is controversial,308 mainly because social theorists who influ-
ence policy initiatives are still grappling with what Wilson calls "the
real challenge"-i.e., how "to develop programs that not only mean-
ingfully address the problems of the underclass but that draw broad
support."309
D. The Societal Backdash
The focus on social and economic divergence within the black
community ignited a new wave of attack on race-conscious affirmative
307. Id. (emphasis omitted).
308. Concerned with sustained public support for antipoverty programs, Theda
Skocpol recommends "Targeting within Universalism." Skocpol, supra note 291, at 414.
Skocpol explains:
Rather than devising new programs narrowly focused on low-income people or
the urban poor, and rather than seeking to reform or expand aid to families with
dependent children and other means-tested public assistance programs, policy-
makers should work toward displacing welfare with new policies that could ad-
dress the needs of less privileged Americans along with those of the middle class
and the stable working class. New policies must speak with a consistent moral
voice to all Americans who would be recipients and taxpayers. The policies
should reinforce fundamental values such as rewards for work, opportunities for
individual betterment, and family and community responsibility for the care of
children and other vulnerable people.
Md at 428-29.
Robert Greenstein, on the other hand, argues that "too heavy an emphasis on costly
universal approaches could result in too few resources being directed to those at the bot-
tom of the economic ladder." Greenstein, supra note 291, at 457. Greenstein, therefore,
recommends a mixture of universal and targeted approaches to fighting poverty:
Achieving a larger impact in reducing poverty is likely to require a mixture of
universal and targeted approaches. Such a strategy would combine programs such
as universal access to health care and assured child support with such carefully
designed targeted approaches as further expansion of the earned income credit
(particularly for large families), increased child care and housing assistance for
low- and moderate-income working families, and increased funding for Head
Start, WIC, childhood immunization, prenatal health care services, compensatory
education for disadvantaged children, and other early-intervention programs that
have good records and enjoy growing political support.
I& at 456.
309. Public Policy Research, supra note 291, at 478.
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action.310 Race-conscious affirmative action was pronounced ineffec-
tual,311 and deemed neglectful of blacks at the lower socioeconomic
echelons.3 12
310. Old critics objected to race-based affirmative action on the ground that, inter alia,
it undermines meritocracy and reinforces perceptions of black incompetence, see, e.g.,
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331-32 (1986) (noting "the objection that affirmative action rep-
resents a deviation from meritocratic standards" and the fear that blacks are elevated "to
positions for which they are unqualified and in which they fail"), stigmatizes blacks, see,
e.g., Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism: How Preferential Treatment Works Against
Blacks, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18 (defining "the new racists" and noting
their "local view ... that the blacks they run across professionally are not, on the average,
up to the white standard"), constitutes discrimination against whites, see, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157 (referring to affirma-
tive action as 'reverse discrimination'), and damages black self-image, see, e.g., Glenn C.
Loury, Beyond Civil Rights: The Better Path to Black Progress, Tim NEw REPurLBc, Oct.
7, 1985, at 22, 25 (stating that "preferential treatment undermines the ability of [blacks]...
to assert ... that they are as good as their accomplishments would seem to suggest").
Apparently, such sentiments have begun to shape the current social and political climate in
California-a state that many experts suggest will be the bellwether for the rest of the
country. See, e.g., Max Vanzi, Affirmative Action Opponents File Initiative with State Offi-
cials; Submission for Legal Review is Step Toward November, 1996 Ballot, L.A. TirMES,
Aug. 8, 1995, at A3 (describing latest efforts of backers of the so-called "California Civil
Rights Initiative" that would ban practice of granting ethnic and gender preferences in
state hiring, contracting and college admissions); Susan Yoachum & Edward Epstein, UC
Scraps Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 1995, at Al (describing historic University
of California Board of Regents vote that reversed 30-year old policies calling for affirma-
tive action in faculty hiring, contracting and admissions); see also Dave Lesher & Amy
Wallace, UC Vote to End Affirmative Action Echoes Across U.S., L.A. TiMES, July 22, 1995,
at Al ("Education leaders [predict] that California's decision ... is likely to be repeated
nationwide.").
311. The general sentiment is that "after a generation of racial preferences things only
got worse." A recent article in FORBES articulated the sentiment as follows:
Quotas have obviously failed to prevent continuing catastrophe in much of black
America. Prevailing taboos make this subject difficult to discuss.... In 1950 only
9% of black families were headed by a single parent; in 1965, 28%; now, fully
half. In 1959 only 15% of black births were illegitimate; in 1992, 66%. One in four
black men in their 20s is either in jail, on probation or on parole. Clearly, affirma-
tive action has done nothing to reverse the dismal trends.
Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, When Quotas Replace Merit, Everybody Suffers,
FORBES, Feb. 15, 1993, at 99; see also EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 243 (discussing
the declining public commitment to antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action pro-
grams should black poverty and the problems linked to such poverty-illegitimacy, jobless-
ness, drug abuse, criminality-worsen after the enactment of such laws and programs);
Special Report: Black and White in America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988 (special issue on
race relations in America).
312. That race-based affirmative action benefitted only educated, skilled blacks has
been the rallying critique:
Between 1970 and 1990 black median family income, adjusted for inflation, crept
snail-like from $21,151 to $21,423. But the proportion of black families earning
above $50,000, jumped sharply, from about 10% to nearly 15%. Dragging down
the median: the increase in black families receiving below $15,000, now nearly
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National and international economic trends resulted in the fall of
white middle-income families into lower income brackets,313 which re-
inforced white discontent with race-conscious affirmative action.3 14 A
40%. So quotas may have helped create a black middle class (although educated
blacks might have done well anyway; after all, the proportion of white high in-
come families also rose in this period). But the black poor have not benefitted.
Brimelow & Spencer, supra note 311, at 80; see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF
OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 124 (1990) (asserting that race-
based affirmative action "benefit[s] those who are not disadvantaged-middle class white
women and middle-class blacks"). Steele suggests returning affirmative action "to its origi-
nal purpose of enforcing equal opportunity-a purpose that in itself disallows racial prefer-
ences." Id. at 123. Citing his own children's middle income background, Steele further
asserts that "[p]references are inexpensive and carry the glamour of good intentions....
To be against them is to be unkind. But I think the unkindest cut is to bestow on children
like my own an undeserved advantage while neglecting the development of those disadvan-
taged children on the East side of my city who will likely never be in a position to benefit
from a preference." Id. at 124. See Roy L. Brooks, Shelby Steele and the Subtext of Our
Developing Civil Rights Laws, 9 LAW & INEo. J. 359 (1991), for a critique of Steele's
claims.
Legal scholar Stephen Carter criticizes race-based affirmative action for its alleged
failure to redress the disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions of lower class blacks. In
Carter's view, race-based affirmative action creates the impression of racial justice, but in
fact perpetuates racial injustice because affirmative action is most beneficial to educated,
highly trained blacks who would probably have advanced in its absence given the success
of the civil rights movement and legislation. Carter asserts that affirmative action creates
this false impression of racial justice bacause of its failure to address structural causes (eco-
nomic organization and distribution) of the degraded socioeconomic status of lower class
blacks. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFmi'MATrIvE ACTION BABY
(1991); see also Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison,
101 YALE L. 1631 (1992) (critiquing Carter's claims).
. Syndicated columnist William Raspberry has commented that while the plight of poor
blacks usually provides a statistical base for many affirmative action proposals, the benefits
of such proposals go primarily to blacks whom he terms as "already advantaged," and
nothing goes to the black poor. See William Raspberry, Should Blacks Help To Exploit
Blacks?, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 4, 1990, at 7B.
313. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DENDUSTRIAL-
IZATION OF AMERIcA (1982) (arguing that systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic
productive capacity results in long term earnings loss); BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT
HARRISON, Tim GREAT U-TuRN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF
AMERICA (1988) (arguing that shrinking corporate profits, because of declining productiv-
ity relative to growing international competition, resulted in zero growth in family income
and a drop in buying power of the average wage); BARBARA EHRENREiCH, FEAR OF FALL-
ING: Tim INNER LIFE OF THE MmnDLE CLASS (1989) (discussing the nervous stress of mid-
die-income earners tormented by the prospect of their decline).
On the matter of a declining middle-class, see FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS:
Tim CHANGING AMERICAN INCOME DisrmmrrON (1988) (describing the growth and sub-
sequent stagnation of average incomes); Katherine L. Bradbury, The Shrinking Middle
Class, NEw ENG. J. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 41; Neal H. Rosenthal, The Shrinking
Middle Class: Myth or Reality?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1985, at 3; Robert J. Samuel-
son, Middle Class Media Myth, NAT'L J., Dec. 31, 1983, at 2673; Lester Thurow, The Disap-
pearance of the Middle Class, N.Y. Twm-s, Feb. 5, 1984, § 3, at 2.
314. For analysis linking downward mobility of white middle-income families and dis-
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major consequence has been an increased demand for some form of
social policy initiative premised not on race, but on wealth and income
diffentials or class.
To make their case, class advocates frequently call attention to
the deprived socioeconomic status of a hypothetical white Appalach-
ian, whose plight is allegedly unaddressed by existing race-conscious
policies that unfairly benefit racial minorities.315 Class advocates con-
tend that class-conscious initiatives are more equitable than race-con-
scious policies for several reasons. First, class-conscious initiatives are
deemed inherently just because their intended beneficiaries are ra-
cially unidentifiable.316 As a consequence, class-conscious initiatives
purportedly avoid any allocation of social benefits on the basis of ra-
cial group identification.317 Without race-conscious entitlements, the
argument goes, the deprived socioeconomic condition of both "truly
content with race-based affirmative action, see EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 172-97;
KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF DOWNWARD MO-
BILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 172-97 (1988) (reporting that blue-collar workers
blamed their downward mobility on government-imposed preferential hiring of particular
racial and ethnic groups). For white attitudes on affirmative action, see Louis Harris et al.,
A Study of Attitudes Toward Racial and Religious Minorities and Toward Women (Louis
Harris 1978) (approximately 75% of whites perceived no discrimination in hiring, paying
and promoting blacks by the end of the 1970s), cited in Jennifer L. Hochschild, Equal
Opportunity and the Estranged Poor, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 143, 148 n.11
(1989); Blacks and Whites Differ on Civil Rights Progress, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY,
Aug. 1991, at 56 (55% of Americans believed that the U.S. had enough laws addressing
racial discrimination); Treatment of Blacks Viewed Differently by Two Races: Affirmative
Action, THE GALLUP REP., Feb. 1981, at 37 (only 7% of whites in 1981 and 11% in 1991
supported affirmative action in hiring).
Legal commentators have noted the influence of attitudes regarding race-based af-
firmative action on the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Giradeau A. Spann, Pure
Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (1990) (Supreme Court has responded to a conserva-
tive shift in majoritarian attitudes about race discrimination by subtly incorporating con-
temporary attitudes into its judicial opinions); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v.
Croson: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1622-24 (1990)
(social backlash has set in against affirmative action and the Croson decision suggests that
the backlash has touched the Supreme Court).
315. The poor Appalachian white first appeared in the Supreme Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 332 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
316. Professor Richard Delgado offers a more basic explanation for white resistance to
race-based remediation:
[G]overnmental programs for blacks always have generated resistance. For, under
the principle of formal neutrality, we are invariably led to see them as favoritism.
They violate the rule against special treatment; we will tolerate them only for a
short time, all the while conscious of their costs.
Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1398
(1991) (reviewing Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM (1990)).
317. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,298 (denying con-
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disadvantaged" blacks and poor whites is better addressed.318 Finally,
class-conscious initiatives are viewed as a palliative for an unfair com-
petition of sorts that allegedly emerges when middle-income blacks
use race to garner education and employment opportunities to the
detriment of middle-income whites. 319
In sum, the advocacy for social policy initiatives premised on
wealth and income differentials is a reaction to specific contemporary
developments in American race relations, as well as to insecurities
stemming from socioeconomic upheavals and uncertainties. It is an
advocacy fueled, in part, by resentment of perceived ineffectual race-
conscious preferences and, in part, by resentment of the loss of eco-
nomic benefits and advantages to which whites have been exclusively
entitled. I argue in the next section that this kind of advocacy is a
pretext for the social subordination of African-Americans. It is symp-
tomatic of a more subtle and silently sophisticated ordering of whites
over blacks, and operates to preserve white dominance over blacks.
E. Class-Conscious Advocacy: Preserving Power
Key events surrounding recent presidential elections illustrate
how a class-conscious advocacy (re)inscribes political rule and power
for European-Americans. At the close of the 1992 presidential elec-
tion, The New York Times reported that then-President-elect Bill Clin-
ton would take office with a mandate for domestic change. Clinton,
according to The New York Times, created the mandate "with inces-
sant talk about the middle class and relative quiet on topics like inner
stitutional protection for classifications premised on membership in particular racial
group).
318. See Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Il-
lustration of America Denying the Impact of Race; 45 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 1089, 1123-25
(1993). Morton takes issue with the notion that race-based affirmative action has not
achieved its goal of redressing indigence:
[T]he myth that affirmative action programs were designed to assist the
socioeconomically disadvantaged is supported only by assuming that at the time
race-based affirmative action was first being considered, race was used as a proxy
to identify the socioeconomically disadvantaged. There is nothing in the history of
affirmative action, however, that would suggest that race was used as a proxy or
that class was originally the basis for such programs.
Id at 1123 (footnote omitted) (citing James E. Jones, The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 383, 387 (1988)).
319. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood, Tim NEw YORKER, Mar. 27,
1995, at 62 (discussing how "the fairness argument" sustains opposition to race-conscious
affirmative action, and the "good" kind of affirmative action, which is affirmative action by
social or economic class).
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cities, the homeless and the underclass. '320
In his campaign speeches, Clinton sought to develop themes of
individual responsibility and market opportunities, themes purport-
edly reflecting only the "values" of a middle class. He spoke of "the
quiet, troubled voice of the forgotten middle class, lamenting that gov-
ernment no longer looks out for their interests or honors their val-
ues-like individual responsibility, hard work, family, community."'321
He called for a "new covenant" that "will say to our corporate leaders
at the top of the ladder: We'll promote growth and the free market,
but we're not going to help you diminish the middle class and weaken
the economy .... The new covenant will say to people on welfare:
We're going to provide the training and education and health care you
need, but if you can work, you've got to work, because you can no
longer stay on welfare forever. '32
Clinton's unabashed appeal to a "middle class" was an appeal to
whites sensing a loss (actual and perceived) of their majority status
since the enactment of civil rights legislation. Thomas and Mary Ed-
sail explain how the costs associated with civil rights enforcement con-
tribute to a sense of loss and foster a middle class identification among
whites:
The issues of race and taxes fostered the creation of a middle-class,
anti-government, property-holding, conservative identification
among key white voters who had previously seen their interests as
aligned with a downwardly-redistributive federal government....
Race and taxes-with their "values," "rights," and redistribu-
tive dimensions-functioned to force the attention of the public on
the costs of federal policies and programs. Those costs were often
first experienced in terms of loss-the loss of control over school
selection, union apprenticeship programs, hiring, promotions,
neighborhoods, public safety, and even over sexual morals and a
stable social order. Those losses or "costs" were then driven home
by rising tax burdens to pay for such services as busing, Medicaid,
subsidized public housing, law enforcement, prisons, welfare, and
new lawyers of civil rights enforcement at every level of
government.
The race and tax agenda effectively focused majority public at-
tention onto what government takes, rather than onto what it
gives....
The costs and burdens of... policies seeking to distribute eco-
nomic and citizenship rights more equitably to blacks and to other
minorities fell primarily on working and lower-middle-class whites
who frequently competed with blacks for jobs and status, who lived
320. DeParle, supra note 21, at A8.
321. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 290.
322. Id.
1434 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
THE RACE/CLASS CONUNDRUM
in neighborhoods adjoining black ghettos, and whose children at-
tended schools most likely to fall under busing orders.
The class-tilt of the costs of integration and of racial equality-
a disproportionate share of which was borne by low and lower-mid-
dle-income whites-turned resentment of those white working-class
voters into a powerful mobilizing force.323
By the time of the 1992 presidential election, it is likely that Clin-
ton was aware of prevailing white resentment towards blacks.324 To
ensure its victory in the presidential elections of the 1980s, the Repub-
lican Party exploited white resentment towards blacks by rearticulat-
ing blatantly racist sentiments as "interests" in the preservation of
middle American values.32z Thus, to recapture the presidency for the
Democratic Party, Clinton, with abandon, trumpeted the causes of the
"forgotten middle class. '326
323. Id. at 11-12.
324. A local arm of his own party had documented prevailing white attitudes about
blacks in the Report on Democratic Defection, the infamous study of "Reagan Democrats"
in Macomb County, Michigan. The following was reported:
These white Democratic defectors express a profound distaste for blacks, a senti-
ment that pervades almost everything they think about government and poli-
tics.... Blacks constitute an explanation for their [white defectors'] vulnerability
and for almost everything that has gone wrong in their lives; not being black is
what constitutes being middle class; not living with blacks is what makes a neigh-
borhood a decent place to live.
Stanley B. Greenberg, Report on Democratic Defection, at 13-18 (The Analysis Group,
Apr. 15, 1985), quoted in EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 182.
325. See generally EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 137-53 (discussing Republican
strategies to lure embittered white Democratic constituents to vote the other way).
326. Admittedly, blacks played important roles to ensure Clinton's ascendancy to the
office of the President. But, as commentators like Andrew Hacker observed:
Clinton kept his black advisers under wraps and made few appearances before
black groups. Jesse Jackson, after his convention speech, agreed to accept a mod-
est role, including an itinerary that kept him at a distance from the candidates.
The campaign avoided making any promises aimed specifically at black citizens.
For the first time in almost half a century, the [Democratic] party's platform made
no mention of redressing racial injustice. As a result, race never became an issue
in 1992.
Andrew Hacker, The Blacks and Clinton, N.Y. Rv. BooKs, Jan. 28, 1993, at 12, 14.
According to Omi and Winant, "the pragmatic politics of winning a presidential elec-
tion in the aftermath of twelve years of Republican rule" account for the omission of race
from the 1992 presidential elections. They observe that as a "new Democrat," Clinton, and
other neoliberals, sought to avoid, as far as possible, framing issues or identities racially:
Neoliberals argue that addressing social policy or political discourse overtly to
matters of race simply serves to distract, or even to hinder, the kinds of reforms
which could most directly benefit racially defined minorities. To focus too much
attention on race tends to fuel demagogy and separatism, and thus exacerbates
the very difficulties which much racial discourse has ostensibly been intended to
solve. To speak of race is to enter a terrain where racism is hard to avoid. Better
to address racism by ignoring race, at least publicly.
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The recent past teaches that political mobilization of whites on
the basis of a middle class identity permits whites to extract from the
state327 a social policy agenda that is only equivocally committed to
racial justice. This policy stance, coupled with certain supply-side eco-
nomic initiatives, 328 then preserves for whites a race-based advantage
in the distribution of tangible benefits (e.g., income, employment, edu-
cation, housing), as well as intangible benefits (e.g., social status and
influence and political power and authority).329
Gary Orfield and Carole Ashkinaze succinctly describe the fed-
eral executive branch's lackadaisical approach to civil rights enforce-
ment in the 1980s. They write:
Under the Reagan administration, there was no serious enforce-
ment against civil rights violations by schools, colleges, or job train-
ing institutions. Instead, civil rights agencies slashed data collection,
investigations, and public release of information. The U.S. Civil
Rights Commission, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division,
and other key agencies were put under the authority of officials who
attacked the goals of the nation's major black and Hispanic organi-
zations. Civil rights research funding was reduced or eliminated in
federal agencies. Some research was commissioned to provide am-
munition for the Justice Department's attack on previously estab-
lished school desegregation orders.
Although the laws were still on the books, the basic attitude
was to minimize enforcement. Nothing was done. In the job training
program enacted in 1982, civil rights regulations were never even
issued in spite of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition against dis-
OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 147-48 (emphasis in original).
It is still too early to assess comprehensively the neoliberal's attempt to suppress mat-
ters of race from public discourse.
327. I adopt a broad view of "the state" that encompasses all the "administrative, legal,
bureaucratic, and coercive systems" that structure social relations. See Theda Skocpol,
Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE
STATE BACK IN 3, 7 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
328. For a helpful discussion of the basic propositions of supply-side economics see
Thomas D. Boston, Conservative Economics: False Prophecies, Failed Policies, in RACE,
CLASS AND CONSERVATISM 135-157 (1988).
329. Commenting on the political and economic setbacks blacks experienced in the
1970s and early 1980s, times of economic restraint, Walter Stafford asserts that:
[M]any middle-class white groups had positioned themselves in the economy so
that restraints would not mean large losses. And those with resources definitely
were not willing to relinquish them to appease groups at the bottom of the eco-
nomic ladder. Indeed, one of the effects of the affluent society is that Americans
are unwilling to relinquish access to resources in a shrinking economy. Instead,
they became more concerned about competitively positioning themselves for ac-
cess to college and other social and political indexes of status and influence. With
a shrinking economic pie, therefore, social, political, and economic rights were
vigorously protected.
Stafford, supra, note 230, at 26-27.
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crimination in federal programs. In higher education there were no
sanctions against colleges. In fact, the Justice Department success-
fully urged the Supreme Court, in the Grove City College case, to
narrow its interpretation of the sex discrimination and civil rights
law. Then, citing the Grove City decision to justify its inaction in
other civil rights cases, it simultaneously opposed Congressional at-
tempts to strengthen the law. Congress finally enacted the 1988
Civil Rights Restoration Act over the President's veto, but the ad-
ministration continued on the same course of nonenforcement0 30
Minimal enforcement of civil rights regulations reflected the mid-
dle class view that the state had done all it could to make access to
opportunities equal and to produce social progress. Further state ac-
tion, according to this view, would threaten democratic doctrines of
equality.33' Indeed, no additional state action was required because
the relative social position of African-Americans is determined inde-
pendently of race and racial conflict. Rather, the status of African-
Americans in a highly stratified society is determined by the workings
of the free market and that is where recourse, if any, lies.33 2
I again turn to Orfield and Ashkinaze for an explanation of the
economic dimensions of this view:
The idea that government has both the responsibility and the power
to make opportunities more equal in a highly stratified society, a
central driving goal of the Great Society, gave way to the belief that
government had gone as far as it could. The hope for a solution, if
there was one, was transferred to the market. If the economy could
expand sufficiently, by unleashing private capitalism, the jobs and
income created would provide new opportunities. The savings
would go into job-creating investments, not paternalistic services,
and produce an economic boom that would put low-income minor-
ity people to work. Welfare cuts and work requirements would in-
crease the incentive to work, and freezing the minimum wage for
nearly a decade would lower the cost to employers of hiring more
workers. 333
The prime vehicles for implementing this economic dogma em-
braced by the middle class have been the Economic Recovery Tax Act
330. GARY ORFELD & CARoLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DoOR: CONSERVATIVE
POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNTrY 209 (1991).
331. "The basic conservative policy was acceptance of the ghetto system as natural and
denunciation of policies intended to challenge or end the color line-such as busing, dis-
persion of subsidized housing, and tough fair-housing enforcement-as unworkable and
unfair to whites." Id at 210.
332. For an opposing view, see Boston, supra note 328, at 98 (asserting that "every
major improvement in the economic status of blacks was caused by coercive political inter-
vention rather than by free market forces").
333. ORimLD & AsHKINAZE, supra note 330, at 4.
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of 1981334 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,335
both of which proved to be racially retrogressive. The Edsalls report
that tax cuts harmed racial minorities while helping whites:
[I]n terms of... racial impact, the 1981-82 changes in federal tax
burdens meant that in 1985, 36.4 percent of all black households and
28.7 percent of Hispanic households fell into the category forced to
pay higher federal taxes-the bottom quintile-compared to just
18.2 percent of white households. Conversely, 21.4 percent of white
households were in the top quintile getting the largest tax cuts, com-
pared to only 9 percent of all black households and 10.9 percent of
Hispanic households. 336
Benefit cuts had similarly disproportionate adverse consequences
for racial minorities. Professor David Stoesz explains the reduction in
public assistance benefits and the punitive eligibility guidelines that
were established:
The new AFDC eligibility guidelines were particularly punitive
since they were directed at poor families who were participating in
the labor force. Suddenly, AFDC family heads who were trying to
improve their economic lot found that they could deduct only $160
per month per child for child care, that the deduction for work ex-
penses was limited to $75 per month, and that the earned income
disregard (the first $30 per month and one-third of income thereaf-
ter) was eliminated after four months. [In addition], [a]s if to stran-
gle the welfare bureaucracy in paper work, OBRA [the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981] required the welfare depart-
ment to redetermine monthly the eligibility of those on AFDC who
insisted on working.337
In racial terms, reductions in AFDC benefits in the 1980s affected
only two percent of white households, but fifteen percent of black
households, and ten percent of Hispanic households. 338 For blacks,
the economic consequences were dire because public assistance bene-
fits are a source of income for a seventh of all black households.339
In their case study of Atlanta, Georgia, Orfield and Ashkinaze
chronicle the failure of conservative policies and market mechanisms
to narrow disparities between white and black Atlantans' access to
334. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 265 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
335. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.s.c.).
336. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 160 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, House-
hold After-Tax Income: 1985, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 151
(1985), Table I, at 7-8)).
337. David Stoesz, Poor Policy: The Legacy of the Kerner Commission for Social Wel-
fare, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1675, 1680 (1993) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
338. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 8, at 162.
339. Id.
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economic opportunities, 340 housing,341 education, 342 and job train-
ing.343 In fact, they found that conservative policies and market mech-
anisms were critical to the social and economic deterioration of
Atlanta's African-American community.34 4
Orfield and Ashkinaze's assessments are consistent with other
studies that were broader in scope. For example, economist Thomas
Boston concluded:
The high-sounding promises of supply-side economics have not ma-
terialized .... Freer markets have not reduced poverty but wors-
ened it. Lower taxes have created a colossal deficit rather than a
balanced budget. Fimally, race relations have not improved with the
dismantling of affirmative action and reversal of the Justice Depart-
ment's enforcement of civil rights. Instead, they have reached their
lowest ebb in decades .... 34
At the base of policies that purport to express the views of a mid-
dle class lie the predominant themes of American individualism: the
rational, self-knowledgeable holder of equal political rights competing
in an open and minimally-regulated economic market. Through direct
and indirect invocation of these themes, such policy initiatives
reproduce social and economic advantages and disadvantages along
racial lines. Such policies, as Walter Stafford argues, effect a distribu-
tion of resources in times of restraint such that established arrange-
ments remain unchallenged.346
The ability to affect the social policy agenda such that the status
quo is reproduced or remains unchanged is an exercise of power.347
This power in these circumstances reinforces the social positions of
European-Americans at the considerable expense of African-
Americans.
340. Oiir.nu & ASHKINAZE, supra note 330, at 45-68.
341. Id. at 69-102.
342. Id. at 103-73.
343. Id. at 174-204.
344. Id. at 205-34.
345. Boston, supra note 328, at 159.
346. See Stafford, supra note 230, at 28-30.
347. A form of power involves the "mobilization of bias," defined to mean:
A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ('rules
of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain
persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a
preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests.
JoHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN AP-
PALACI-iAN VALLEY 14 (1980) (quoting PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ,
POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACrICE 43 (1970)).
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V. Social Policy in a Post-Civil-Rights Future
Omi and Winant contend that right-wing efforts declined to em-
brace overtly racist politics in order to dismantle the gains of the civil
rights movement for racial minorities. Indeed, the racial upheavals of
the 1960s precluded reliance on the overtly racist notions of biological
inferiority and superiority. 348 The key device employed to dismantle
the political gains of racial minorities has been the use of "code
words"-which have been defined as "phrases and symbols which re-
fer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular
democratic or egalitarian ideals (e.g., justice, equal opportunity)." 49
"Working class" and "middle class" are "code words," as defined by
Omi and Winant. The use of these terms has galvanized whites, who
feel threatened by minority gains, to transform the social policy
agenda of the post-civil-rights era.
That whites in a post-civil-rights era would find a new category,
such as class, on which to base their identity, and around which to act
collectively to resist diminishment of their majority status, is not sur-
prising. Having dominated racialized minority groups, it is almost in-
evitable that whites would employ economic, political, and legal
resources as well as metaphors of individualism to block resistance to
their privileged status and to transform their identities consistent with
the nature of the resistance. 350
This "tactical adaptation," as Etienne Balibar would call it,351 is
all the more indicative of the fact that, in Gramscian language, "some-
thing like a hegemony... [has] develop[ed] here. ' 352 The shift to the
vocabulary of class-an advocacy that incorporates differences in be-
havioral and cultural characteristics-and the invocation of American
individualism provide justifications for the continuation of certain
structural inequalities (e.g., economic stratification, residential segre-
gation, employment discrimination). At the same time, the change in
vocabulary strategically avoids an overt appeal to racial prejudice or
discrimination. Thus, differences between blacks and whites are per-
ceived to be rooted in ostensibly incompatible lifestyles and cul-
348. But see generally CHARLES MURRAY & RICHARD HERNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE
(1994) (signalling, albeit tacitly, a willingness to return to a focus on "genetic" factors that
influence intelligence, and thus, social standing in the United States).
349. OMI & WINANT, supra note 3, at 120.
350. Cf. Balibar, supra note 43, at 4 (asserting that a dominant group acquires political
skills and a self-consciousness which anticipate the way that resistance to it would be ex-
pressed, and transforms itself with the nature of that resistance).
351. Id. at 17.
352. Id. at 20.
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tures-i.e., in value systems that are either harmonious or discordant
with American individualism. From this point of view, state practices
and policies merely acknowledge, reflect and incorporate these differ-
ences. This is the "neoracism" of which Balibar speaks:
It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but
the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first
sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples
in relation to others but 'only' ... the incompatibility of life-styles
and traditions .... 353
In this era of racial hegemony, the "incompatible culture" argu-
ments that are couched in the vocabulary of class become more cen-
tral to state practices and policies. Thus, African-Americans must
develop new survival strategies. 354 The challenge, as Howard Winant
suggests, is "to dismantle individualistic and essentialist conceptions of
identity and culture." 355 Individualistic and essentialist conceptions of
identity and culture, as I have demonstrated, undergird state practices
and policies that disadvantage and thus subordinate African-
Americans.
In her book Identity Politics,356 Shane Phelan offers a prescriptive
for the type of dismantling suggested by Winant. Phelan asserts that
"identity formation, inevitably bound as it is to the location of com-
munity membership, is a matter not only of ontology but also of strat-
egy."'357 It would seem, then, that the most direct counteroffensive to
racial hegemony is the strategic development of an African-American
identity with a view toward its concrete implications for social policy
and citizenship in American society.
There are signs of such a strategy developing. Leonce Gaiter rails
against mainstream society's failure to acknowledge the complex na-
ture of African-American culture, and its insistence that the black un-
derclass represents the whole of the African-American community.358
His reprimand is informed by a sensitivity to the political stakes asso-
ciated with the portrayal of African-Americans. He writes:
353. Id. at 21.
354. For an historical survey of the survival and resistive strategies of African-Ameri-
cans, see Robin D.G. Kelly, The Black Poor and the Politics of Opposition in a New South
City, 1929-1970, in TH "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE: ViEws FROM HISTORY 293 (Michael B.
Katz ed., 1993).
355. WINANT, supra note 7, at 102.
356. SHrN PHELAN, ID)E =rrY Pouncs: LESBIAN FEMImSM AND THE LmIMS oF
CommuN (1989).
357. Id. at 136 (emphasis in original).
358. Leonce Gaiter, The Revolt of the Black Bourgeoisie, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1994,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 42.
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[A] reason the myth of an all-encompassing black underclass sur-
vives-despite the higher number of upper-income black families-
is that it fits with a prevalent form of white liberalism, which is just
as informed by racism as white conservatism. Since the early 70's,
good guilt-liberal journalists and others warmed to the picture of
black downtrodden masses in need of their help. Through the
agency of good white people, blacks would rise. This image of Afri-
can-Americans maintained the lifeline of white superiority that
whites in this culture cling to, and therefore this image of blacks
stuck. A strange tango was begun. Blacks seeking advancement op-
portunities allied themselves with whites eager to "help" them.
However, those whites continued to see blacks as inferiors, victims,
cases, and not as equals, individuals or, heaven forbid, competitors.
It was hammered into the African-American psyche by media-
appointed black leaders and the white media that it was essential to
our political progress to stay or seem to stay economically and so-
cially deprived. To be recognized and recognize oneself as middle or
upper class was to threaten the political progress of black people.359
Concerned that African-Americans are now hampered by the
images maintained earlier to ensure progress, Gaiter speaks to the is-
sue of blacks' control over their identity:
Imagine being told by your peers, the records you hear, the pro-
grams you watch, the "leaders" you see on TV, classmates, prospec-
tive employers-imagine being told by virtually everyone that in
order to be your true self you must be ignorant and poor, or at least
seem so.
Blacks must now see to it that our children face no such bur-
den. We must see to it that the white majority, along with vocal
minorities within the black community (generally those with a self-
serving political agenda), do not perpetuate the notion that African-
Americans are invariably doomed to the underclass.
African-Americans are moving toward seeing ourselves-and
demanding that others see us-as individuals, not as shards of a de-
graded monolith. The American ideal places primacy on the rights
of the individual, yet historically African-Americans have been de-
nied those rights. We blacks can effectively demand those rights,
effectively demand justice only when each of us sees him or herself
as an individual with the right to any of the opinions, idiosyncrasies
and talents accorded other Americans. 360
Granted, African-Americans seeing themselves as individuals is
crucial to the reconstruction of the identity of blacks in America. As a
cultural product, individualism is not easily dispensed with in Ameri-
can society. Notions of individual autonomy, rights and freedoms per-
vade the social order. But, as African-Americans reconstruct their
identity by demanding inclusion in the indiviualistic structure of
359. Id. at 43.
360. Id.
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American society, vigorous critique of racial hegemony and agitation
for a transformation of existing relations of power must accompany
that demand. African-Americans must maintain a deliberate con-
sciousness of the fact that prior as well as existing interpretations of
individualism have rendered "blackness" a referent to characteristics
that are deviant, inferior, and un-American. Uncritical endorsement
of the individualistic structure of American society is simply out of the
question.
The paradox of African-Americans is that even as we act strategi-
cally to avoid monolithic constructions of blackness, we cannot disre-
gard the fact that all blacks are socially positioned in relation to all
whites. The plain fact is that common experiences as African-Ameri-
cans, as a community historically subjected to forms of disenfranchise-
ment or oppression or both, create a black socioeconomic identity
which, in turn, is the very basis for our distinctive political struggles
over the meanings of equality for African-Americans. Given our
shared, albeit imposed identity, no individual black ever rises above
the community of African-Americans. Revolt, as they may, middle
and upper income blacks cannot secede from blackness.
Notwithstanding these complexities, the success of any strategy of
identity formation is, in part, dependent upon the rehabilitation of
policymakers who, on one hand, affirm the socioeconomic identity of
blacks in law and policy but who, on the other hand, have exhibited
very little inclination to center their policy analysis around the ideolo-
gies and consciousness that both define and fracture the American
identity. In order for policymakers to center their policy analysis
around American individualism and its consequences for African-
Americans (and other racialized minorities), policymakers should
adopt a policy approach that self-consciously asks the following ques-
tion: How has individualistic democratic capitalism subordinated Af-
rican-Americans? This suggested policy approach is influenced by the
work of feminist jurisprudents who question everything by regularly
asking the "the woman question. '361
Asking the woman question is a feminist method for inquiring
into the consequences of forms of gender oppression and domina-
tion.3 62 As a method, asking the woman question does not dictate a
361. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HiARv. L. REv. 829,
837-49 (1990); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE LJ. 1373, 1384-87 (1986); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The In-
quiries of Feminist Jurisprudence; 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's LJ. 64, 72-77 (1985).
362. Professor Bartlett writes:
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particular result:
Asking the woman question does not require decision in favor of a
woman. Rather, the method requires the decisionmaker to search
for gender bias and to reach a decision in the case that is defensible
in light of that bias. It demands, in other words, special attention to
a set of interests and concerns that otherwise may be, and histori-
cally have been, overlooked. The substance of asking the woman
question lies in what it seeks to uncover: disadvantage based upon
gender.363
In several important ways the feminist method of asking the wo-
man question can serve as a model for policymakers inquiring into the
subordination of African-Americans. Like gender oppression, racial
oppression is located not at the surface of doctrine but deep in the
structures of American cultural identity and the socioeconomic identi-
ties of the American people. As discussed in Parts II.B and III of this
Article, the cultural identity of America and its people is structured by
individualistic democratic capitalism, which embodies ideas about
freedom, political enfranchisement and economic independence.
Moreover, individualistic democratic capitalism is a racialized concept
that works at the representational level simultaneously to disempower
(and thus subordinate) African-Americans, and to empower (and thus
elevate) European-Americans.
When policymakers routinely predicate their decisions on the
tenets of individualistic democratic capitalism, they ensure and
reproduce an organization of power along racial lines. But if policy-
makers were to self-consciously ask how individualistic democratic
capitalism has subordinated African-Americans, they might begin to
pay attention to the ways in which American individualism has denied
opportunities for self-identification to African-Americans, and has
disempowered African-Americans by rigidly dictating who they are
and what they mean. 364
Asking the woman question reveals the ways in which political choice and institu-
tional arrangement contribute to women's subordination. Without the woman
question, differences associated with women are taken for granted and, unexam-
ined, may serve as a justification for laws that disadvantage women. The woman
question reveals how the position of women reflects the organization of society
rather than inherent characteristics of women. As many feminists have pointed
out, difference is located in relationships and social institutions-the workplace,
the family, clubs, sports, childrearing patterns, and so on-not in women them-
selves. In exposing the hidden effects of laws that do not explicitly discriminate on
the basis of sex, the woman question helps to demonstrate how social structures
embody norms that implicitly render women different and thereby subordinate.
Bartlett, supra note 361, at 843.
363. Id. at 846 (emphasis in original).
364. The argument being made here is analogous to that put forward by Shane Phelan
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Modeling a social policy approach on the woman question fo-
cuses attention on the history of American individualism and on the
fact that it has been an empowering source for European-Americans
who are unwilling to depart from power. The power of whites over
blacks in a post-civil-rights era is no longer manifested in explicit stat-
utes, regulations, and customs. The power of whites over blacks in a
post-civil-rights era is expressed in signification systems, which then
structure racial identity and social and economic inequality. Asking
how individualistic democratic capitalism has subordinated African-
Americans possibly begins the process of confronting white power and
its post-civil-rights configuration.
With this methodological prescriptive in mind, policymakers
should begin their analysis of the advocacy for class-conscious poli-
cymaking by recognizing that identifying the black "underclass" is the
first step in a process by which whites derive an understanding about
all black people. This is because the black "underclass" is a represen-
tation of blackness.365 The black "underclass," therefore, stands at the
center of the contemporary race/class debate.366 It is the very exist-
ence of a black "underclass" in post-civil-rights America that sustains
public doubt about the efficacy of race-conscious social policies and
that has provoked debate over the legitimacy of welfare which, as I
have established, is a race-identified policy.
With that recognition, policymakers can then begin to assess
whether class-consciousness-the proposed alternative to race-con-
sciousness-will ever advance substantive antiracist goals. And that
assessment must account for several important characteristics of the
modem race/class debate.
As the modem race/class debate unfolded, terms like "poverty"
and "underclass" amounted to veiled allusions to racial minorities, es-
when she contends that "oppression has less to do with what we are told we are like than it
does with the rigidity with which we are told what we are like, what we mean, and how we
should manifest that meaning." PHELAN, supra note 356, at 156. Taking this assertion to
its logical conclusion, Phelan states that oppression "can be resisted only through rejection
of the identities and explanations that are given to us." Id at 157. Moreover, she intimates
that resistance is viable because "we do not, in fact, live the lives that our theoretic repre-
sentations would suggest." Id
On the process of rejecting the identities given to us, see generally bell hooks, Our-
LAw CULTURE: RESISTING REPRESENTATIONS (1994).
365. For a thoughtful collection of essays on contemporary representations of black-
ness in a struggle over identity and access to political and social power, see bell hooks,
BLACK LooKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
366. See FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 90.
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pecially African-Americans. 367 "Poverty," in particular, signified an
adversity that naturally characterized African-Americans when they
figured centrally, and recurrently, in social policy commentary. The
association of poverty with the African-American community has af-
fected the status of all its members.
African-Americans occupying the lowest socioeconomic echelons
are dubbed the "underclass." Rather than a mere referent to an ex-
treme condition of poverty, "underclass" became a euphemism for ra-
cial subordinates, whose subordination was justified on the grounds of
perceived immorality and pathological character and behavior traits.
Attention is directed to attributes of individuals, and deflected from
social group affiliation and history, and structures of inequality. Indi-
viduals comprising the "underclass" are disdained, not for their margi-
nal economic position, but for their race-identified lifestyle and
behavior. Indeed, their existence at the economic margins of society
is accepted as being ordained by behavior, culture, and class.
Because social science explanations for the black "underclass"
depend upon behavior, culture and so-called class characteristics,
these explanations, in tautological fashion, contribute to black pov-
erty. Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman interviewed Chi-
cago employers about their hiring and recruitment practices. They
reported the following regarding the employers' reliance on class and
urban geography:
We found that employers ... used [those categories] to refine the
category of race, which for them is primary. Indeed, it was through
the interaction of race with class and space that these categories
were imbued with new meaning. It was race that made class and
space important to employers.
[E]mployers have become lay social theorists, creating numer-
ous distinctions among the labor force that then serve as bases for
statistical discrimination [the use of group membership as a proxy
for aspects of productivity]. From their own experiences and biases,
those of other employers, and accounts in the mass media, employ-
ers have attributed meaning to the categories of race and ethnicity,
class, and space. These have then become markers of more or less
desirable workers.
These categories were often confounded with each other, as
367. Historically, "poverty" and "underclass" were not as thoroughly racialized as they
are today. But, "the grip of the black underclass on the American imagination serves to
obscure the historical and economic processes that by the late twentieth century produced
a multitude of underclasses, people who were neither black nor residents of Northern cen-
tral cities." Jacqueline Jones, Southern Diaspora: Origins of the Northern "Underclass," in
THE "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE: VIEwS FROM HISTORY 27, 29 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993).
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when one respondent contrasted the white youth (with opportuni-
ties) from the North Shore with the black one (without opportuni-
ties) from the South Side. Although the primary distinction that
more than 70 percent of our informants made was based on race
and ethnicity, it was frequently confounded with class: black and
Hispanic equaled lower class; white equaled middle class. And these
distinctions also overlapped with space: "inner-city" and at times
"Chicago" equaled minority, especially black; "suburb" equaled
white. In fact, race was important in part because it signaled class
and inner-city residence, which are less easy to observe directly.368
Chicago employers identified as undesirable workers who exhib-
ited certain behavior, culture and class characteristics that mirror the
social science description of the "underclass." Commonly listed traits
reportedly included:
unskilled, uneducated, illiterate, dishonest, lacking initiative, unmo-
tivated, involved with drug and gangs, did not understand work, had
no personal charm, were unstable, lacked a work ethic, and had no
family life or role models. 369
As proxies for race, these behavioral, cultural and class character-
istics justify a determination not to hire blacks:
The minority worker is not as punctual and not as concerned about
punctuality as the middle-class white. So they're not as wired to the
clock in keeping time and being on time as someone else who was
raised in a family where the father went to work every day and the
mother was up at the same time every day to make breakfast or go
to work herself. It's just a cultural difference. 370
They [blacks] don't want to work.371
They've [blacks] got an attitude problem.372
Most of them [blacks] are not as educated as you might think. I've
never seen any of these guys read anything outside of a comic book.
These Mexicans are sitting here reading novels constantly, even
though they are in Spanish. These guys will sit and watch cartoons
while the other guys are busy reading. To me that shows basic lazi-
ness. No desire to upgrade yourself.3 73
The association of "poverty" and "underclass" with African-
Americans vitiates legally-protected residential and employment op-
portunities for African-Americans-even those at the upper socioeco-
368. Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But.. .". The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note
265, at 203, 207-09 (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 208.
370. Id. at 209.
371. Id. at 212.
372. Id
373. Id
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nomic echelon-because, as Raymond Franklin states, the middle
layers of white America cannot readily disassociate race and class:
The overrepresentation of black males in the lower classes ... is
intimately associated with race, affecting the status of blacks other
than those in the lower class (middle-income blacks specifically...
The black population is defined by its residential segregation in the
metropolitan area, by its social segregation in other spheres of life,
and by its overcrowding in low-income and relatively unskilled posi-
tions. In the minds of Middle America, race and class become juxta-
posed. In everyday social exchanges, the middle layers of white
America cannot readily dissociate these two phenomena, be they
actual or imagined; whites, therefore, resist entry of middle- and/or
working-class blacks into "their" space (communities, schools,
parks, and places of work) or feel demeaned by working under
black supervision or alongside blacks on equally and personally em-
powered terms. The possibility of middle- or stable working class
blacks integrating on genuine terms with whites of comparable class
positions easily degenerates into race exclusion and put-downs,
even in the absence of class differences. It is often middle-class
black families fleeing black neighborhoods who encounter pure ra-
cial barriers established by middle- and affluent working-class
whites. The Great White Fear is that the marginal entry of middle-
class blacks like themselves will be followed by lower-class black
"hordes" unlike themselves. Thus, income, status, and upward mo-
bility of educated blacks are detrimentally affected because of over-
crowding of blacks in the lowest occupational positions in the
system. Race, therefore, becomes an independently experienced force
determining the status of some portion of the black population who
have the class credentials to integrate. But the race factor, its operative
vitality, is not unrelated to class.3 7 4
The terms "poverty" and "underclass" socially differentiate Afri-
can-Americans from European-Americans because their range of
meanings has been narrowed to an almost exclusive reference to Afri-
can-Americans. European-Americans, regardless of their actual so-
cioeconomic situation, are, at least theoretically, excluded from
"poverty" and the "underclass." "Working class" emerges as the pol-
icy appellation for European-Americans. 375
Use of the term "working class" is no random designation, or
mere descriptive grouping, for European-Americans. Raymond Wil-
liams has traced the origin of the term "working class" to the sociopo-
litical and economic transformations that occurred in the late-
374. FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 139-40 (emphasis added).
375. The term "middle class" is interchangeable with "working class" when used to
denominate European-Americans. The historic relation between "working class" and
"middle class" is discussed infra at note 379.
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eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries (namely, the Ameri-
can and French Revolutions and the Industrial Revolution) and to the
development of an alternative vocabulary for a new sense of individ-
ual mobility in a new social system that created new kinds of social
divisions.3 76
The essential history of the introduction of CLASS, as a word which
would supersede older names for social divisions, relates to the in-
creasing consciousness that social position is made rather than
merely inherited. All the older words, with their essential meta-
phors of standing, stepping and arranging in rows, belong to a soci-
ety in which position was determined by birth. Individual mobility
could be seen as movement from one estate, degree, order or rank to
another. What was changing consciousness was not only increased
individual mobility, which could be largely contained within the
older terms, but the new sense of a society... or a particular social
system which actually created social divisions, including new kinds
of division 3 77 _
As the new vocabulary of class took hold, those who by "useful
labours contribute[d] to the support and maintenance of society"
sought to distinguish themselves from the privileged and the idle by
embracing the term "working classes. ' 378 In addition to implying pro-
ductive or useful activity, "working class" also denoted a fundamental
economic relationship, as opposed to relative social position.379
376. RAYMOND WILL.AMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTUR AND SOCIETY
51-59 (1976).
377. Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
378. Id. at 54.
379. Id. at 56. "Middle classes" emerged alongside "working classes," thus both com-
plicating and confusing the vocabulary of class. According to Williams, each term repre-
sents a separate, yet co-existing, model of class:
middle implied hierarchy and therefore implied LO ER CLASS: not only theoreti-
cally but in repeated practice. On the other hand working implied productive or
useful activity, which would leave all who were not WORKING CLASS unproductive
and useless (easy enough for an aristocracy, but hardly accepted by a productive
MIDDLE C.ASS).... The MMDDLE CLASS ... is an expression of relative social
position and thus of social distinction. The WORKING CLASS... is an expression of
economic relationships. Thus the two common modem class terms rest on differ-
ent models, and the position of those who are conscious of relative social position
and thus of social distinction, and yet, within an economic relationship, sell and
are dependent on their labour, is the point of critical overlap between the models
and the terms. It is absurd to conclude that only the WORKING CLASSES work...,
but if those who work in other than 'manual' labour describe themselves in rela-
tive social position (MIDDLE CLASS) the confusion is inevitable.
I&. at 55-56.
The continuing vitality of these separate, coexisting models of class is evident in David
Halle's study of New Jersey chemical workers. See DAVID HALLE, AMERICA'S WORKING
MAN: WORK, HOME AND POLrICS AMONG BLUE COLLAR PROPERTY OWNERS (1984).
Halle reports that white workers "have two-separate images of their place in the class
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As discussed earlier, the interpretation and meaning of wage
work, and the identity of those performing it during the late-eight-
eenth through mid-nineteenth centuries, involved ideas about race
and the social standing, practices and institutions determined thereby.
When in conflict, evidence of their resolution was found in everyday
speech. Use of the term "white worker," for example, was a semantic
attempt to deal with the limitations on early American individualism
experienced by European-Americans.
Today, like then, the political economy of individualism presents
issues and problems for European-Americans that engender compara-
ble semantic resolution. Rather than continuing the linguistic practice
of modifying "worker" with "white," however, "working class" now
stands unmodified. In an era of racial hegemony (as opposed to out-
right racial domination) any such modification is redundant, and thus
superfluous. So, as Christopher Jencks suggests, a naked "working
class" (or "middle class") is an antonym to the concept of "under-
class. ' 380 There is agreement with Jencks. Christopher Lasch flatly
declares that Americans think of themselves as middle class "if only
because they were doing better than their parents and better, cer-
tainly, than blacks and Hispanics who lived in the 'culture of
poverty.'" 381
Deployed in relation to a discourse about the determinants of Af-
rican-American subordination, use of "working class" fulfills its his-
toric function of distinguishing the productive and useful from the
structure, one referring to life at work (the 'working man'), and one referring to life
outside work (being 'middle class,' or 'lower middle class')." Id. at 228. He continues:
The two images of class ... correspond to the position of workers in the class
structure and reflect the clear difference between experience at work and experi-
ence in the residential setting. The concept of the working man implies, as its
central idea, a moral and empirical distinction between blue-collar workers and
the rest of the class structure. This reflects the fact that in men's work setting
there is a distinction between their situation and that of the white-collar sectors
(though that distinction cannot be pushed too far).
The second image of class clearly expresses the material framework of men's
life outside work. And the various forms in which this second image exists among
those blue-collar workers all have in common a blurring of the middle ranges of
the class structure. Workers usually believe there is a top and a bottom, but the
area in between is vastly increased, and within it blue and white-collar differences
of occupation are muted and of minor importance. This reflects the reality of
men's residential, leisure, and family situation, where such differences in some
ways are blurred.
Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
380. Christopher Jencks, What Is the Underclass-and Is It Growing?, Focus, Spring-
Summer 1989, at 15.
381. LAscH, supra note 14, at 483.
[Vol. 46
unproductive and useless-i.e., those (to be) legitimated by individu-
alistic democratic capitalism and those (to be) marginalized by indi-
vidualistic democratic capitalism. Consider Jonathan Rieder's report
that white ethnics show their hostility to "people on welfare" by con-
trasting parasites and producers.3 82 He attributed the following to the
spokesman for a civic group: "For years, we have witnessed the ap-
peasement of nonproductive and counterproductive 'leeches' at the
expense of New York's middle-class work force. ' '3s3 The spokesman
defined his white constituents as working or middle class by projecting
inutility toward "people on welfare"-people who, in his estimation,
are unworthy of any legitimation, recognition, or appeasement.
Consider also David Halle's observations on the way New Jersey
chemical workers identify themselves.3 4 When asked "What social
class do you think of yourself as belonging to?" these workers chose
"working class" from a possible range of options including "upper
class," "middle class" and "lower class. '' 38s Halle reports that those
who chose the option "working class" did so because they think of
themselves as "working men," a concept which involves a cluster of
related ideas.38 6 Embedded within the concept of the working man is
a notion about who really works in America: "Big business don't
work, they just hire people who do," and "People on welfare aren't
working men, they don't want to work."387 Thus, Halle reports, the
concept of the working man implies as much hostility toward the poor
as toward big business.3 8 Moreover, according to Halle, "one current
underlying this hostility is a tacit racism, an implication that the poor
382. JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARsiE: TiE JEws AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYcNI
AGAINST LmERALISM 101 (1985).
383. ad at 101-02.
384. See HALLE, supra note 379, at 202-19.
385. Id. at 202-04.
386. According to Halle, the "job features" aspect of the concept of the working man
includes the following-
a. Physical work Working men do manual work, physical work, a laboring
work. ("It's hard physical work," "It's working with your hands.")
b. Dangerous or dirty work They are often exposed to physical discomfort
and even danger on the job. ("We get our hands dirty," "We breathe in chemical
fumes.")
c. Boring and routine work Their work is repetitive and monotonous. ("We
do the same thing over and again.")
d. Factory work They work in factories as opposed to offices.
e. Closely supervised work They work under the close direction of supervi-
sors. ("We have to punch in and out," "We're told what to do.")
Id. at 205.
387. Id
388. Id. at 219.
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consist mostly of blacks and Hispanics, and that they are unwilling to
work. ' 389 Thus, the concept of the working man suggests a racial iden-
tity, an unspoken but nonetheless acknowledged identification of
whiteness with work.390
Today's vocabulary of class and the advocacy it engenders pro-
vide a structure within which the racialized tenets of individualistic
democratic capitalism are rearticulated in language that is ostensibly
race-neutral. It provides this structure by offering a description and
analysis of social stratification in terms of the material and the cul-
tural. These material and cultural conditions, in turn, are abstracted
from the sociopolitical dimensions of American life that are deeply
rooted in systems of racial classification and subordination. The un-
stated, but nonetheless evident, assumption is that social stratification
is randomly determined by equal opportunity to economic competi-
tion for all. Any resulting inequality is justified and rendered accepta-
ble with the meritocracy argument.39'
Policymakers should be mindful, however, that social stratifica-
tion under American individualism is not "a random harvest. '392
Race plays a corrosive and pervasive role not only in the creation of
stratification, but also in the social response to, or more accurately,
the social neglect of, stratification. After examining the consequences
of social stratification (substandard housing, poverty, inadequate
health services, crime), Robert Heilbroner asked why the United
States, a nation that could, more easily than any other, afford to re-
move social and economic inequalities, has been among the more lag-
389. Id.
390. Halle reported that blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans who performed the same
work as the Irish, Polish or Italian chemical worker were seen as intruders rather than as
working men or even as Americans. That is, one's racial identity casts doubt on the class
identity of blacks and Hispanics. Id. at 248.
391. Orlando Patterson argues that the liberal equal opportunity doctrine is popular
because human beings need some system of rationalization to explain their lives and their
destinies. Hence, the tendency to reject chance as a major force in the social universe. He
states:
[N]o one likes to think that his or her success is due largely or even partly to luck
or to such intangibles as being in the right place at the right time, having the right
set of contacts, having a nice smile or a 'nice guy' image. Instead, all Ameri-
cans ... like to believe that they got where they are as a result of their intelli-
gence, education, motivation, and hard work.
Orlando Patterson, Inequality, Freedom, and Equal Opportunity, in EQUALrrY AND SO-
CIAL POLICY 15, 28-29 (Walter Feinberg ed., 1978).
392. The term "random harvest" is borrowed from Theodore Lowi. See Lowi, supra
note 135, at 243.
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gard in doing so.393 Heilbroner concluded that "the important role
played by race in the etiology of [social stratification] gives [a] clear-
cut reason why the institutions of capitalism in America have failed to
develop in the same way as in other nations. '394
It is the obvious fact that the persons who suffer most from the
kinds of neglect.., mentioned-residents of the slums, recipients of
welfare payments, the medically deprived, and the inmates of pris-
ons-are disproportionately Negro. This merging of the racial issue
with that of neglect serves as a rationalization for the policies of
inaction that have characterized so much of the American response
to need. Programs to improve slums are seen by many as programs
to "subsidize" Negroes; proposals to improve the conditions of pris-
ons are seen as measures to coddle black criminals; and so on. In
such cases, the fear and resentment of the Negro takes precedence
over all the social problem itself.3 95
Today's vocabulary of class overlooks the inherently racial
dimensions of social stratification that concerned Heilbroner. Today's
vocabulary of class defines the landscape of social relations in terms of
politically, socially and historically unencumbered individuals whose
liberties are given free expression in the market place. Today's vocab-
ulary of class pretends that race has no hold on social relations, that
race has no role in arming market participants with an identity that
predetermines a hierarchy of winners and losers.
Within its general disavowal of the racial aspects of social stratifi-
cation, today's vocabulary of class preserves political rule and power
for European-Americans, beneficiaries of the frontier myth with its
emphasis on individual self-reliance and limited government in the
economic milieu. Rather than an overt consolidation of political rule
and power around race, working (or middle) class status serves as a
substitute anchor.
These insights into the modern race/class debate can reveal to
policymakers the existence of racial bias surrounding the class nomen-
clature and the advocacy it engenders. It is part of a broader policy
discourse in which European-Americans seek to perpetuate a kind of
dominance over racialized minorities, especially African-Ameri-
cans.396 Thus, as currently conceived, class is analytically inadequate
393. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the United States, in Is LAW
DEAD? 288 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971).
394. Id. at 297.
395. Id. at 296.
396. On the policy consequences of European-Americans' efforts to maintain their so-
cial dominance over African-Americans, see Andrew Hacker, The Crackdown on African-
Americans, Tim NATION, July 10, 1995, at 45 (reviewing supposedly race-neutral public
policies that target African-Americans).
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as a basis for policymaking because it engenders policies that tend to
be antithetical to the egalitarian ideal.
An era of racial hegemony requires an analytic construct for poli-
cymaking that historicizes the relations of European-Americans and
African-Americans in the United States. Historicization focuses the
policy agenda not on the pathology of atomized individuals nor even
on socioeconomic schisms within racialized communities. Historiciza-
tion focuses the policy agenda on the saliency of collective identities
acquired in specific ideological contexts.
It is here that the construct I have labelled class comes into play.
By naming that "something which in fact happens (and can be shown
to have happened) in human relationships," class compels policymak-
ers to think in a relational mode-to see African-Americans (and
other racialized minorities) in an historical relationship with Euro-
pean-Americans. It is not simply that class links the historical past to
the present. Class exposes an ongoing struggle between European-
Americans and African-Americans over the socioeconomic composi-
tion of American society-over the very meaning of Americanness.
Class promises to expose how, at least in connection with race, indi-
vidualistic democratic capitalism continually operates-notwithstand-
ing its various incarnations-to disadvantage all African-Americans,
some more than others.
VI. Conclusion
The policy of the United States is to bring the Negro American to
full and equal sharing in the responsibilities and rewards of citizen-
ship. Thirty years after that declaration of policy in the Moynihan
Report, American society is still struggling with how best to make that
policy a reality. American society is having a difficult time making
that policy a reality because the problem has been and still is, as James
Baldwin so eloquently reminds us, that life in America involves a sta-
tus hierarchy with Negroes demarcating the bottom. It is an ugly real-
ity that Americans pretend does not exist.
After a relatively brief experiment with race-consciousness as a
means for leveling the American hierarchy, policymakers now pro-
pose an alternative that upon examination embodies a notion of class
that stops short of its full conceptual limitations. Policymakers could
choose instead the multimodal concept of class-that results from a
dialectical interaction between race and individualism-that focuses
the policy agenda on a process of domination in American history.
American social policy is at a watershed, and the choice is theirs to
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make. Only one choice, however, promises a fuller equality for Afri-
can-Americans in America.

